Citations
| 1332 | R.: A logic of authentication
- Burrows, Abadi, et al.
- 1990
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...ogic-specificsspecification is automated.s2. Logic-Based VerificationsThe technique of logic-based formalsverification is accredited largely to Burrows, Abadisand Needham, developers of the BAN logic =-=[11]-=-.sThis work initiated intense research in the area ofslogic-based formal verification. Several logics,ssuch as GNY [12], CS [13] and ZV [14] have beensdeveloped on the basis of BAN. These logics cansb... |
| 222 | Reasoning about belief in cryptographic protocols,”
- Gong, Needham, et al.
- 1990
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...is accredited largely to Burrows, Abadisand Needham, developers of the BAN logic [11].sThis work initiated intense research in the area ofslogic-based formal verification. Several logics,ssuch as GNY =-=[12]-=-, CS [13] and ZV [14] have beensdeveloped on the basis of BAN. These logics cansbe used to generate concise proofs and havesidentified a number of flaws in protocolsspreviously considered secure. They... |
| 46 |
Common Authentication Protocol Speci cation Language. http://www.mitre.org/research/capsl
- Millen
- 1997
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...ecification.s3. The CAPSL SpecificationsLanguagesCAPSL, acronym for Common AuthenticationsProtocol Specification Language, is a formalslanguage for expressing authentication and keyexchange protocols =-=[15]-=-. Its purpose is to expresssenough of the abstract features of these protocols tossupport an analysis for protocol failures. Thesauthors of CAPSL had broadened the applicabilitysof CAPSL further with ... |
| 41 | Efficient infinite-state analysis of security protocols
- Huima
- 1999
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...techniques provide a systematicsapproach to discovering protocol flaws andsweaknesses. Common approaches to formalsprotocol verification are based on modal logics [1],s[2], [3] or state-machines [4], =-=[5]-=-, [6], [7].sAutomation of such formal verification techniquessremoves many of the potential error sources insmanual verification [8].sAlthough formal verification has demonstratedsgreat success in dis... |
| 27 | Formal Requirements for Key Distribution Protocols
- Syverson, Meadows
- 1994
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...tion techniques provide a systematicsapproach to discovering protocol flaws andsweaknesses. Common approaches to formalsprotocol verification are based on modal logics [1],s[2], [3] or state-machines =-=[4]-=-, [5], [6], [7].sAutomation of such formal verification techniquessremoves many of the potential error sources insmanual verification [8].sAlthough formal verification has demonstratedsgreat success i... |
| 26 |
AUTLOG--an advanced logic of authentication
- Kessler, Wedel
- 1994
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...Conversely, formalsverification techniques provide a systematicsapproach to discovering protocol flaws andsweaknesses. Common approaches to formalsprotocol verification are based on modal logics [1],s=-=[2]-=-, [3] or state-machines [4], [5], [6], [7].sAutomation of such formal verification techniquessremoves many of the potential error sources insmanual verification [8].sAlthough formal verification has d... |
| 19 |
Logic for verifying public-key cryptographic protocols
- Coffey, Saidha
- 1997
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...ited largely to Burrows, Abadisand Needham, developers of the BAN logic [11].sThis work initiated intense research in the area ofslogic-based formal verification. Several logics,ssuch as GNY [12], CS =-=[13]-=- and ZV [14] have beensdeveloped on the basis of BAN. These logics cansbe used to generate concise proofs and havesidentified a number of flaws in protocolsspreviously considered secure. They incorpor... |
| 18 |
Automatically Detecting Most Vulnerabilities in Cryptographic Protocols
- Brackin
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...rsely, formalsverification techniques provide a systematicsapproach to discovering protocol flaws andsweaknesses. Common approaches to formalsprotocol verification are based on modal logics [1],s[2], =-=[3]-=- or state-machines [4], [5], [6], [7].sAutomation of such formal verification techniquessremoves many of the potential error sources insmanual verification [8].sAlthough formal verification has demons... |
| 11 | What makes a cryptographic protocol secure
- Meadows
- 2003
(Show Context)
Citation Context ... The complexsand difficult translation from the informal protocolsdescription to the formal protocol specification issthe critical step in order to convey the exactsmeaning of security protocol steps =-=[9]-=-. Anysmisunderstanding of theses steps will result in asflawed formal specification, rendering the formalsverification process useless. This is particularlystrue of logic-based verifications, as the i... |
| 11 | Handling infeasible specifications of cryptographic protocols
- Gong
- 1991
(Show Context)
Citation Context ..., December 16-18, 2005 (pp234-239) of the BAN logic and is quite powerful in its abilitysto uncover even subtle protocol flaws. Discussionssof the virtues and limitations of the logic can besfound in =-=[17]-=- and [18].sIn GNY, message extensions are added to thesprotocol description during protocol formalisation,sso that principals can communicate their beliefssand thus reason about each other’s beliefs. ... |
| 8 |
Formal Verification: An Imperative Step in the Design of Security Protocols
- Coffey, Dojen, et al.
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...sprovide security services, such as key distribution,sauthentication and non-repudiation, over insecuresnetworks. The design process of cryptographicsprotocols is particularly complex and error-prones=-=[1]-=-. The surprisingly significant number ofspublished protocols that have subsequently beensfound to contain various flaws, sometimes severalsyears after the original publication, highlights thescomplexi... |
| 5 |
Security Analysis of (Un-) Fair Non-repudiation
- Gürgens, Rudolph
- 2002
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...iques provide a systematicsapproach to discovering protocol flaws andsweaknesses. Common approaches to formalsprotocol verification are based on modal logics [1],s[2], [3] or state-machines [4], [5], =-=[6]-=-, [7].sAutomation of such formal verification techniquessremoves many of the potential error sources insmanual verification [8].sAlthough formal verification has demonstratedsgreat success in discover... |
| 5 | A Novel Approach to the Automation of Logic-Based Security Protocol Verification
- Dojen, Coffey
- 2004
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...tensions, one can use the CAPSLsspecification language to model protocols forsverification with the GNY logic. Such a formalsspecification can be used as the input to ansautomated proving engine [8], =-=[10]-=- as outlined insFigure 1, where the translation from the CAPSLsprotocol specification into the logic-specificsspecification is automated.s2. Logic-Based VerificationsThe technique of logic-based forma... |
| 4 |
Layered Proving Trees: A Novel Approach to the Automation of Logic-Based Security
- Dojen, Coffey
- 2005
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...tion are based on modal logics [1],s[2], [3] or state-machines [4], [5], [6], [7].sAutomation of such formal verification techniquessremoves many of the potential error sources insmanual verification =-=[8]-=-.sAlthough formal verification has demonstratedsgreat success in discovering protocol flaws, thesesformal techniques are not foolproof. The complexsand difficult translation from the informal protocol... |
| 2 | A Comparative Analysis of State-Space Tools for Security Protocol Verification
- Healy, Coffey, et al.
- 2004
(Show Context)
Citation Context ... provide a systematicsapproach to discovering protocol flaws andsweaknesses. Common approaches to formalsprotocol verification are based on modal logics [1],s[2], [3] or state-machines [4], [5], [6], =-=[7]-=-.sAutomation of such formal verification techniquessremoves many of the potential error sources insmanual verification [8].sAlthough formal verification has demonstratedsgreat success in discovering p... |
| 2 |
A logic for modeling the dynamics of beliefs
- Zhang, Varadharajan
- 2001
(Show Context)
Citation Context ... to Burrows, Abadisand Needham, developers of the BAN logic [11].sThis work initiated intense research in the area ofslogic-based formal verification. Several logics,ssuch as GNY [12], CS [13] and ZV =-=[14]-=- have beensdeveloped on the basis of BAN. These logics cansbe used to generate concise proofs and havesidentified a number of flaws in protocolsspreviously considered secure. They incorporatesseveral ... |
| 1 |
Some remarks on the logic of Gong, Needham and
- Mathuria, Safavi-Naini, et al.
- 1994
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...r 16-18, 2005 (pp234-239) of the BAN logic and is quite powerful in its abilitysto uncover even subtle protocol flaws. Discussionssof the virtues and limitations of the logic can besfound in [17] and =-=[18]-=-.sIn GNY, message extensions are added to thesprotocol description during protocol formalisation,sso that principals can communicate their beliefssand thus reason about each other’s beliefs. The useso... |
