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## Private computation of spatial and temporal power consumption with smart meters

Venue: | in Proc. Int. Conf. Applied Cryptography Network Security, 2012 |

Citations: | 14 - 0 self |

### Citations

1007 | Public-Key Cryptosystems Based on Composite Degree Residue Classes
- Paillier
- 1999
(Show Context)
Citation Context ... by incorporating zero-knowledge proofs to show that measurements are within a certain sensible range [4]. 566 Z. Erkin and G. Tsudik 3.4 Homomorphic Encryption The Paillier cryptosystem presented in =-=[17]-=- is additively homomorphic. This means that there exists an operation over the ciphertexts Epk (m1) and Epk (m2) such that the result of that operation corresponds to a new ciphertext whose decryption... |

169 |
The Foundations of Cryptography, Basic Applications
- Goldreich
- 2004
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...d Danezis [14] propose a mechanism for privacy-preserving billing in a smart grid by using homomorphic encryption, secure multi-party computation (MPC) techniques and cryptographic commitment schemes =-=[13]-=-. It requires the use of certificates to obtain accountability. Since it involves heavy-weight cryptographic tools – such as MPC – the cost of this scheme is very high. In a recent result, Shi et al. ... |

166 | Efficient proofs that a committed number lies in an interval. In:
- Boudot
- 2000
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...y are more relevant to security rather than privacy. Also, some pollution attacks can be addressed by incorporating zero-knowledge proofs to show that measurements are within a certain sensible range =-=[4]-=-. 566 Z. Erkin and G. Tsudik 3.4 Homomorphic Encryption The Paillier cryptosystem presented in [17] is additively homomorphic. This means that there exists an operation over the ciphertexts Epk (m1) a... |

109 | Efficient aggregation of encrypted data in wireless sensor networks
- Castelluccia, Mykletun, et al.
- 2005
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...ts tackled privacy issues in smart meters, including privacy-preserving billing [19,14] and aggregation of private data. Examples of techniques that compute the sum of multiple private inputs include =-=[7,5]-=-, where encryption is done by modular addition (each player simply adds its key to the plaintext) and aggregation is very efficient, also performed via addition. However, this approach assumes a semi-... |

79 | Privacy-Preserving Smart Metering
- Rial, Danezis
- 2011
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...ypes of measurements in Section 8. We finally conclude the paper in Section 9. 2 Related Work A number of research results tackled privacy issues in smart meters, including privacy-preserving billing =-=[19,14]-=- and aggregation of private data. Examples of techniques that compute the sum of multiple private inputs include [7,5], where encryption is done by modular addition (each player simply adds its key to... |

76 |
A provably secure additive and multiplicative privacy homomorphism
- Domingo-Ferrer
- 2002
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...ny secrets. Peter et al. [18] consider three methods of aggregating data in a wireless networks based on homomorphic encryption [11]. The first protocol uses the Domingo-Ferrer (DF) encryption scheme =-=[8]-=- that is allegedly both additively and multiplicatively homomorphic. However, there is no evidence that the underlying DF cryptosystem is secure. The second protocol is a minor modification of [7] and... |

64 | Privacy-preserving Aggregation of Time-series Data
- Shi, Chan, et al.
- 2011
(Show Context)
Citation Context .... It requires the use of certificates to obtain accountability. Since it involves heavy-weight cryptographic tools – such as MPC – the cost of this scheme is very high. In a recent result, Shi et al. =-=[20]-=- introduce an interesting technique for aggregating private data using distributed differential privacy. Similar to our work, it blends secret sharing with homomorphic encryption. However, it also req... |

62 |
IPSec: The New Security Standard for the Internet, Intranets, and Virtual Private Networks. Upper Saddle River,
- Doraswamy, Harkins
- 1999
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...er Consumption 565 Moreover, we assume that all underlying communication channels are secure: both integrity and authentication of all messages are obtained via standard means, e.g., IPSec or SSL/TLS =-=[9]-=-. 3.2 Notation Our notation is summarized in Table 1. Table 1. Notation Summary Symbol Definition Symbol Definition N number of smart meters M number of measurement intervals n product of two large pr... |

52 |
Efficient and provably secure aggregation of encrypted data in wireless sensor networks”
- Castelluccia, Chan, et al.
- 2009
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...ts tackled privacy issues in smart meters, including privacy-preserving billing [19,14] and aggregation of private data. Examples of techniques that compute the sum of multiple private inputs include =-=[7,5]-=-, where encryption is done by modular addition (each player simply adds its key to the plaintext) and aggregation is very efficient, also performed via addition. However, this approach assumes a semi-... |

48 |
A survey of homomorphic encryption for nonspecialists,”Eurasip
- Fontaine, Galand
- 2007
(Show Context)
Citation Context ... without the aggregator or where the latter is simply not trusted with any secrets. Peter et al. [18] consider three methods of aggregating data in a wireless networks based on homomorphic encryption =-=[11]-=-. The first protocol uses the Domingo-Ferrer (DF) encryption scheme [8] that is allegedly both additively and multiplicatively homomorphic. However, there is no evidence that the underlying DF cryptos... |

48 | Privacy-friendly energy-metering via homomorphic encryption,”
- Garcia, Jacobs
- 2011
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...cret sharing with homomorphic encryption. However, it also requires the aggregator to solve an instance of the discrete log problem (albeit, with limited range) to obtain plaintext. Garcia and Jacobs =-=[12]-=- propose a scheme to compute aggregate consumption without revealing individual measurements using homomorphic encryption and 564 Z. Erkin and G. Tsudik secret sharing. For this purpose, every smart m... |

46 | Privacy-friendly Aggregation for the Smart-grid
- Kursawe, Danezis, et al.
- 2011
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...ure. The second protocol is a minor modification of [7] and the third protocol is based on Elliptic Curve ElGamal, which is quite inefficient because of expensive algebraic operations. Kursawe et al. =-=[15]-=- present cryptographic protocols for computing aggregated consumptions using Diffie-Hellman key exchange protocol and bilinear mapping, which also requires expensive elliptic curve operations. Kohlwei... |

29 |
C.: I have a dream!: differentially private smart metering
- Ács, Castelluccia
- 2011
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...a transferred is quadratic in the number of smart meters, which is clearly inefficient. Another approach offering differential privacy in the context of smart meters is given by Árc and Castelluccia =-=[1]-=-. In addition to smart meters, the authors introduce two other parties: a supplier and an aggregator. Individual measurements are protected by adding Laplacian noise. This scheme uses efficient symmet... |

23 |
Composite signal representation for fast and storage-efficient processing of encrypted signals.
- Bianchi, Piva, et al.
- 2010
(Show Context)
Citation Context ... of such measurements can be packed into one plaintext: ĉ(i,p) := c(i1,p)|c(i2,p)|c(i3,p)| . . . |c(iL,p) as follows: ĉ(i,p) := L∑ j=1 c(ij,p) · 2j·(k+&logN') . (20) This construction is similar to =-=[21,3]-=-. It assumes that each measurement from N smart meters is aggregated in subsequent steps. Therefore, each measurement type has a reserved “compartment” of k + &logN' bits. With N > M , compartments ar... |

22 | On the security economics of electricity metering.
- Anderson, Fuloria
- 2012
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...us allowing for real-time management of the grid. While smart meters offer some clear benefits, accurate and fine-grained measurements of household energy consumption trigger serious privacy concerns =-=[2]-=-. A plethora of sensitive information can be gleaned or derived from such measurements, e.g., types of electrical devices being used as well as presence (and number of) inhabitants. For example, due t... |

10 | Differentially private billing with rebates. In:
- Danezis, Kohlweiss, et al.
- 2011
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...ypes of measurements in Section 8. We finally conclude the paper in Section 9. 2 Related Work A number of research results tackled privacy issues in smart meters, including privacy-preserving billing =-=[19,14]-=- and aggregation of private data. Examples of techniques that compute the sum of multiple private inputs include [7,5], where encryption is done by modular addition (each player simply adds its key to... |

10 | On Concealed Data Aggregation for Wireless Sensor Networks
- Peter, Piotrowski, et al.
- 2007
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...n thus decrypt the aggregated value by subtraction. This operation is not easily extensible to settings without the aggregator or where the latter is simply not trusted with any secrets. Peter et al. =-=[18]-=- consider three methods of aggregating data in a wireless networks based on homomorphic encryption [11]. The first protocol uses the Domingo-Ferrer (DF) encryption scheme [8] that is allegedly both ad... |

8 | A secure multidimensional point inclusion protocol,” in
- Troncoso-Pastoriza, Katzenbeisser, et al.
- 2007
(Show Context)
Citation Context ... of such measurements can be packed into one plaintext: ĉ(i,p) := c(i1,p)|c(i2,p)|c(i3,p)| . . . |c(iL,p) as follows: ĉ(i,p) := L∑ j=1 c(ij,p) · 2j·(k+&logN') . (20) This construction is similar to =-=[21,3]-=-. It assumes that each measurement from N smart meters is aggregated in subsequent steps. Therefore, each measurement type has a reserved “compartment” of k + &logN' bits. With N > M , compartments ar... |

6 | Designing Privacy-preserving Smart Meters with Low-cost Microcontrollers
- Molina-Markham, Danezis, et al.
- 2012
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...of that product. In practice, smart meters are supposed to report Private Computation of Spatial and Temporal Power Consumption 575 their consumptions as often as 5 minutes. Implementation results in =-=[16]-=- show that even more expensive cryptographic operations can be realized efficiently on smart meters. It is our conclusion that the proposed cryptographic protocols in this paper, which are only based ... |

1 |
Malfunctioning smart meters demonstrate their intelligence
- Fine
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...formed by a smart meter, that include: en/de-cryptions, generation of random numbers, PRF invocations and hashing. We denote the probability of malfunction for a smart meter (e.g., quoted at 0.08% in =-=[10]-=-) by Pr(F) = α. The total number of operations performed by each party for different cases is summarized in Table 2. Table 2. Numbers of cryptographic operations for: (1) smart meter (SM), (2) aggrega... |