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## Random Oracles are Practical: A Paradigm for Designing Efficient Protocols (1995)

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Citations: | 1613 - 70 self |

### Citations

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3466 | M.: New directions in cryptography - Diffie, Hellman - 1976 |

1373 | Probabilistic encryption - Goldwasser, Micali - 1984 |

1233 | The Knowledge Complexity of Interactive Proofsystems - Goldwasser, Micali, et al. - 1989 |

1004 | The MD5 Message-Digest Algorithm - Rivest - 1992 |

952 | A digital signature scheme secure against adaptive chosenmessage attacks - Goldwasser, Micali, et al. - 1988 |

744 | How to construct random functions - Goldreich, Goldwasser, et al. - 1986 |

657 | How to generate cryptographically strong sequences of pseudo-random bits - Blum, Micali - 1984 |

556 | Theory and applications of trapdoor functions - Yao - 1982 |

473 | Non-malleable cryptography - Dolev, Dwork, et al. - 1998 |

434 | A hard-core predicate for all one-way functions - Goldreich, Levin - 1989 |

378 | Non-Interactive Zero-Knowledge Proof of Knowledge and Chosen Ciphertext Attack - Rackoff, Simon - 1991 |

355 | Zero knowledge proofs of identity - Feige, Fiat, et al. - 1988 |

355 | Digitalized Signatures and Public-Key Functions as Intractable as Factorization - Rabin - 1979 |

340 | How to construct pseudorandom permutations from pseudorandom functions - Luby, Rackoff - 1986 |

290 |
M.: A Simple Unpredictable Pseudo-random Number Generator
- Blum, Blum, et al.
- 1986
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...tation with inverse f \Gamma1 ; G(r) \Phi x denotes the bitwise XOR of x with the first jxj bits of the output of G(r); and "k" denotes concatenation. For a concrete implantation, f might be=-= squaring [42, 3]-=- or RSA [38]. We suggest two schemes to encrypt efficiently in the random oracle model: (1) Set E G (x) = f(r) k G(r) \Phi x for a random value r from the domain of f . (2) Set E G;H (x) = f(r) k G(r)... |

279 | Public-key cryptosystems provably secure against chosen ciphertext attacks - Naor, Yung - 1990 |

207 | On the composition of zero-knowledge proof systems - Goldreich, Krawczyk - 1990 |

199 | Limits on the provable consequences of one-way permutations - Impagliazzo, Rudich - 1989 |

183 | Multiple non-interactive zero knowledge proofs based on a single random string - Feige, Lapidot, et al. - 1990 |

151 | Non-interactive zero-knowledge and its applications - Blum, Feldman, et al. - 1988 |

128 |
An Efficient Probabilistic Public-Key Encryption Scheme Which Hides All Partial Information
- Blum, Goldwasser
- 1985
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...e second is secure against chosen-ciphertext attack in the sense of [36] as well as non-malleable in the sense of [13]; and both are significantly more efficient than previous provably-secure schemes =-=[24, 4, 34, 36, 11, 13] for the s-=-ame goals. Justification Of Known Heuristics. A variety of well-known "tricks" find formal justification by moving to the random oracle setting. (This does not mean that existing protocols c... |

121 |
The round complexity of secure protocols
- Beaver, Micali, et al.
- 1990
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...ls in which the adversary is denied access to the random 2 Personal communication, via S. Micali and S. Rudich. 3 In this application it does not suffice to replace the pseudorandom generator used in =-=[1]-=- by a random generator. 4 oracle. 4 Thus in many applications (and the ones of this paper in particular) PRFs don't suffice. Note, however, that when the setting permits instantiation of the oracle vi... |

83 | The notion of security for probabilistic cryptosystems - Micali, Rackoff, et al. - 1988 |

82 | A Modification of the RSA Public-Key Encryption Procedure - Williams - 1980 |

76 | A uniform complexity treatment of encryption and zero-knowledge - Goldreich - 1993 |

69 | Zero-knowledge proofs of knowledge without interaction (extended abstract - Santis, Persiano - 1992 |

60 | On the cryptographic applications of random functions - Goldreich, Goldwasser, et al. - 1985 |

52 | Non-interactive zeroknowledge proof systems - Santis, Micali, et al. - 1990 |

30 | How to sign given any trapdoor permutation - Bellare, Micali - 1992 |

26 | An ecient probabilistic public-key encryption scheme which hides all partial information - Blum, Goldwasser - 1985 |

7 | Chaum and C. Cr' epeau, "Minimum Disclosure Proofs of Knowledge - Brassard, D - 1988 |

5 | Provably fast and secure digital signature algorithms based on secure hash functions - Leighton, Micali - 1993 |

3 | Foundations of cryptography," class notes - Goldreich - 1989 |

2 | Damg ard, "Towards practical public key cryptosystems secure against chosen ciphertext attacks - unknown authors - 1991 |

2 | Symmetric Public-Key Cryptosystems", submitted to - Galil, Haber, et al. - 1989 |

1 | An asymmetric authentication protocol - Rogaway, Blakley - 1993 |