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Security and Composition of Multi-party Cryptographic Protocols (1998)
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| Venue: | JOURNAL OF CRYPTOLOGY |
| Citations: | 457 - 20 self |
BibTeX
@ARTICLE{Canetti98securityand,
author = {Ran Canetti},
title = {Security and Composition of Multi-party Cryptographic Protocols},
journal = {JOURNAL OF CRYPTOLOGY},
year = {1998},
volume = {13},
pages = {2000}
}
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Abstract
We present general definitions of security for multi-party cryptographic protocols, with focus on the task of evaluating a probabilistic function of the parties' inputs. We show that, with respect to these definitions, security is preserved under a natural composition operation. The definitions follow the general paradigm of known definitions; yet some substantial modifications and simplifications are introduced. The composition operation is the natural `subroutine substitution' operation, formalized by Micali and Rogaway. We consider several standard settings for multi-party protocols, including the cases of eavesdropping, Byzantine, non-adaptive and adaptive adversaries, as well as the information-theoretic and the computational models. In particular, in the computational model we provide the first definition of security of protocols that is shown to be preserved under composition.
Keyphrases
multi-party cryptographic protocol computational model natural composition operation multi-party protocol subroutine substitution general paradigm composition operation known definition general definition substantial modification adaptive adversary probabilistic function first definition several standard setting
