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## Hospital choices, hospital prices and financial incentives to physicians (2012)

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Citation Context ...iance in price after we condition on our severity groups. 7.2 Inequality Analysis The inequality model makes the following assumptions: p(ci; h; ) = o h lpo (ci; h) p(ci); ;h p o (ci; h; ) p(ci); ;h: =-=(8)-=- o h lpo (ci; h) was assumed equal to expected price in the logit analysis, so the di¤erence between this speci…cation and that used in the logit analysis is that the inequality analysis allows for me... |

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Citation Context ...struct an inequality that relates the price coe¢ cient to di¤erences in prices and di¤erences in distances: E p; (p o (ih; h; h 0 ) + p o (ih 0; h0 ; h)) j Ii; E d(ih; h; h 0 ) + d ih 0; h0 ; h j Ii; =-=(12)-=- We sum over alternative hospitals h 0 > h for each h and over severities a to obtain the inequality: p; X X a h0 >h ih;i h0 for each h = 1; :::; H. X (p o (ih; h; h 0 ) + p o (ih0; h0 ; h)) X X a X h... |

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Citation Context ...who only consider giving birth at a hospital. We estimate this model using maximum likelihood. We consider three di¤erent assumptions regarding the price coe¢ cient p; , in the estimation (a) p; = p; =-=(6)-=- (b) p; = p; ; (c) p; = 0 + 1:pcap where pcap is the insurer’s capitation rate. Equation (2) states that the price is exactly equal to our measure of the expected list price multiplied by one minus th... |

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84 | Inference on Regressions with Interval Data on a Regressor or Outcome - Manski, Tamer - 2002 |

81 | Hospital ownership and public medical spending
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Citation Context ...ity interactions and allows for classi…cation error in those interactions which is assumed to be mean zero conditional on the patient’s plan and chosen hospital. Finally f (d(li; lh)) = d; d(li; lh); =-=(10)-=- 26 Provided expectations are unbiased the average of actual prices will converge to the average of expected prices, so we could have used actual and not a measure of expected prices in our inequaliti... |

57 |
Competition among hospitals
- Gaynor, Vogt
- 2003
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...tions imply X s;h 0 >h w(h; h 0 ; s) (h; h 0 ; s) (h 0 ; h; s) !p 0; then our model implies that X w(h; h 0 " ; s) s;h 0 >h p; p(h; h 0 ; s) + p(h 0 ; h; s) + d; d(h; h 0 ; s) + d(h 0 ; h; s) # !P 0: =-=(13)-=- The inequality in equation (13) is in terms of observables and the parameters of interest but it will not identify separate p; and d; coe¢ cients 27 , so we set d; = 1. This implies that we will 27 I... |

52 | Antitrust and competition in health care markets
- Gaynor, Vogt
- 2000
(Show Context)
Citation Context ... 0 ; s) observable. Moreover since the h;h 0 ;s are mean zero conditional on the hospital choice 34 ^q(h; h 0 ; s) > N q(h; h 0 ; s); 2 (h; h 0 ; s)=Nh;h0 ;s ; where q(h; h 0 ; s) g(qh; s) g(qh0; s); =-=(14)-=- N ( ; ) designates the normal distribution, 2 (h; h0 ; s) is the variance of ( p p(ci; h; h0 )+ d(li; lh; lh0)) across observations in S(h; h0 ; s), and Nh;h0 ;s is the cardinality of that set. Each ... |

50 | Competition and market power in option demand markets
- Capps, Dranove, et al.
- 2003
(Show Context)
Citation Context ... inpatient utilization and prescription drug costs. Blue Shield and Blue Cross, which have the lowest proportion of capitated payments, were historically di¤erent from other insurers. They were 501(c)=-=(4)-=- tax exempt as social welfare plans, acting as administrators of Medicare and providing coverage to state and federal government employees. By 2003, however, Blue Cross and Blue Shield companies were ... |

43 | 2000) “How Does Managed Care Do It
- Cutler, Newhouse
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...ws for measurement error in price and the logit analysis did not. conditional on the patient’s plan and chosen hospital. Also We assume this error is mean zero g (qh(s); si) = g o (qh(s); si) si; ;h; =-=(9)-=- i.e., the inequality analysis places no restrictions on the quality severity interactions and allows for classi…cation error in those interactions which is assumed to be mean zero conditional on the ... |

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33 | Insurer-hospital bargaining: Negotiated discounts in postderegulation Connecticut - Sorensen - 2003 |

33 | Hospital Market Structure and the Behavior of Nonprofit Hospitals - Duggan |

32 |
The industrial organization of health care markets
- Dranove, Satterthwaite
- 2000
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...her’s hospital (an i 2 S (h; h 0 ; s) and i 0 2 S (h 0 ; h; s = si)) our revealed preference inequality becomes p; h p o (ci; h; h 0 ) + p o (ci0; h0 i ; h) 0 W I (i; h; h 0 ) + W I (i 0 ; h 0 ; h) = =-=(11)-=- + d; h d(li; lh; lh0) + i d(li0; lh0; lh) i;h;h 0 i 0 ;h 0 ;h where i;h;h 0 p; p(ci); ;h;h 0 + s i 0; ;h 0 :h. Note that all coe¢ cients are plan speci…c. Our inequalities for hospital h and insurer ... |

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30 |
Hospital-insurer bargaining: An empirical investigation of appendectomy pricing
- Brooks, Dor, et al.
- 1996
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...urbance in the choice equation. More formally we have where W o ( ) is the model we obtain after substituting Wi; ;h(x; h; ) = W o i; ;h (xo ; h; ) + "i; ;h (7) o hlpo (ci; h) = ;hlp(ci; h) " p i; ;h =-=(8)-=- for ;hlp(ci; h) in equation (6), and, if “a”indexes the severity groupings of patients and “c”their groupings for price so that si = s (a (ci)), substituting We g (qh(s); s(a(ci)) = g (qh(s); si) " g... |

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17 |
Inference for parameters dened by moment inequalities using generalized moment selection
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- 2010
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...h a multinomial logit model of hospital choice, as it provides a familiar way of investigating the patterns in the data. The logit model makes the following assumptions. ;hlp(ci; h) = o h lpo (ci; h) =-=(2)-=- d1; = d1; d2; = d2 (3) 42 This term is also useful in allowing PPO enrollees in Blue Shield and Blue Cross to have di¤erent preferences, or more discretion over choice of hospital, than enrollees in ... |

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8 |
Regression discontinuity designs with an endogenous forcing variable and an application to contracting in health care. unpublished manuscript
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- 2010
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...e function whose maximum determines the hospital (h) that patient i of insurer is allocated to, is assumed to take the additively separable form Wi; ;h = p; p(ci; h; ) + g (qh(s); si) + f (d(li; lh)) =-=(1)-=- where p(ci; h; ) is the price insurer is expected to pay at hospital h for a patient who enters with condition (or diagnosis) ci, si is a measure of the severity of the patient’s diagnosis qh(s) is a... |

7 |
Who Ordered That? The Economics of Treatment Choices in Medical Care
- Chandra, Cutler, et al.
- 2011
(Show Context)
Citation Context .... Then the observable part of our inequalities is formed by taking couples of patients i 2 S (h; h0 ; s) and i0 2 S (h0; h; s) and using equation (1) to form p; h W (i; h; h 0 ) + W (i 0 ; h 0 ; h) = =-=(7)-=- p(ci; h; h 0 ) + p(ci0; h0 i h ; h) + f (li; lh; lh0) + i f (li0; lh0; lh)] We then average over all couples i 2 S (h; h 0 ; s) and i 0 2 S (h 0 ; h; s) for all h 0 6= h. Since we have removed the qu... |

7 | Transmission of financial incentives to physician by intermediary organizations in California. Health Affairs 21(4 - Rosenthal, Frank, et al. - 2002 |

7 |
The effect of network arrangements on hospital pricing behavior
- Burgess, Carey, et al.
- 2005
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...p(ci; h) in equation (6), and, if “a”indexes the severity groupings of patients and “c”their groupings for price so that si = s (a (ci)), substituting We g (qh(s); s(a(ci)) = g (qh(s); si) " g i; ;h: =-=(9)-=- for g (qh(s); si) in that equation, so that "i; ;h p; " p i; ;h + "g i; ;h; 53 We have obtained more detailed outcomes measures, including mortality and readmissions data for infants as well as their... |

7 | Medical care expenditures under gatekeeper and point-of-service arrangements. Health Serv Res 36(6 - JJ, Kapur, et al. - 2001 |

7 | On the Asymptotic Bias of Wald-Type Estimators of a Straight Line When -17Both Variables are Subject to Error - Pakes - 1982 |

6 |
The effect of explicit financial incentives on physician behavior
- Armour, Pitts, et al.
- 2001
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...odel of hospital choice, as it provides a familiar way of investigating the patterns in the data. The logit model makes the following assumptions. ;hlp(ci; h) = o h lpo (ci; h) (2) d1; = d1; d2; = d2 =-=(3)-=- 42 This term is also useful in allowing PPO enrollees in Blue Shield and Blue Cross to have di¤erent preferences, or more discretion over choice of hospital, than enrollees in other insurers. 15g (q... |

6 | The Welfare E¤ects of Restricted Hospital Choice in the U.S - Ho |

5 |
California Health Care Market Report 2005." California HealthCare Foundation. California HealthCare Foundation
- Baumgarten
- 2005
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...th a multinomial logit model of hospital choice, as it provides a familiar way of investigating the patterns in the data. The logit model makes the following assumptions. p(ci; h; ) = o h lpo (ci; h) =-=(2)-=- where lp o (ci; h) is the average list price of patients who enter hospital h with diagnosis ci and one minus the average discount rate hospital h gives managed care providers, o h is g (qh(s); si) =... |

5 |
Managed Care". Handbook of Health Economics
- Glied
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...e and varied by hospital-patient combination. This disturbance would have a non-zero conditional expectation because of selection, but the selection would be in a direction that maintained the bound. =-=(15)-=- 24of hospitals at that …ne a level of severity. We therefore use the severity classi…cations given to us by the obstetricians we consulted to aggregate into …ve “super-severity” groups. These consis... |

4 | Is hospital competition socially wasteful - DP, MB |

4 | Hospitals as hotels: the role of patient amenities in hospital demand” Working Paper 14619. National Bureau of Economic Research
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- 2008
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...ure 2 plots the constrained against the unconstrained estimates48. Thestted line captures 98.2% of the variance of the unconstrained estimates. We then imposed the futher constraint that ;m;s = : =-=(17)-=- This reduced the number of parameters estimated to 380. Figure 3 plots the constrained against the unconstrained estimates after imposing the additonal constraint. Thestted line now captures 95.7% of... |

4 | Fewer and More Specialized: A New Assessment of Physician Supply in California. California HealthCare Foundation - Grumbach, Chattopadhyay, et al. - 2009 |

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3 |
California’s beleaguered physician groups—will they survive
- Bodenheimer
(Show Context)
Citation Context ... measurement error; and it becomes the disturbance in the choice equation. More formally we have where W o ( ) is the model we obtain after substituting Wi; ;h(x; h; ) = W o i; ;h (xo ; h; ) + "i; ;h =-=(7)-=- o hlpo (ci; h) = ;hlp(ci; h) " p i; ;h (8) for ;hlp(ci; h) in equation (6), and, if “a”indexes the severity groupings of patients and “c”their groupings for price so that si = s (a (ci)), substitutin... |

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3 |
How does managed care do it
- DM, McClellan, et al.
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...for measurement error in price and the logit analysis did not. We assume this error is mean zero conditional on the patients plan and chosen hospital. Also g(qh(s); si) = g o (qh(s); si) si;;h; =-=(9)-=- i.e., the inequality analysis places no restrictions on the quality severity interactions and allows for classi cation error in those interactions which is assumed to be mean zero conditional on the ... |

3 | Continued growth of public and private Accountable Care Organizations. Health Affairs website. http://healthaffairs. org/blog/2013/02/19/continued-growth-of-public-and-private -accountable-care-organizations/. Accessed November 12 - Muhlestein - 2014 |

2 |
Physician Incentives in Health Maintenance Organizations
- LJ
- 2001
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...verity and insurer as the patient who chose h. Formally, let Nh;h 0 ;s be the number of patients in the set S(h; h 0 ; s) and for any x( ) de…ne x(h; h 0 ; s) 1 X Nh;h0 ;s i2S(h;h0 ;s) x(i; h; h 0 ): =-=(12)-=- Then averaging equation (11) over i 2 S(h; h 0 ; s) and i 0 2 S(h 0 ; h; s) we get p; p(h; h 0 ; s) + p(h 0 ; h; s) + d; d(h; h 0 ; s) + d(h 0 ; h; s) (h; h 0 ; s) (h 0 ; h; s) 0: The moment inequali... |

2 |
Primary Care PhysiciansExperience of Financial Incentives in Managed-Care Systems
- Grumbach, Osmond, et al.
- 1998
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...igure 2 plots the constrained against the unconstrained estimates. The …tted line captures 98.2% of the variance of the unconstrained estimates38 . We then imposed the futher constraint that ;m;s = : =-=(17)-=- This reduced the number of parameters estimated to 380. Figure 3 plots the constrained against the unconstrained estimates after imposing the additonal constraint. The …tted line now captures 95.7% 3... |

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1 |
The Impact of Physician Characteristics in Conditional Choice Models for Hospital Care
- DR
- 1992
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...i; h) is the average list price of patients who enter hospital h with diagnosis ci and one minus the average discount rate hospital h gives managed care providers, o h is g (qh(s); si) = qh + zhx(si) =-=(3)-=- where qh are hospital …xed e¤ects, x(si) are functions of the sickness level of the patient and zh are hospital characteristics, both of which are speci…ed below, and f (d(li; lh)) = d1d(li; lh) + d2... |

1 | Do Physician Incentives A¤ect Hospital Choice? A Progress Report". Forthcoming - Ho, Pakes - 2011 |

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1 |
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(Show Context)
Citation Context ...tions to estimate an equation for d ;h, the discount at the hospital-insurer level, as a function of hospital, insurer and market characteristics. We specify a logistic functional form so that d ;h 2 =-=[0; 1]-=- and derive an equation that can be estimated using nonlinear least squares. Explanatory variables include, for example, indicators for for-pro…t hospitals and hospitals that are members of systems (g... |

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