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## A Probabilistic Formulation of Imperfect Cryptography (2003)

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Venue: | in Proc. of 1st Int. Workshop on Issues in Security and Petri Nets, WISP’03 |

Citations: | 6 - 3 self |

### Citations

1351 | On the security of public key protocols
- Dolev, Yao
- 1983
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...d when passing to the usual Dolev-Yao model. 1 Introduction The use of formal methods for modeling and analyzing cryptographic operations is well-established. Since the seminal paper by Dolev and Yao =-=[6]-=- introduced a simple and intuitive formalization of cryptographic operations, many alternative definitions have been proposed on the basis of several approaches, ranging from modal logics to process a... |

470 | The inductive approach to verifying cryptographic protocols
- Paulson
- 1998
(Show Context)
Citation Context ... and intuitive formalization of cryptographic operations, many alternative definitions have been proposed on the basis of several approaches, ranging from modal logics to process algebras (see, e.g., =-=[4, 10, 8, 7, 12, 11]-=-). Key to success of such a theory was the very simple idea behind the definition of a ciphertext. In practice, a message encrypted with a given key K can be decrypted and read only by someone knowing... |

377 | Reconciling two views of cryptography (the computational soundness of formal encryption
- Abadi, Rogaway
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...ead only by someone knowing the key K, while for each other user such a message is a black box lacking in any sense. For instance, a recent formal view of cryptography introduced by Abadi and Rogaway =-=[1]-=- defines formal algebraic cryptographic expressions and a related notion of equivalence. The novelty is that such an approach relates the formal view and the classical computational model of cryptogra... |

134 | Security Properties and CSP
- Schneider
- 1996
(Show Context)
Citation Context ... and intuitive formalization of cryptographic operations, many alternative definitions have been proposed on the basis of several approaches, ranging from modal logics to process algebras (see, e.g., =-=[4, 10, 8, 7, 12, 11]-=-). Key to success of such a theory was the very simple idea behind the definition of a ciphertext. In practice, a message encrypted with a given key K can be decrypted and read only by someone knowing... |

112 |
Towards a mathematical foundation for information flow security
- Gray
- 1991
(Show Context)
Citation Context ... and intuitive formalization of cryptographic operations, many alternative definitions have been proposed on the basis of several approaches, ranging from modal logics to process algebras (see, e.g., =-=[4, 10, 8, 7, 12, 11]-=-). Key to success of such a theory was the very simple idea behind the definition of a ciphertext. In practice, a message encrypted with a given key K can be decrypted and read only by someone knowing... |

110 |
The Interrogator: Protocol Security Analysis
- Millen, Clark, et al.
- 1987
(Show Context)
Citation Context |

104 | Approximate noninterference
- Pierro, Hankin, et al.
- 2002
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...alence that takes into consideration polynomial time attacks. Moreover, probabilistic notions of security as well as approximated security properties can be found in the recent literature (see, e.g., =-=[7, 5, 2]-=-), but they do not relate probability and cryptographic primitives. 2 Background In this section, we recall the formal view of cryptography presented in [1]. In particular, expressions are built up fr... |

60 |
Analyzing encryption protocols using formal veri cation techniques
- Kemmerer
- 1989
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Citation Context |

47 | A Process-algebraic Approach for the Analysis of Probabilistic Non-interference
- Aldini, Bravetti, et al.
- 2004
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...alence that takes into consideration polynomial time attacks. Moreover, probabilistic notions of security as well as approximated security properties can be found in the recent literature (see, e.g., =-=[7, 5, 2]-=-), but they do not relate probability and cryptographic primitives. 2 Background In this section, we recall the formal view of cryptography presented in [1]. In particular, expressions are built up fr... |

26 | Computational Probabilistic Non-interference
- Backes, P¯tzmann
- 2002
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...the protocols and information leakage due to the nature of the cryptographic means. In the literature, both probability and computational complexity are studied in formal settings, as shown, e.g., in =-=[3]-=- in the context of a model of asynchronous probabilistic reactive systems, and in [9], which employs an asymptotic notion of probabilistic equivalence that takes into consideration polynomial time att... |

4 |
Scedrov: A Probabilistic Poly-Time Framework for Protocol Analysis
- Lincoln, Mitchell, et al.
- 1998
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...n the literature, both probability and computational complexity are studied in formal settings, as shown, e.g., in [3] in the context of a model of asynchronous probabilistic reactive systems, and in =-=[9]-=-, which employs an asymptotic notion of probabilistic equivalence that takes into consideration polynomial time attacks. Moreover, probabilistic notions of security as well as approximated security pr... |