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...ptance of emerging IT systemssand applications based on them. Automated Validation of Trust and Securitysof Service-oriented Architectures 01/01/2008 36 FP7-ICT-2007-1 216471 AVANTSSAR Project number =-=(1)-=-sProject acronym (2) ICT-1-1.4 ICT-2007.1.2 ICT-2007.1.1 Service-Oriented Architectures. Secure and dependable infrastructures. Web Services. Trust.sSecurity. Policies. Obligations. Orchestration. For...

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...October 17, 2007 AVANTSSAR, project no. 216471 39 Data abstraction: In the analysis of security protocols, data abstraction has been used to verify protocols for an unbounded number of sessions, e.g. =-=[69, 74, 78, 103, 131, 182, 233]-=-, mapping the infinite set of fresh data created during the sessions to a finite set, and giving sufficient conditions such that this abstraction is correct [79]. For the analysis of services, we plan...

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...ther. Still, most currently existing security solutions are limited to protecting applications within a single security context. Moreover, the messagepassing nature of interactions ofWeb Services (WS =-=[8, 234]-=-) and of other security-sensitive services increases their vulnerability: even assuming that the cryptographic primitives work correctly (that is, the system cannot be attacked exploiting weaknesses o...

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... of the intruder deduction techniques we have employed in [98]. Resolution of structural constraints. In addition to the techniques above, we will explore an approach relying on automata-based models =-=[57, 192]-=- or Petri nets [200] of Web Services. To this end, service message contents will be abstracted away. The satisfiability problem of a ASLan specification in this setting corresponds to the synthesis of...

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...ty, software engineering, formal methods (logics, model-checking, and theorem-proving) and application of semi-automated formal methods to distributed systems and security protocols and systems, e.g. =-=[3, 11, 35, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 49, 50, 51, 52, 81, 112, 113, 9, 82, 83, 84, 142, 143, 147, 114, 214, 227]-=-. Key Staff Prof. Dr. David Basin (http://www.inf.ethz.ch/∼basin) is a full professor and has the chair for Information Security at ETH Zurich’s Department of Computer Science since January 2003. He i...

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...alysis of security protocols, the basic components of security-sensitive services, has been widely studied and several analysis tools with different degrees of automation have been developed (see e.g =-=[70, 71, 114, 176, 179, 123, 205]-=-). This includes the industrial-strength technology of some of the project partners, the AVISPA Tool for protocol analysis [30] (developed in the context of the EU Project AVISPA “Automated Validation...

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...dations and development and implementation of formal reasoning techniques for the specification and verification of protocols, services, and systems for information security and mobile networks, e.g. =-=[3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 35, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 120, 121, 143, 144, 145, 161, 177, 178, 227, 228]-=-. Key Staff Prof. Dr. Luca Viganò (http://profs.sci.univr.it/∼vigano) received his Ph.D. in Computer Science from the University of Saarbrücken, Germany, in 1997, and his Habilitation in Computer Sc...

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...d through ASLan have to be carefully designed to allow for describing the different aspects, abstraction levels and relations. ASLan thus provides a significant extension to existing policy languages =-=[116, 2, 154, 235]-=-, and will be the first language to allow for comprehensive specifications of all aspects related to service security. FP7-ICT-2007-1 October 17, 2007 AVANTSSAR, project no. 216471 36 WP 3: Automated ...

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...rmit such an implementation, we plan to employ other techniques from automatic control theory [196] to automatically synthesise services in this abstraction. Existing algorithms for automatic control =-=[29, 128]-=- provide effective decision procedures in a general setting. We will develop methods based on these general techniques but dedicated and tailored to the specific case of the constraints imposed on ser...

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...e combination of trust and security policies and protocols. In particular, while initial work has been carried out on the automatic composition of security policies or requirements for services (e.g. =-=[192, 225, 56, 63]-=-), none of these approaches has sufficient coverage for our purposes, and major questions remain unanswered. As we already remarked above, the same holds, for example, also to the security analysis of...

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...eir implementation in the AVANTSSAR platform (WP 4). Expertise: Automated Reasoning and Model Checking of Software and Protocols The UGDIST group has a long history of research in Automated Reasoning =-=[23, 133, 28, 16, 25, 26, 27, 14]-=- and its application to model checking of software [12, 24, 13] and of security protocols [19, 22, 18, 11, 15, 20]. In particular, the group has shown how protocol insecurity can be reduced to an AI p...

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...t we will discuss in Section B3 (such as the SENSORIA project and the NESSI Open Framework), the project that is most closely related to AVANTSSAR is the Samoa project at Microsoft Research Cambridge =-=[64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 136]-=-. This approach exploits recent advances in the analysis of security protocols in the practical setting of XML Web Services. Samoa proposes a logic-based approach to checking SOAP-based protocols base...

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...dations and development and implementation of formal reasoning techniques for the specification and verification of protocols, services, and systems for information security and mobile networks, e.g. =-=[3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 35, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 120, 121, 143, 144, 145, 161, 177, 178, 227, 228]-=-. Key Staff Prof. Dr. Luca Viganò (http://profs.sci.univr.it/∼vigano) received his Ph.D. in Computer Science from the University of Saarbrücken, Germany, in 1997, and his Habilitation in Computer Sc...

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...tials. Note that for the case of dynamic service composition these communication protocols have to be generated at runtime and existing trust negotiation systems do not support this runtime synthesis =-=[75, 237, 60, 184, 213, 167]-=-. Since many security mechanisms are implemented using cryptographic techniques, our work will benefit from the experience and the efficient analysis methods for cryptographic protocols that we have a...

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...and Model Checking of Software and Protocols The UGDIST group has a long history of research in Automated Reasoning [23, 133, 28, 16, 25, 26, 27, 14] and its application to model checking of software =-=[12, 24, 13]-=- and of security protocols [19, 22, 18, 11, 15, 20]. In particular, the group has shown how protocol insecurity can be reduced to an AI planning problem and, in turn, to a sequence of SAT problems whi...

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...ocols The UGDIST group has a long history of research in Automated Reasoning [23, 133, 28, 16, 25, 26, 27, 14] and its application to model checking of software [12, 24, 13] and of security protocols =-=[19, 22, 18, 11, 15, 20]-=-. In particular, the group has shown how protocol insecurity can be reduced to an AI planning problem and, in turn, to a sequence of SAT problems which can be solved by means of state-of-the-art SAT s...

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...Oriented Architectures The security and cryptography group has experience in the design and analysis of security-sensitive algorithms, protocols, and service-oriented architectures and their policies =-=[37, 88, 87, 150, 159]-=-. The experience in security covers the entire range from computational reasoning in cryptography to the formal analysis of systems [11, 35, 49, 50, 51, 143, 144], including work to bridge the gap bet...

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...e combination of trust and security policies and protocols. In particular, while initial work has been carried out on the automatic composition of security policies or requirements for services (e.g. =-=[192, 225, 56, 63]-=-), none of these approaches has sufficient coverage for our purposes, and major questions remain unanswered. As we already remarked above, the same holds, for example, also to the security analysis of...

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...t we will discuss in Section B3 (such as the SENSORIA project and the NESSI Open Framework), the project that is most closely related to AVANTSSAR is the Samoa project at Microsoft Research Cambridge =-=[64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 136]-=-. This approach exploits recent advances in the analysis of security protocols in the practical setting of XML Web Services. Samoa proposes a logic-based approach to checking SOAP-based protocols base...

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...t we will discuss in Section B3 (such as the SENSORIA project and the NESSI Open Framework), the project that is most closely related to AVANTSSAR is the Samoa project at Microsoft Research Cambridge =-=[64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 136]-=-. This approach exploits recent advances in the analysis of security protocols in the practical setting of XML Web Services. Samoa proposes a logic-based approach to checking SOAP-based protocols base...

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... general, these properties are difficult to verify with automated tools. But some experiments have been successful performed using Murphi in [218] and using AVISPA’s back-ends OFMC in [141] and SATMC =-=[15]-=- (see also [217]). There is also a possibility to get automated proofs for such properties thanks to recent results in [155] that give a complete verification algorithm for contract signing protocols ...

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...dations and development and implementation of formal reasoning techniques for the specification and verification of protocols, services, and systems for information security and mobile networks, e.g. =-=[3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 35, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 120, 121, 143, 144, 145, 161, 177, 178, 227, 228]-=-. Key Staff Prof. Dr. Luca Viganò (http://profs.sci.univr.it/∼vigano) received his Ph.D. in Computer Science from the University of Saarbrücken, Germany, in 1997, and his Habilitation in Computer Sc...

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... entire range from computational reasoning in cryptography to the formal analysis of systems [11, 35, 49, 50, 51, 143, 144], including work to bridge the gap between these different views of security =-=[36, 38, 220]-=-. Key Staff Dr. Birgit Pfitzmann (http://www.zurich.ibm.com/∼bpf/) is a senior research staff member of IBM Research at the Zurich Research Lab. Birgit Pfitzmann joined IBM in 2001. Since then she con...

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...t we will discuss in Section B3 (such as the SENSORIA project and the NESSI Open Framework), the project that is most closely related to AVANTSSAR is the Samoa project at Microsoft Research Cambridge =-=[64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 136]-=-. This approach exploits recent advances in the analysis of security protocols in the practical setting of XML Web Services. Samoa proposes a logic-based approach to checking SOAP-based protocols base...

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...eir implementation in the AVANTSSAR platform (WP 4). Expertise: Automated Reasoning and Model Checking of Software and Protocols The UGDIST group has a long history of research in Automated Reasoning =-=[23, 133, 28, 16, 25, 26, 27, 14]-=- and its application to model checking of software [12, 24, 13] and of security protocols [19, 22, 18, 11, 15, 20]. In particular, the group has shown how protocol insecurity can be reduced to an AI p...

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...t we will discuss in Section B3 (such as the SENSORIA project and the NESSI Open Framework), the project that is most closely related to AVANTSSAR is the Samoa project at Microsoft Research Cambridge =-=[64, 65, 66, 67, 68, 136]-=-. This approach exploits recent advances in the analysis of security protocols in the practical setting of XML Web Services. Samoa proposes a logic-based approach to checking SOAP-based protocols base...

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...eir implementation in the AVANTSSAR platform (WP 4). Expertise: Automated Reasoning and Model Checking of Software and Protocols The UGDIST group has a long history of research in Automated Reasoning =-=[23, 133, 28, 16, 25, 26, 27, 14]-=- and its application to model checking of software [12, 24, 13] and of security protocols [19, 22, 18, 11, 15, 20]. In particular, the group has shown how protocol insecurity can be reduced to an AI p...

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...ty, software engineering, formal methods (logics, model-checking, and theorem-proving) and application of semi-automated formal methods to distributed systems and security protocols and systems, e.g. =-=[3, 11, 35, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 49, 50, 51, 52, 81, 112, 113, 9, 82, 83, 84, 142, 143, 147, 114, 214, 227]-=-. Key Staff Prof. Dr. David Basin (http://www.inf.ethz.ch/∼basin) is a full professor and has the chair for Information Security at ETH Zurich’s Department of Computer Science since January 2003. He i...

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...k was distinguished by an AFIF national award. Since 2005 he is researcher at INRIA (Nancy). His researches focuses on theoretical and practical aspects of the verification of cryptographic protocols =-=[204, 97, 33]-=-. Dr. Laurent Vigneron (http://www.loria.fr/∼vigneron) is an assistant professor at the University Nancy 2 since 1997, and works at LORIA. He received his Ph.D. from University of Nancy in 1994, and h...

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...titled to call S1. Thus, language constructs are needed to express the possibility of policy change over time. Obligations. Another example of policy implementation occurs with respect to obligations =-=[62, 148, 41, 223]-=- imposed on a user after a resource has been utilised. Consider a requirement on logging particular events for a composed service that is expressed by a policy stating which events have to be logged u...

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...ocols The UGDIST group has a long history of research in Automated Reasoning [23, 133, 28, 16, 25, 26, 27, 14] and its application to model checking of software [12, 24, 13] and of security protocols =-=[19, 22, 18, 11, 15, 20]-=-. In particular, the group has shown how protocol insecurity can be reduced to an AI planning problem and, in turn, to a sequence of SAT problems which can be solved by means of state-of-the-art SAT s...

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...for the automated analysis of services whose operations may often be independent. POR has already been employed by project members together with symbolic techniques in cryptographic protocol analysis =-=[49]-=-. Our second task will be to integrate the different attacker models that will be developed in WP 3.3 into a unified attacker model against which we will assess the security of a composed service. We ...

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...eir implementation in the AVANTSSAR platform (WP 4). Expertise: Automated Reasoning and Model Checking of Software and Protocols The UGDIST group has a long history of research in Automated Reasoning =-=[23, 133, 28, 16, 25, 26, 27, 14]-=- and its application to model checking of software [12, 24, 13] and of security protocols [19, 22, 18, 11, 15, 20]. In particular, the group has shown how protocol insecurity can be reduced to an AI p...

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...3.2 will permit to glue these attacker models into a unified threat model. In the last few years the Dolev-Yao model has been extended to take into account the properties of lowlevel primitives (e.g. =-=[110, 118, 166, 50, 97, 93, 100]-=-). These extensions are however insufficient to address the problems we will tackle in this proposal [34]. We list now some of the extensions that will be needed: FP7-ICT-2007-1 October 17, 2007 AVANT...

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...gely outside the scope of state-of-the-art technologies. Besides the recent application of standard techniques such as model-checking to the formal analysis of security systems and Web Services (e.g. =-=[34, 35, 130, 150, 206]-=-), and aside from other related work that we will discuss in Section B3 (such as the SENSORIA project and the NESSI Open Framework), the project that is most closely related to AVANTSSAR is the Samoa ...

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...ocols The UGDIST group has a long history of research in Automated Reasoning [23, 133, 28, 16, 25, 26, 27, 14] and its application to model checking of software [12, 24, 13] and of security protocols =-=[19, 22, 18, 11, 15, 20]-=-. In particular, the group has shown how protocol insecurity can be reduced to an AI planning problem and, in turn, to a sequence of SAT problems which can be solved by means of state-of-the-art SAT s...

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...ce they might be critical for many application, e.g. healthcare, certificate validity period, and the like. This may require an extension of the satisfiability procedures of WP 3.1 (see, for example, =-=[54]-=-). 2. The TS Orchestrator will then apply a synthesis algorithm in order to build on-the-fly the protocols for exchanging the credentials required to comply with the respective policies of the compone...

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..., by introducing a refinement layer and refining a service call to a directory service call with dynamic binding. We will address modelling issues for which there is currently little work so far (cf. =-=[55, 192, 63]-=-), such as modelling service disruption or reconfiguration of the service infrastructure. Along the way we will address provisions for changing services that are already present, as a change in the se...

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...dations and development and implementation of formal reasoning techniques for the specification and verification of protocols, services, and systems for information security and mobile networks, e.g. =-=[3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 35, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 120, 121, 143, 144, 145, 161, 177, 178, 227, 228]-=-. Key Staff Prof. Dr. Luca Viganò (http://profs.sci.univr.it/∼vigano) received his Ph.D. in Computer Science from the University of Saarbrücken, Germany, in 1997, and his Habilitation in Computer Sc...

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...problems such as these, AVANTSSAR will go beyond mere extension and optimisation of existing methods. As a central issue, we will develop novel compositional reasoning techniques based on recent work =-=[9]-=- that gives sufficient, automatically verifiable conditions for protocols not to interfere at the network level, and includes the development of decomposition techniques that detect component services...

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...and Model Checking of Software and Protocols The UGDIST group has a long history of research in Automated Reasoning [23, 133, 28, 16, 25, 26, 27, 14] and its application to model checking of software =-=[12, 24, 13]-=- and of security protocols [19, 22, 18, 11, 15, 20]. In particular, the group has shown how protocol insecurity can be reduced to an AI planning problem and, in turn, to a sequence of SAT problems whi...

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...ty, software engineering, formal methods (logics, model-checking, and theorem-proving) and application of semi-automated formal methods to distributed systems and security protocols and systems, e.g. =-=[3, 11, 35, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 49, 50, 51, 52, 81, 112, 113, 9, 82, 83, 84, 142, 143, 147, 114, 214, 227]-=-. Key Staff Prof. Dr. David Basin (http://www.inf.ethz.ch/∼basin) is a full professor and has the chair for Information Security at ETH Zurich’s Department of Computer Science since January 2003. He i...

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...ty, software engineering, formal methods (logics, model-checking, and theorem-proving) and application of semi-automated formal methods to distributed systems and security protocols and systems, e.g. =-=[3, 11, 35, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 49, 50, 51, 52, 81, 112, 113, 9, 82, 83, 84, 142, 143, 147, 114, 214, 227]-=-. Key Staff Prof. Dr. David Basin (http://www.inf.ethz.ch/∼basin) is a full professor and has the chair for Information Security at ETH Zurich’s Department of Computer Science since January 2003. He i...

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...alysis of security protocols, the basic components of security-sensitive services, has been widely studied and several analysis tools with different degrees of automation have been developed (see e.g =-=[70, 71, 114, 176, 179, 123, 205]-=-). This includes the industrial-strength technology of some of the project partners, the AVISPA Tool for protocol analysis [30] (developed in the context of the EU Project AVISPA “Automated Validation...

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...eir implementation in the AVANTSSAR platform (WP 4). Expertise: Automated Reasoning and Model Checking of Software and Protocols The UGDIST group has a long history of research in Automated Reasoning =-=[23, 133, 28, 16, 25, 26, 27, 14]-=- and its application to model checking of software [12, 24, 13] and of security protocols [19, 22, 18, 11, 15, 20]. In particular, the group has shown how protocol insecurity can be reduced to an AI p...

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...dations and development and implementation of formal reasoning techniques for the specification and verification of protocols, services, and systems for information security and mobile networks, e.g. =-=[3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 35, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 120, 121, 143, 144, 145, 161, 177, 178, 227, 228]-=-. Key Staff Prof. Dr. Luca Viganò (http://profs.sci.univr.it/∼vigano) received his Ph.D. in Computer Science from the University of Saarbrücken, Germany, in 1997, and his Habilitation in Computer Sc...

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...ocols The UGDIST group has a long history of research in Automated Reasoning [23, 133, 28, 16, 25, 26, 27, 14] and its application to model checking of software [12, 24, 13] and of security protocols =-=[19, 22, 18, 11, 15, 20]-=-. In particular, the group has shown how protocol insecurity can be reduced to an AI planning problem and, in turn, to a sequence of SAT problems which can be solved by means of state-of-the-art SAT s...

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...eir implementation in the AVANTSSAR platform (WP 4). Expertise: Automated Reasoning and Model Checking of Software and Protocols The UGDIST group has a long history of research in Automated Reasoning =-=[23, 133, 28, 16, 25, 26, 27, 14]-=- and its application to model checking of software [12, 24, 13] and of security protocols [19, 22, 18, 11, 15, 20]. In particular, the group has shown how protocol insecurity can be reduced to an AI p...

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...gely outside the scope of state-of-the-art technologies. Besides the recent application of standard techniques such as model-checking to the formal analysis of security systems and Web Services (e.g. =-=[34, 35, 130, 150, 206]-=-), and aside from other related work that we will discuss in Section B3 (such as the SENSORIA project and the NESSI Open Framework), the project that is most closely related to AVANTSSAR is the Samoa ...

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...ty, software engineering, formal methods (logics, model-checking, and theorem-proving) and application of semi-automated formal methods to distributed systems and security protocols and systems, e.g. =-=[3, 11, 35, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 49, 50, 51, 52, 81, 112, 113, 9, 82, 83, 84, 142, 143, 147, 114, 214, 227]-=-. Key Staff Prof. Dr. David Basin (http://www.inf.ethz.ch/∼basin) is a full professor and has the chair for Information Security at ETH Zurich’s Department of Computer Science since January 2003. He i...

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... Springer. [15] A. Armando, R. Carbone and L. Compagna. LTL Model Checking for Security Protocols. In the Proceedings of the 20th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Symposium (CSF20), Springer, 2007. =-=[17]-=- A. Armando, C. Castellini, E. Giunchiglia, and M. Maratea. The SAT-based approach to separation logic. Journal of Automated Reasoning, pages 1–27, 2006. [13] A. Armando, M. Benerecetti, and J. Mantov...

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...ty, software engineering, formal methods (logics, model-checking, and theorem-proving) and application of semi-automated formal methods to distributed systems and security protocols and systems, e.g. =-=[3, 11, 35, 42, 43, 44, 45, 46, 47, 49, 50, 51, 52, 81, 112, 113, 9, 82, 83, 84, 142, 143, 147, 114, 214, 227]-=-. Key Staff Prof. Dr. David Basin (http://www.inf.ethz.ch/∼basin) is a full professor and has the chair for Information Security at ETH Zurich’s Department of Computer Science since January 2003. He i...

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...dations and development and implementation of formal reasoning techniques for the specification and verification of protocols, services, and systems for information security and mobile networks, e.g. =-=[3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 35, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 120, 121, 143, 144, 145, 161, 177, 178, 227, 228]-=-. Key Staff Prof. Dr. Luca Viganò (http://profs.sci.univr.it/∼vigano) received his Ph.D. in Computer Science from the University of Saarbrücken, Germany, in 1997, and his Habilitation in Computer Sc...

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...dations and development and implementation of formal reasoning techniques for the specification and verification of protocols, services, and systems for information security and mobile networks, e.g. =-=[3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 35, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 120, 121, 143, 144, 145, 161, 177, 178, 227, 228]-=-. Key Staff Prof. Dr. Luca Viganò (http://profs.sci.univr.it/∼vigano) received his Ph.D. in Computer Science from the University of Saarbrücken, Germany, in 1997, and his Habilitation in Computer Sc...

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...on platform (WP 4). Expertise: Theoretical Foundations and Automated Tools for Security Analysis The Cassis group at INRIA has a strong, internationally acknowledged experience in automated deduction =-=[32, 108, 202, 230, 229, 231]-=- and security analysis [204, 92, 111, 152, 11]. Dr. Rusinowitch is the head of the Cassis group and has participated as site leader in the FET Open Project IST-2001-39252 AVISPA [30]. Key Staff Dr. Mi...

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...g, and abstraction in software verification. IeAT plans to support one PhD student for the full duration of the project and hire one post-doc starting with the second year. Five relevant publications =-=[53]-=- D. Beauquier, M. Duflot, M. Minea. A probabilistic property-specific approach to information flow. In Mathematical Methods, Models, and Architectures for Computer Network Security. 3rd International ...

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...dations and development and implementation of formal reasoning techniques for the specification and verification of protocols, services, and systems for information security and mobile networks, e.g. =-=[3, 4, 5, 6, 7, 10, 11, 35, 48, 49, 50, 51, 52, 82, 83, 84, 85, 86, 120, 121, 143, 144, 145, 161, 177, 178, 227, 228]-=-. Key Staff Prof. Dr. Luca Viganò (http://profs.sci.univr.it/∼vigano) received his Ph.D. in Computer Science from the University of Saarbrücken, Germany, in 1997, and his Habilitation in Computer Sc...

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...itional dynamic logic with intersection, that permits to express parallelism, and on deontic logic, that permits to express norms. This work has lead to the definition of a logic for privacy policies =-=[2, 39, 41]-=-. Team member Y. Chevalier has previously worked within the AVISPA project on the automated analysis of cryptographic protocols [102, 101, 104, 10, 92, 96, 95, 94, 99, 11]. Since June 2006, he collabo...

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...i nets. UPS-IRIT will hire two PhD students and one Post-doc student (for one year) to work on the project. Five relevant publications FP7-ICT-2007-1 October 17, 2007 AVANTSSAR, project no. 216471 93 =-=[40]-=- P. Balbiani and F. Cheikh. Safety problems in access control with temporal constraints. InMMM-ACNS, vol. 3685 of LNCS, pp. 165–178. Springer, 2005. [41] P. Balbiani, Y. Chevalier, and M. Kourjieh. Re...

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...titled to call S1. Thus, language constructs are needed to express the possibility of policy change over time. Obligations. Another example of policy implementation occurs with respect to obligations =-=[62, 148, 41, 223]-=- imposed on a user after a resource has been utilised. Consider a requirement on logging particular events for a composed service that is expressed by a policy stating which events have to be logged u...

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...n among Clients and Partners. OPENTRUST will hire a new engineer or Ph.D. student for working on AVANTSSAR. FP7-ICT-2007-1 October 17, 2007 AVANTSSAR, project no. 216471 99 Five relevant publications =-=[72]-=- L. Bloch, C. Wolfhugel, N. Makarevitch, C. Queinnec, and H. Schauer. Securite Informatique, Eyrolles Edition, 2006. [162] M. F. Krafft, R. Hertzog, R. Mas, and N. Makarevitch. Debian, administration ...