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## Strategy-Proofness and Arrow’s Conditions: Existence and Correspondence Theorems for Voting Procedures and Social Welfare Functions (1975)

Venue: | J. Econ. Theory |

Citations: | 530 - 0 self |

### Citations

1033 |
Equilibrium points in n-person games
- Nash
- 1950
(Show Context)
Citation Context ... individual n + 1 cast ballot B,+l = (x y z). Let B’ = (Bl ,...,sBil,..., B,). This implies, based on (6) thatsvn+ls3(B, B,,,) = vFs3(B)sandsc~+~,~(B’, B,,,) = z13”*~(B’).sSubstitution into (7) givess=-=(8)-=-s(9)szP+~*~(B’, B,+J Bi v”+~*~(B, B,,,) (10)swhich shows that t~+l,~ is manipulable at (B, B,,,). This contradicts thesassumption that the lemma’s necessary part is false.sSuppose the sufficient part ... |

553 |
The Theory of Committees and Elections
- Black
- 1958
(Show Context)
Citation Context ... sense thatsBi E Ri . By substituting ballot Bi’ for Bi individual i can improve thesoutcome of the vote according to his own preferences, i.e.,sv”“(B, )...) Bit,..., B,) aivnm(B1 )..., Ri )...) B,). =-=(2)-=-sThe ballot Bi 3 Ri is the individual’s sincere strategy and the ballotsBi # Ri is a sophisticated strategy.s4 Set valued decision functions can give unambiguous choices if they are coupledswith a lot... |

376 |
Manipulation of voting schemes: A general result
- Gibbard
- 1973
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...t andFarquharson [3]conjectured in passing thatfor thescase of three or more alternatives no nondictatorial strategy-proof votingsprocedure exists. By means of distinctly different techniques Gibbard =-=[7]-=-andsSatterthwaite [ 131 independently formalized and proved this conjecture.2sIn addition Zeckhauser [19] proved a similar existence theorem. Vickerys[IS] and Gibbard [7] speculated about, but did not... |

145 |
The Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal
- Sen
- 1970
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...atorial and strong alternative-sexcluding voting procedures:sv”*~(B) = f&B) where T = S, and i E I,, (14)svns3(B) = h2’(B) = x, (15)sv”*“(B) = h;3(B) = y, (16)svnS3(B) = h%3(B) = z,sv”‘~(B) = h$3(B),s=-=(17)-=-s(18)s200 MARK ALLEN SATTERHWAITEs?P3(B) = hym3(B), and (19)sP3(B) = @3(B), (20)swhere the notation h>3 represents a strong alternative-excluding votingsprocedure with range U and where B E pmn, S, = ... |

117 |
The Theory of Social Choice
- Fishburn
- 1973
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...functions can give unambiguous choices if they are coupledswith a lottery mechanism that randomly selects one alternative from among any setssof tied alternatives. This is the approach which Fishburn =-=[6]-=- and Zeckhauser [19]sadopted. I reject this approach here because I think that the use of decision mechanismsswith a random element would be politically unacceptable to almost all committees.sGibbard ... |

33 |
Quasi-Transitivity, Rational Choice and Collective Decisions', Review of Economic Studies
- Sen
- 1969
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...of Wn+l depends on the fact thatsXn contains seven classes of fully dictatorial and strong alternative-sexcluding voting procedures:sv”*~(B) = f&B) where T = S, and i E I,, (14)svns3(B) = h2’(B) = x, =-=(15)-=-sv”*“(B) = h;3(B) = y, (16)svnS3(B) = h%3(B) = z,sv”‘~(B) = h$3(B),s(17)s(18)s200 MARK ALLEN SATTERHWAITEs?P3(B) = hym3(B), and (19)sP3(B) = @3(B), (20)swhere the notation h>3 represents a strong alte... |

13 |
Theory of Voting, Yale
- Farquharson
- 1969
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...m indebted to Jean-Marie Blin, Richard Day, Theodore Groves, Rubin Saposnik,sMaria Schmundt, Hugo Sonnenschein, and an anonymous referee for their help in thesdevelopment of this paper.s1 Farquharson =-=[4]-=- introduced the terms sophisticated strategy and sincere strategy.s187sCopyright 0 1975 by Academic Press, Inc.sAU rights of reproduction in any form reserved.s188 MARK ALLEN SATTERTHWAITEsthat under ... |

6 |
Existence of a Strategy Proof Voting Procedure: A Topic in Social Choice Theory
- Satterthwaite
- 1973
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...11seach commented on different aspects of the manipulability of non-sdictatorial voting procedures.sThis paper has six sections. In Section 2 I formulate the problem andsz In my doctoral dissertation =-=[13]-=- I stated Theorem 1 (existence of a strategy proofsvoting procedure) and proved it using the constructive proof presented in Section 3sof this paper. This work was done independently of Gibbard. Subse... |

4 |
Stability of sincere voting under some classes of non-binary group decision procedures
- Pattanaik
- 1974
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...ividual n + 1 cast ballot B,+l = (x y z). Let B’ = (Bl ,...,sBil,..., B,). This implies, based on (6) thatsvn+ls3(B, B,,,) = vFs3(B)sandsc~+~,~(B’, B,,,) = z13”*~(B’).sSubstitution into (7) givess(8)s=-=(9)-=-szP+~*~(B’, B,+J Bi v”+~*~(B, B,,,) (10)swhich shows that t~+l,~ is manipulable at (B, B,,,). This contradicts thesassumption that the lemma’s necessary part is false.sSuppose the sufficient part is f... |

3 |
Strategic voting without collusion under binary and democratic group decision rules. The Review of Economic Studies
- Pattanaik
- 1975
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...+~*~ is not strategy proof for somesindividual i E I, . This implies that a ballot set (B, B,+l) = (Bl ,..., Bi ,..,,s4 3 Bn,,) E P:+’ and ballot B,’ exist such thatsv”+~*~(B’, B,,,) &v”+~*~(B, B,,,) =-=(11)-=-swhere (B’, B,,,) = (B, ,..., Bi’y..., B, , B,+l). Assume without loss ofsgenerality that Bnfl = (X y z). Equations (8) and (9) hold and thereforesvF*” may be substituted for zP+~*~ :sv;*~(B’) &vns3(B... |

3 |
The Possibility of a Cheat Proof Social Choice Function: A Theorem of A
- Schmeidler, Sonnenschein
- 1974
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...itically unacceptable to almost all committees.sGibbard [7] argued in detail in favor of this paper’s approach.s5 I have adapted this definition of strategy-proofness from Schmeidler andsSonnenschein =-=[14]-=-. My earlier definition in [13] is equivalent, but more awkward tosuse in proofs.sSTRATEGY-PROOFNESS AND ARROW'S CONDITIONS 191sThe second interpretation relates to the theory of games. If a votingspr... |

3 |
Voting Systems, Honest Preferences and Pareto
- Zeckhauser
- 1973
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...ial strategy-proof votingsprocedure exists. By means of distinctly different techniques Gibbard [7]andsSatterthwaite [ 131 independently formalized and proved this conjecture.2sIn addition Zeckhauser =-=[19]-=- proved a similar existence theorem. Vickerys[IS] and Gibbard [7] speculated about, but did not definitively establishsthe relationship between strategy-proofness and Arrow’s four require-sments. Fina... |

2 |
social decision rules, Quart
- VICKERY, Utility
- 1960
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...al and strong alternative-sexcluding voting procedures:sv”*~(B) = f&B) where T = S, and i E I,, (14)svns3(B) = h2’(B) = x, (15)sv”*“(B) = h;3(B) = y, (16)svnS3(B) = h%3(B) = z,sv”‘~(B) = h$3(B),s(17)s=-=(18)-=-s200 MARK ALLEN SATTERHWAITEs?P3(B) = hym3(B), and (19)sP3(B) = @3(B), (20)swhere the notation h>3 represents a strong alternative-excluding votingsprocedure with range U and where B E pmn, S, = (x, y... |

1 |
Comment on Hanson’s Group Preferences, Econometrica 38
- FISHBURN
- 1970
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...social ordering Al, alternative x cannot have movedsdown in relation to its position within the original social ordering A, .sThe reasonableness of the ND, CS, and NNR conditions is obvious.sFishburn =-=[5]-=- and Plott [12] contain excellent discussion of the reasonable-sness of rationality and IIA. Conditions CS, NNR, and IIA, as Arrows[l, pp. 971 has noted, imply the condition of Pareto optimality.sPare... |

1 |
counter-threats, and strategic voting, forthcoming in Econometrica
- PATTANAIK, Threats
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...). Let B’ = (Bl ,...,sBil,..., B,). This implies, based on (6) thatsvn+ls3(B, B,,,) = vFs3(B)sandsc~+~,~(B’, B,,,) = z13”*~(B’).sSubstitution into (7) givess(8)s(9)szP+~*~(B’, B,+J Bi v”+~*~(B, B,,,) =-=(10)-=-swhich shows that t~+l,~ is manipulable at (B, B,,,). This contradicts thesassumption that the lemma’s necessary part is false.sSuppose the sufficient part is false. Therefore a v”*ls3 with its set of... |

1 |
Social choice and social rationality,” Social Science Working Paper No
- PLOTT
- 1971
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...g Al, alternative x cannot have movedsdown in relation to its position within the original social ordering A, .sThe reasonableness of the ND, CS, and NNR conditions is obvious.sFishburn [5] and Plott =-=[12]-=- contain excellent discussion of the reasonable-sness of rationality and IIA. Conditions CS, NNR, and IIA, as Arrows[l, pp. 971 has noted, imply the condition of Pareto optimality.sPareto Optimality (... |

1 |
Collective Choice and Social Welfare,” Oliver and
- SEN
(Show Context)
Citation Context ... thatsXn contains seven classes of fully dictatorial and strong alternative-sexcluding voting procedures:sv”*~(B) = f&B) where T = S, and i E I,, (14)svns3(B) = h2’(B) = x, (15)sv”*“(B) = h;3(B) = y, =-=(16)-=-svnS3(B) = h%3(B) = z,sv”‘~(B) = h$3(B),s(17)s(18)s200 MARK ALLEN SATTERHWAITEs?P3(B) = hym3(B), and (19)sP3(B) = @3(B), (20)swhere the notation h>3 represents a strong alternative-excluding votingspr... |