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Dynamic Nonlinear Income Taxation with Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting and No Commitment (2014)
BibTeX
@MISC{Guoy14dynamicnonlinear,
author = {Jang-ting Guoy and Alan Krausez},
title = {Dynamic Nonlinear Income Taxation with Quasi-Hyperbolic Discounting and No Commitment},
year = {2014}
}
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Abstract
This paper examines a dynamic model of nonlinear income taxation in which the government cannot commit to its future tax policy, and individuals are quasi-hyperbolic discounters who cannot commit to future consumption plans. The gov-ernment has both paternalistic and redistributive objectives, and therefore uses its taxation powers to maximize a utilitarian social welfare function that reects in-dividualstrue (long-run) preferences. Under rst-best taxation, quasi-hyperbolic discounting exerts no e¤ect on the level of social welfare attainable. Under second-best taxation, quasi-hyperbolic discounting increases (resp. decreases) the level of social welfare attainable when separating (resp. pooling) taxation is optimal. In stark contrast to previous studies, this result implies that some individuals can actually be better-o ¤ in the long run as a result of their short-run impatience.
Keyphrases
quasi-hyperbolic discounting dynamic nonlinear income taxation social welfare quasi-hyperbolic discounter long run previous study government cannot commit quasi-hyperbolic discounting increase dynamic model consumption plan stark contrast utilitarian social welfare function second-best taxation redistributive objective future tax policy nonlinear income taxation taxation power short-run impatience rst-best taxation
