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An Explanation of Anomalous Behavior in Models of Political Participation
| Citations: | 8 - 1 self |
BibTeX
@MISC{Goeree_anexplanation,
author = {Jacob K. Goeree and Charles A. Holt},
title = { An Explanation of Anomalous Behavior in Models of Political Participation},
year = {}
}
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Abstract
This paper characterizes behavior with “noisy” decision making for models of political interaction characterized by simultaneous binary decisions. Applications include: voting participation games, candidate entry, the volunteer's dilemma, and collective action problems with a contribution threshold. A simple graphical device is used to derive comparative statics and other theoretical properties of a “quantal response” equilibrium, and the resulting predictions are compared with Nash equilibria that arise in the limiting case of no noise. Many anomalous data patterns in laboratory experiments based on these games can be explained in this manner.
Keyphrases
political participation anomalous behavior many anomalous data pattern comparative static political interaction simple graphical device voting participation game noisy decision making limiting case simultaneous binary decision candidate entry theoretical property resulting prediction contribution threshold quantal response equilibrium laboratory experiment collective action problem
