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## Learning And Noisy Equilibrium Behavior In An Experimental STUDY OF IMPERFECT PRICE COMPETITION (2000)

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Venue: | International Economic Review |

Citations: | 19 - 6 self |

### Citations

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Citation Context ..., by introducing a set of "near-maximizing agents" (Akerlof and Yellen, 1985), ε-equilibria (Radner, 1980), or probabilistic choice models of boundedly rational equilibrium behavior (Rosent=-=hal, 1989; McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995-=-). The intuition behind the Akerlof and Yellen model is that some firms may not respond optimally to changes in an exogenous parameter, but this inertia may have only a second-order effect if profit f... |

606 | Predicting how people play games: Reinforcement learning in experimental games with unique, mixed strategy equilibria,” American Economic Review 88 - Erev, Roth - 1998 |

580 | Discrete Choice Theory of Product Differentiation - Anderson, Palma, et al. - 1992 |

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Quantity precommitment and Bertrand competition yield Cournot outcomes
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Citation Context ...ut pricing behavior. Examples of the first approach include product differentiation (e.g. Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse, 1992), consumer search costs (e.g. Diamond, 1971), capacity constraints (e.g. =-=Kreps and Scheinkman, 1983-=-), and trigger-price strategies in repeated games (e.g. Friedman, 1971; Porter, 1983). These changes in structural assumptions add realism and richness to price competition models, but they cannot be ... |

500 | Individual choice behavior - Luce - 1959 |

488 |
P.(1971): \A model of price adjustment
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Citation Context ...y structure or changing the assumptions about pricing behavior. Examples of the first approach include product differentiation (e.g. Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse, 1992), consumer search costs (e.g. =-=Diamond, 1971-=-), capacity constraints (e.g. Kreps and Scheinkman, 1983), and trigger-price strategies in repeated games (e.g. Friedman, 1971; Porter, 1983). These changes in structural assumptions add realism and r... |

289 |
A non-cooperative equilibrium for supergames
- Friedman
- 1971
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Citation Context ...n (e.g. Anderson, de Palma, and Thisse, 1992), consumer search costs (e.g. Diamond, 1971), capacity constraints (e.g. Kreps and Scheinkman, 1983), and trigger-price strategies in repeated games (e.g. =-=Friedman, 1971-=-; Porter, 1983). These changes in structural assumptions add realism and richness to price competition models, but they cannot be the whole story, since pricing above marginal cost persists in experim... |

152 |
Can Small Deviations from Rationality Make Significant Differences to Economic Equilibria?” American Economic Review 75(4): 708–720
- Akerlof, Yellen
- 1985
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...Gneezy, 2000). The second approach to the Bertrand paradox generally involves some relaxation of the assumption of perfect rationality, for example, by introducing a set of ‘‘nearmaximizing agents’’ (=-=Akerlof and Yellen, 1985-=-), e-equilibria (Radner, 1980), or probabilistic choice models of boundedly rational equilibrium behavior (Rosenthal, 1989; McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995). In the Akerlof and Yellen model, a fraction of ... |

134 | A study of cartel stability: The joint executive committe, 1880—1886
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Citation Context ..., de Palma, and Thisse, 1992), consumer search costs (e.g. Diamond, 1971), capacity constraints (e.g. Kreps and Scheinkman, 1983), and trigger-price strategies in repeated games (e.g. Friedman, 1971; =-=Porter, 1983-=-). These changes in structural assumptions add realism and richness to price competition models, but they cannot be the whole story, since pricing above marginal cost persists in experiments that impl... |

83 |
Anomalous Behavior in a Traveler's Dilemma
- Capra, Goeree, et al.
- 1999
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...of a dynamic learning model to predict trends in adjustment to equilibrium. These predictions are derived by using an error rate and a learning parameter estimated from a prior laboratory experiment (=-=Capra et al., 1999-=-). The predictions are then evaluated with a new experiment in which the parameter representing the market share of the high price firm is changed. Finally, the data from the experiment are used to es... |

81 | Experimental sealed bid first price auctions with directly observed bid functions." Games and human behavior: Essays in honor of Amnon Rapoport - Selten, Buchta - 1999 |

78 | André de Palma and Jacques-Francois Thisse - Anderson - 1992 |

76 | Individual Learning in Normal Form Games: Some Laboratory Results - Cheung |

73 | Collusive behavior in noncooperative epsilon-equilibria of oligopolies with long but finite lives
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Citation Context ... Bertrand paradox generally involves some relaxation of the assumption of perfect rationality, for example, by introducing a set of ‘‘nearmaximizing agents’’ (Akerlof and Yellen, 1985), e-equilibria (=-=Radner, 1980-=-), or probabilistic choice models of boundedly rational equilibrium behavior (Rosenthal, 1989; McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995). In the Akerlof and Yellen model, a fraction of the population fails to maxim... |

71 | Price competition and market concentration: an experimental study - Dufwenberg, Gneezy - 2000 |

53 | Experience Weighted Attraction Learning in Normal-Form Games - Camerer, Ho - 1999 |

39 | Learning and Incentive Compatible Mechanisms for Public Goods Provision: An Experimental Study - Chen, Tang - 1998 |

30 | Stochastic Game Theory: Adjustment and Equilibrium Under Bounded Rationality - Anderson, Goeree, et al. - 1997 |

29 | Adaptive Learning Vs. Equilibrium Refinements in an Entry Limit Pricing Game - Cooper, Garvin, et al. - 1997 |

26 | Facilitating Practices: The Effects of Advance Notice and Best-Price Policies - Holt, Scheffman - 1987 |

25 |
A Bounded Rationality Approach to the Study of Noncooperative Games
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Citation Context ...rationality, e.g., by introducing a set of "near-maximizing agents" (Akerlof and Yellen, 1985), ε-equilibria (Radner, 1980), or probabilistic choice models of boundedly rational equilibrium=-= behavior (Rosenthal, 1989-=-; McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995). The intuition behind the Akerlof and Yellen model is that some firms may not respond optimally to changes in an exogenous parameter, but this inertia may have only a sec... |

20 | The logit equilibrium: a perspective on intuitive behavioral anomalies - Anderson, Goeree, et al. - 2002 |

17 |
Anomalous behavior in a Traveler’s Dilemma. American Economic Review 89:678–90
- Capra, Goeree, et al.
- 1999
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...of a dynamic learning model to predict trends in adjustment to equilibrium. These predictions are derived by using an error rate and a learning parameter estimated from a prior laboratory experiment (=-=Capra et al., 1999-=-). The predictions are then evaluated with a new experiment in which the parameter representing the market share of the highprice firm is changed. Finally, the data from the experiment are used to est... |

16 | Naive Bayesian learning and adjustment to equilibrium in signaling games: Instituto de Análisis Económico and - Brandts, Holt - 2005 |

13 |
Collusive Behavior in Oligopolies with Long but Finite Lives
- Radner
- 1980
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...h to the Bertrand paradox generally involves some relaxation of the assumption of perfect rationality, e.g., by introducing a set of "near-maximizing agents" (Akerlof and Yellen, 1985), ε-e=-=quilibria (Radner, 1980-=-), or probabilistic choice models of boundedly rational equilibrium behavior (Rosenthal, 1989; McKelvey and Palfrey, 1995). The intuition behind the Akerlof and Yellen model is that some firms may not... |

12 | Experience Weighted Attraction Learning - Camerer, Ho - 1999 |

7 | Bounded Rationality in Homogeneous Product Pricing Games - Baye, Morgan - 1999 |

5 | Ido Erev (1995) "Learning in Extensive-Form Games: Experimental Data and Simple Dynamic Models in the Intermediate Term - Roth - 1995 |

4 | Individual Choice Behavior (New - Luce - 1959 |

1 | Fang-Fang Tang (1998) "Learning and Incentive Compatable Mechanisms for Public Goods Provision: An Experimental Study - Chen |

1 | Bounded Rationality - Baye, Morgan - 1999 |

1 | Stochastic Learning Equilibrium,’’ mimeo - Goeree, Holt - 2001 |

1 | Risk Averse Behavior in Asymmetric Matching Pennies Games,’’ mimeo - Palfrey - 2000 |