Citation Context

...23], the entropy loss in the fuzzy commitment is much lower than in the fuzzy vault. However, since the fuzzy commitment scheme only tolerates errors that are small with respect to the Hamming metric =-=[13]-=-, sophisticated encoding and signal processing techniques must be applied to compensate spatial rotations and translations of the fingerprint, as well as permutations, detections and insertions of the...

Citation Context

...bit extraction schemes based on quantization, e.g. of Linnartz and Tuyls [16], of Chang et. al. [17], and of Chen et. al. [18], and applications of the fuzzy commitment scheme of Juels and Wattenberg =-=[19]-=- to biometric templates, e.g., the constructions of Martini and Beinlich [20] for fingerprints, of Kevenaar et. al. [21] for face recognition, of Hao et. al. [22] for iris, and of Korte et. al. [23] f...

Citation Context

... fingerprint authentication while preserving the privacy of the biometric features [1]. It belongs to the class of biometric template protection techniques [2], and is based on the fuzzy vault scheme =-=[3]-=- of Juels and Sudan, which applies Reed-Solomon decoding to redundantly bind the biometric template to a randomly selected secret polynomial. Fingerprint authentication is typically based on minutiae,...

Citation Context

...Of course, there could be more complex dependencies between the location of individual minutiae. However, to our knowledge, there are no observations or models implying such dependencies (we refer to =-=[49]-=- for a detailed discussion of this aspect). Using our statistical model, we can show the following result: Theorem 6. If T is chosen according to the random process Select T and the maximum likelihood...

Citation Context

...bit considerably different minutiae placement density functions, and thus, the maximum probability of a minutiae location may differ as well. B. Estimating the number of surplus minutiae According to =-=[4]-=-, a good-quality live-scan fingerprint has 20–70 minutiae. Since f(t, r) decreases with an increasing average number s of minutiae per query fingerprint not matching with genuine minutiae, it might be...

Citation Context

...or which minutiae information is available, we can estimate the entropy of T only by modeling its probability distribution. Several publications have proposed models for minutiae distributions, e.g., =-=[44]-=- and [45]. However, their analysis already takes into consideration the error 153 International Journal on Advances in Security, vol 3 no 3 & 4, year 2010, http://www.iariajournals.org/security/ 2010,...

Citation Context

...rch space for attackers due to the internal structure of the secret. We assume that the hash value does not leak any information; this assumption is frequently used in cryptographic protocol analysis =-=[37]-=-. 7) Selecting the feature space: Subsequently, letM be the set of all possible minutiae and n = |M| the number of possible values for a minutia or chaff point. If the fingerprint images have a resolu...

Citation Context

...ure, for instance, the Biometric Encryption scheme by Soutar et. al. [14], Cancelable Biometrics by Ratha et. al. [15], robust bit extraction schemes based on quantization, e.g. of Linnartz and Tuyls =-=[16]-=-, of Chang et. al. [17], and of Chen et. al. [18], and applications of the fuzzy commitment scheme of Juels and Wattenberg [19] to biometric templates, e.g., the constructions of Martini and Beinlich ...

Citation Context

...siderable challenge to template protection schemes [4]. The fuzzy vault is able to tolerate such errors and, hence, is particularly interesting for minutiae-based authentication. Several publications =-=[5]-=-[6][7][8][9][10] report successful implementation of the fuzzy vault scheme based on minutiae. However, the subsequent publication of efficient attacks [11][12] demonstrates that the parameters propos...

Citation Context

...itment scheme of Juels and Wattenberg [19] to biometric templates, e.g., the constructions of Martini and Beinlich [20] for fingerprints, of Kevenaar et. al. [21] for face recognition, of Hao et. al. =-=[22]-=- for iris, and of Korte et. al. [23] for DNA fingerprints. The fuzzy vault has also been applied to iris recognition, e.g., in [24]. A. The general fuzzy vault scheme The fuzzy vault has been proposed...

Citation Context

... minutiae data, in particular with insertions, deletions, and permutations of minutiae. Whereas the constructions of the fuzzy fingerprint vault in [5], [6], [7] and [10] use minutiae locations only, =-=[8]-=- uses both location and orientation of the minutiae. A somewhat surprising finding is that using minutiae orientations in addition to their locations does not add significant benefit for the privacy p...

Citation Context

... well as permutations, detections and insertions of the detected minutiae. Several promising techniques have been proposed, in particular, usage of fingerprint ridge patterns as biometric feature [20]=-=[56]-=-, transformation of the minutiae data to the frequency domain [57] and using the characteristic vector of minutiae occurrence with respect to a grid [58][59]. However, we are not aware of any comprehe...

Citation Context

... sufficiently correct alignment. Some implementations use topological information of the fingerprint ridge patterns [7][9], while others apply a minutiae matcher algorithm [10][8]. Early proposals [5]=-=[6]-=- even relied on minutiae matching by human experts, which is clearly not practical. We do not impose any assumption on the method used for alignment or the goodness of the relative alignment; instead,...

Citation Context

...], Mihailescu et. al. presented an improved brute force attack and showed that the parameters suggested by Clancy et. al. in [5], and by Uludag and Jain in [7] do not provide the claimed security. In =-=[30]-=-, Scheirer and Boult proposed three new attack methods beyond the scenario of reconstruction of the biometric template from a single vault. The most serious one is a correlation attack, where an attac...

Citation Context

...t is one of many template protection techniques that have been proposed in the literature, for instance, the Biometric Encryption scheme by Soutar et. al. [14], Cancelable Biometrics by Ratha et. al. =-=[15]-=-, robust bit extraction schemes based on quantization, e.g. of Linnartz and Tuyls [16], of Chang et. al. [17], and of Chen et. al. [18], and applications of the fuzzy commitment scheme of Juels and Wa...

Citation Context

...ction criteria was given with respect to security against brute force attacks, and eligible parameters deduced by combining empirical data with analytical and heuristic arguments. Other constructions =-=[27]-=-[28] did not use the absolute location of the minutiae at all, but features deduced from the relative topological structures around the minutiae. These features are stable with respect to orientations...

Citation Context

.... [18], and applications of the fuzzy commitment scheme of Juels and Wattenberg [19] to biometric templates, e.g., the constructions of Martini and Beinlich [20] for fingerprints, of Kevenaar et. al. =-=[21]-=- for face recognition, of Hao et. al. [22] for iris, and of Korte et. al. [23] for DNA fingerprints. The fuzzy vault has also been applied to iris recognition, e.g., in [24]. A. The general fuzzy vaul...

Citation Context

...ble challenge to template protection schemes [4]. The fuzzy vault is able to tolerate such errors and, hence, is particularly interesting for minutiae-based authentication. Several publications [5][6]=-=[7]-=-[8][9][10] report successful implementation of the fuzzy vault scheme based on minutiae. However, the subsequent publication of efficient attacks [11][12] demonstrates that the parameters proposed do ...

Citation Context

...antage that it expresses the (negative logarithm of the) maximum probability of guessing, and thus, can be used to deduct lower bounds on attacks (see Theorem 1). In contrast, some publication, e.g., =-=[39]-=- and [40], use the Shannon entropy H to assess the security of biometric template protection. The use of the Shannon entropy might be appealing due to the rich underlying mathematical theory, which al...

Citation Context

... It is believed to be hard for k < t < √ r(k − 1), and it is known that random instances of this problem are as hard as the worst case [50]. For very large fields sizes, it is known to be NP-complete =-=[51]-=-. For these reasons, it has been repeatedly suggested as a basis for cryptographic constructions [50]. According to [52], two approaches are most efficient for the polynomial reconstruction: Either, a...

Citation Context

...can neglect potential chaff points that are not stored therein. Second, the strong dependencies of a minutia orientation with the corresponding location and with the orientation of other minutiae [33]=-=[34]-=- can facilitate distinction of genuine minutiae from chaff points in the vault. For instance in [8], an example of a vault is depicted, where many points can be visually identified as probable chaff p...

Citation Context

...II. II. Background The fuzzy fingerprint vault is one of many template protection techniques that have been proposed in the literature, for instance, the Biometric Encryption scheme by Soutar et. al. =-=[14]-=-, Cancelable Biometrics by Ratha et. al. [15], robust bit extraction schemes based on quantization, e.g. of Linnartz and Tuyls [16], of Chang et. al. [17], and of Chen et. al. [18], and applications o...

Citation Context

...k was implemented and proved to be very efficient for relevant parameters by Kholmatov and Yanikoglu [31]. A potential countermeasure against the correlation attack was proposed by Nandakumar et. al. =-=[32]-=-. A complete different type of attack was proposed by Chang et. al. [11], which tried to distinguish genuine minutiae in the vault from chaff points by the number of pixels in their proximity with suf...

Citation Context

...ate protection. The use of the Shannon entropy might be appealing due to the rich underlying mathematical theory, which allows to deduct quite impressive results, e.g., see [41]. However, as shown in =-=[42]-=-, the Shannon entropy can, for certain probability distributions, be very insignificant for assessing the minimum attack complexities. In general, the inequality H∞(A) ≤ H(A) holds for any random vari...

Citation Context

...Biometric Encryption scheme by Soutar et. al. [14], Cancelable Biometrics by Ratha et. al. [15], robust bit extraction schemes based on quantization, e.g. of Linnartz and Tuyls [16], of Chang et. al. =-=[17]-=-, and of Chen et. al. [18], and applications of the fuzzy commitment scheme of Juels and Wattenberg [19] to biometric templates, e.g., the constructions of Martini and Beinlich [20] for fingerprints, ...

Citation Context

...sed authentication. Several publications [5][6][7][8][9][10] report successful implementation of the fuzzy vault scheme based on minutiae. However, the subsequent publication of efficient attacks [11]=-=[12]-=- demonstrates that the parameters proposed do not provide adequate security. For the fuzzy vault, theoretical results are known, from which rigid security estimates could be deduced. In particular, Do...

Citation Context

...IA - www.iaria.org oversimplification. There are (at least) two effects resulting in a non-uniform distribution of these probabilities, which are subsequently discussed. Firstly, it has been shown in =-=[11]-=- that since the chaff points are selected after the genuine minutiae in the vault were determined, the average free area (not occupied by the d-spheres Bd(m) of other points) in the proximity of chaff...

Citation Context

...eedSolomon decoding problem or polynomial reconstruction problem. It is believed to be hard for k < t < √ r(k − 1), and it is known that random instances of this problem are as hard as the worst case =-=[50]-=-. For very large fields sizes, it is known to be NP-complete [51]. For these reasons, it has been repeatedly suggested as a basis for cryptographic constructions [50]. According to [52], two approache...

Citation Context

...eve the private data from combining two independently generated vaults of the same user. This attack was implemented and proved to be very efficient for relevant parameters by Kholmatov and Yanikoglu =-=[31]-=-. A potential countermeasure against the correlation attack was proposed by Nandakumar et. al. [32]. A complete different type of attack was proposed by Chang et. al. [11], which tried to distinguish ...

Citation Context

...ngerprint vault, which allows error tolerant fingerprint authentication while preserving the privacy of the biometric features [1]. It belongs to the class of biometric template protection techniques =-=[2]-=-, and is based on the fuzzy vault scheme [3] of Juels and Sudan, which applies Reed-Solomon decoding to redundantly bind the biometric template to a randomly selected secret polynomial. Fingerprint au...

Citation Context

...re stable with respect to orientations, and in the case of [28], even of translations. The FAR and GAR values reported in [28] are better than those from [8] at the cost of a larger template size. In =-=[29]-=-, Nagar et. al. propose a combination of the fuzzy fingerprint vault and the fuzzy commitment scheme. The fuzzy commitment scheme is used to individually protect the ordinate values in the vault corre...

Citation Context

...e by Soutar et. al. [14], Cancelable Biometrics by Ratha et. al. [15], robust bit extraction schemes based on quantization, e.g. of Linnartz and Tuyls [16], of Chang et. al. [17], and of Chen et. al. =-=[18]-=-, and applications of the fuzzy commitment scheme of Juels and Wattenberg [19] to biometric templates, e.g., the constructions of Martini and Beinlich [20] for fingerprints, of Kevenaar et. al. [21] f...

Citation Context

...rints, of Kevenaar et. al. [21] for face recognition, of Hao et. al. [22] for iris, and of Korte et. al. [23] for DNA fingerprints. The fuzzy vault has also been applied to iris recognition, e.g., in =-=[24]-=-. A. The general fuzzy vault scheme The fuzzy vault has been proposed by Juels and Sudan in [3] and [25]. It is an error tolerant authentication scheme based on the set of private attributes m1, . . ....

Citation Context

...at it expresses the (negative logarithm of the) maximum probability of guessing, and thus, can be used to deduct lower bounds on attacks (see Theorem 1). In contrast, some publication, e.g., [39] and =-=[40]-=-, use the Shannon entropy H to assess the security of biometric template protection. The use of the Shannon entropy might be appealing due to the rich underlying mathematical theory, which allows to d...

Citation Context

...security of biometric template protection. The use of the Shannon entropy might be appealing due to the rich underlying mathematical theory, which allows to deduct quite impressive results, e.g., see =-=[41]-=-. However, as shown in [42], the Shannon entropy can, for certain probability distributions, be very insignificant for assessing the minimum attack complexities. In general, the inequality H∞(A) ≤ H(A...

Citation Context

...ing on the method, by which minutiae correspondences are identified and the matching tolerance applied. For instance, the distribution of the distance of matching minutiae reported in literature (see =-=[55]-=-) implies that a tolerance (with respect to Euclidean distance) of δ < 10 will significantly reduce the match rates. The presence of chaff points will further reduce the performance of minutiae matche...

Citation Context

...us, can neglect potential chaff points that are not stored therein. Second, the strong dependencies of a minutia orientation with the corresponding location and with the orientation of other minutiae =-=[33]-=-[34] can facilitate distinction of genuine minutiae from chaff points in the vault. For instance in [8], an example of a vault is depicted, where many points can be visually identified as probable cha...

Citation Context

...enge to template protection schemes [4]. The fuzzy vault is able to tolerate such errors and, hence, is particularly interesting for minutiae-based authentication. Several publications [5][6][7][8][9]=-=[10]-=- report successful implementation of the fuzzy vault scheme based on minutiae. However, the subsequent publication of efficient attacks [11][12] demonstrates that the parameters proposed do not provid...

Citation Context

...the worst case [50]. For very large fields sizes, it is known to be NP-complete [51]. For these reasons, it has been repeatedly suggested as a basis for cryptographic constructions [50]. According to =-=[52]-=-, two approaches are most efficient for the polynomial reconstruction: Either, after guessing k genuine minutiae, the polynomial is reconstructed using polynomial interpolation, e.g., by Lagrange inte...

Citation Context

... [23] for DNA fingerprints. The fuzzy vault has also been applied to iris recognition, e.g., in [24]. A. The general fuzzy vault scheme The fuzzy vault has been proposed by Juels and Sudan in [3] and =-=[25]-=-. It is an error tolerant authentication scheme based on the set of private attributes m1, . . . ,mt, e.g., biometric feature data. While the reference data stored (the vault) allows performing the au...

Citation Context

...n criteria was given with respect to security against brute force attacks, and eligible parameters deduced by combining empirical data with analytical and heuristic arguments. Other constructions [27]=-=[28]-=- did not use the absolute location of the minutiae at all, but features deduced from the relative topological structures around the minutiae. These features are stable with respect to orientations, an...

Citation Context

...xcept that they have the minimum distance d. Although it is known that minutiae tend to overdisperse on a small scale (precisely, between 11 and 20 pixels for 500 dpi) and to cluster on a large scale =-=[46]-=-. The overdispersion on a small scale can be partially explained by minimum distances typically enforced by minutiae extraction algorithms to avoid ambiguous results, e.g., see [47], but in [46] biolo...

Citation Context

...y upper bounds the probability of any attack. Therefore, we can state the following result, which was presented already - for a larger class of schemes and using different mathematical notations - in =-=[43]-=-. Theorem 3. H̃∞(P |Y ) ≤ − log (FAR). Theorem 3 implies that the information content of a cryptographic key extracted from P cannot exceed − log (FAR). In [35], this conclusion was drawn for arbitrar...

Citation Context

... the query fingerprint with respect to the minutiae in the vault. To accomplish this, either vertical alignment of the fingerprints prior to minutiae extraction , e.g., using singular point detection =-=[38]-=-, 150 International Journal on Advances in Security, vol 3 no 3 & 4, year 2010, http://www.iariajournals.org/security/ 2010, © Copyright by authors, Published under agreement with IARIA - www.iaria.or...

Citation Context

...dent from the number f of fingers used for the fuzzy vault, as both ψ and n scale linearly with f . We stress that our estimate is valid for minutiae extracted with the MINDTCT algorithm. As shown in =-=[54]-=-, other feature extractors exhibit considerably different minutiae placement density functions, and thus, the maximum probability of a minutiae location may differ as well. B. Estimating the number of...

Citation Context

...g [19] to biometric templates, e.g., the constructions of Martini and Beinlich [20] for fingerprints, of Kevenaar et. al. [21] for face recognition, of Hao et. al. [22] for iris, and of Korte et. al. =-=[23]-=- for DNA fingerprints. The fuzzy vault has also been applied to iris recognition, e.g., in [24]. A. The general fuzzy vault scheme The fuzzy vault has been proposed by Juels and Sudan in [3] and [25]....

Citation Context

.... One of the most prominent solutions to solve this issue is the fuzzy fingerprint vault, which allows error tolerant fingerprint authentication while preserving the privacy of the biometric features =-=[1]-=-. It belongs to the class of biometric template protection techniques [2], and is based on the fuzzy vault scheme [3] of Juels and Sudan, which applies Reed-Solomon decoding to redundantly bind the bi...

Citation Context

..., of Chang et. al. [17], and of Chen et. al. [18], and applications of the fuzzy commitment scheme of Juels and Wattenberg [19] to biometric templates, e.g., the constructions of Martini and Beinlich =-=[20]-=- for fingerprints, of Kevenaar et. al. [21] for face recognition, of Hao et. al. [22] for iris, and of Korte et. al. [23] for DNA fingerprints. The fuzzy vault has also been applied to iris recognitio...

Citation Context

...the minutiae in the vault are identified in the query fingerprints (the minutiae match rate), which in turn depends on the alignment of these minutiae sets. 4) Combining several fingers: According to =-=[35]-=-, the minutiae of a single finger do not provide sufficient entropy to extract a secure cryptographic key. Therefore, we allow to use minutiae from more than one finger. The minutiae of the different ...

Citation Context

...pyright by authors, Published under agreement with IARIA - www.iaria.org discussion on approaches for multi-instance fusion in template protection schemes and implications to security can be found in =-=[36]-=-. Since we allow the biometric templates to be taken from several fingers of a person, the minutiae, and likewise, the chaff points, are not only represented by their location but also by the finger c...

Citation Context

...mall scale can be partially explained by minimum distances typically enforced by minutiae extraction algorithms to avoid ambiguous results, e.g., see [47], but in [46] biological arguments taken from =-=[48]-=- are used. Due to the enforcement of a minimum distance d during template selection this effect is in line with our model, at least for sufficiently large d. Furthermore, the overdispersion reported i...