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## Learning Efficient Nash Equilibria in Distributed Systems (2010)

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Citations: | 15 - 1 self |

### Citations

497 | The evolution of conventions
- Young
- 1993
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...time). This contrasts with many other adaptive learning procedures – including ordinary log linear learning – that select the risk dominant equilibrium in 2 x 2 games (Kandori, Mailath and Rob, 1993; =-=Young, 1993-=-; Blume, 1993, 1995, 2003). 12Example 2. Let � be a 2� 2 game with payoff matrix A B A 30,30 0, 40 B 24,23 10,20 This game has no pure Nash equilibria, so by theorem 1 the learning process selects th... |

435 | Individual strategy and social structure: An evolutionary theory of institutions - Young - 1998 |

339 |
The statistical mechanics of strategic interaction
- Blume
- 1993
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Citation Context ...ontrasts with many other adaptive learning procedures – including ordinary log linear learning – that select the risk dominant equilibrium in 2 x 2 games (Kandori, Mailath and Rob, 1993; Young, 1993; =-=Blume, 1993-=-, 1995, 2003). 12Example 2. Let � be a 2� 2 game with payoff matrix A B A 30,30 0, 40 B 24,23 10,20 This game has no pure Nash equilibria, so by theorem 1 the learning process selects the combination... |

246 | Selfish Routing and the Price of Anarchy
- Roughgarden
- 2005
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...at result from particular learning rules? In the last few years the study of these issues has been developing rapidly among computer scientists and distributed control theorists (Papadimitriou, 2001; =-=Roughgarden, 2005-=-; Mannor and Shamma, 2007; Marden and Shamma, 2008; Marden, Arslan, and Shamma, 2009; Marden et al., 2009; Asadpour and Saberi, 2009; Shah and Shin, 2010). Concurrently game theorists have been invest... |

149 | Algorithms, games, and the internet
- Papadimitriou
- 2001
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Citation Context ... of the equilibria that result from particular learning rules? In the last few years the study of these issues has been developing rapidly among computer scientists and distributed control theorists (=-=Papadimitriou, 2001-=-; Roughgarden, 2005; Mannor and Shamma, 2007; Marden and Shamma, 2008; Marden, Arslan, and Shamma, 2009; Marden et al., 2009; Asadpour and Saberi, 2009; Shah and Shin, 2010). Concurrently game theoris... |

96 | The statistical mechanics of best-response strategy revision - Blume - 1995 |

79 | Uncoupled Dynamics do not Lead to Nash Equilibrium
- Hart, Mas-Colell
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...Concurrently game theorists have been investigating the question of whether decentralized rules can be devised that converge to Nash equilibrium (or correlated equilibrium) in general n-person games (=-=Hart and Mas-Colell, 2003-=-, 2006; Foster and Young, 2003, 2006; Young, 2009; Hart and Mansour, 2010). Among control theorists and computer scientists, the issue is not whether a given learning rule is descriptively accurate as... |

59 | Evolving Aspirations and Cooperation - Karandikar, Mookherjee, et al. - 1998 |

51 | Evolutionary Implementation and Congestion Pricing - Sandholm - 2002 |

45 | Now noise matters - Blume - 2003 |

40 | Revisiting log-linear learning: Asynchrony, completeness and a payoff-based implementation. Under submission
- Marden, Shamma
(Show Context)
Citation Context ... the last few years the study of these issues has been developing rapidly among computer scientists and distributed control theorists (Papadimitriou, 2001; Roughgarden, 2005; Mannor and Shamma, 2007; =-=Marden and Shamma, 2008-=-; Marden, Arslan, and Shamma, 2009; Marden et al., 2009; Asadpour and Saberi, 2009; Shah and Shin, 2010). Concurrently game theorists have been investigating the question of whether decentralized rule... |

39 | Stochastic Uncoupled Dynamics and Nash Equilibrium - Hart, Mas-Colell |

37 | Regret testing: Learning to play Nash equilibrium without knowing you have an opponent - Foster, Young - 2006 |

31 | Cooperative control and potential games
- Marden, Arslan, et al.
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...tudy of these issues has been developing rapidly among computer scientists and distributed control theorists (Papadimitriou, 2001; Roughgarden, 2005; Mannor and Shamma, 2007; Marden and Shamma, 2008; =-=Marden, Arslan, and Shamma, 2009-=-; Marden et al., 2009; Asadpour and Saberi, 2009; Shah and Shin, 2010). Concurrently game theorists have been investigating the question of whether decentralized rules can be devised that converge to ... |

29 | Payoff-based dynamics for multiplayer weakly acyclic games
- Marden, Young, et al.
- 2009
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Citation Context ...loping rapidly among computer scientists and distributed control theorists (Papadimitriou, 2001; Roughgarden, 2005; Mannor and Shamma, 2007; Marden and Shamma, 2008; Marden, Arslan, and Shamma, 2009; =-=Marden et al., 2009-=-; Asadpour and Saberi, 2009; Shah and Shin, 2010). Concurrently game theorists have been investigating the question of whether decentralized rules can be devised that converge to Nash equilibrium (or ... |

19 | Achieving Pareto optimality through distributed learning - Marden, Young, et al. - 2012 |

18 | How Long to Equilibrium? The Communication Complexity of Uncoupled Equilibrium Procedures
- Hart, Mansour
- 2010
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...decentralized rules can be devised that converge to Nash equilibrium (or correlated equilibrium) in general n-person games (Hart and Mas-Colell, 2003, 2006; Foster and Young, 2003, 2006; Young, 2009; =-=Hart and Mansour, 2010-=-). Among control theorists and computer scientists, the issue is not whether a given learning rule is descriptively accurate as a model of human behavior, but whether it leads to good system-wide perf... |

17 |
Some learning rules for acquiring information
- Houston, Kacelnik, et al.
- 1982
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Citation Context ... realized average. This approach is known to converge to Nash equilibrium in 2 x 2 games but not in general (Bowling and Veloso, 2002). Similar ideas have been used to model animal foraging behavior (=-=Houston, Kacelnik, and McNamara, 1982-=-; Motro and Shmida, 1995; Thuijsman, Peleg, Amitai, and Shmida, 1995). For example, bees tend to search in the neighborhood of the last visited flower as long as the nectar yield is high, and search w... |

16 | Multi-agent learning for engineers
- Mannor, Shamma
- 2007
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...icular learning rules? In the last few years the study of these issues has been developing rapidly among computer scientists and distributed control theorists (Papadimitriou, 2001; Roughgarden, 2005; =-=Mannor and Shamma, 2007-=-; Marden and Shamma, 2008; Marden, Arslan, and Shamma, 2009; Marden et al., 2009; Asadpour and Saberi, 2009; Shah and Shin, 2010). Concurrently game theorists have been investigating the question of w... |

16 | Automata, matching and foraging behavior of bees
- Thuijsman, Peleg, et al.
- 1995
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...quilibrium in 2 x 2 games but not in general (Bowling and Veloso, 2002). Similar ideas have been used to model animal foraging behavior (Houston, Kacelnik, and McNamara, 1982; Motro and Shmida, 1995; =-=Thuijsman, Peleg, Amitai, and Shmida, 1995-=-). For example, bees tend to search in the neighborhood of the last visited flower as long as the nectar yield is high, and search widely 9for an alternative patch otherwise (this is known as a near-... |

13 | On the inefficiency ratio of stable equilibria in congestion games - Asadpour, Saberi - 2009 |

10 | Global convergence of Foster and Young’s regret testing - Germano, Lugosi - 2007 |

10 | Learning, mutation and long-run equilibrium in games. Econometrica 61 - Kandori, Mailath, et al. - 1993 |

7 |
Completely uncoupled dynamics and Nash equilibria. working paper
- Babichenko
- 2010
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Citation Context ...ium with high probability. Indeed it can be shown that, for general n-person games, there exist no completely uncoupled rules with finite memory that select a Nash equilibrium in this stronger sense (=-=Babichenko, 2010-=-; see also Hart and Mas-Colell, 2003, 2006). The learning rule that we propose is related to the trial and error learning procedure of Young (2009), and more distantly related to the ‘learning by samp... |

4 | Near-far search: an evolutionarily stable foraging strategy - Motro, Shmida - 1995 |

1 |
On the inefficiency ratio of stable equilibria
- Asadpour, Saberi
- 2009
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...computer scientists and distributed control theorists (Papadimitriou, 2001; Roughgarden, 2005; Mannor and Shamma, 2007; Marden and Shamma, 2008; Marden, Arslan, and Shamma, 2009; Marden et al., 2009; =-=Asadpour and Saberi, 2009-=-; Shah and Shin, 2010). Concurrently game theorists have been investigating the question of whether decentralized rules can be devised that converge to Nash equilibrium (or correlated equilibrium) in ... |

1 |
Multi-agent learning with a variable learning rate
- Bowling, Veloso
- 2002
(Show Context)
Citation Context ...benchmark actions, and u is an n-vector of their benchmark payoffs. For 2 Learning rules with high and low rates of exploration have been studied in a variety of settings, including computer science (=-=Bowling and Veloso, 2002-=-) and biology (Thuijsman et al., 1995). 5simplicity we assume that each u i is consistent with some payoff in the game, that is, u � u ( a ) for some a�A. Since A is finite, it follows that the state... |

1 | Average testing and the efficient boundary,” Working Paper - Arieli, Babichenko - 2011 |

1 | 2010b, “How long to Pareto efficiency?”, Working Paper 562 - Babichenko |