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Algorithmic mechanism design (1999)

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by Noam Nisan , Amir Ronen
Venue:Games and Economic Behavior
Citations:662 - 23 self
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Citations

2633 A Course in Game Theory - Osborne, Rubinstein - 1994
1754 Counterspeculation, auctions, and competitive sealed tenders - Vickrey - 1961
1560 The byzantine generals problem - Lamport, Shostak, et al. - 1982
976 Multipart Pricing of Public Goods - Clarke - 1971
778 Incentives in teams - Groves - 1973
678 Approximation Algorithms for NP-Hard Problems - Hochbaum - 1996
344 Computationally manageable combinatorial auctions. - RothKopf, Pekec, et al. - 1998
322 Microeconomic Theory. - Mas-Collel, Whinston, et al. - 1995
307 Characterization of satisfactory mechanisms for the revelation of preferences for public goods - Green, Laffont - 1977
306 Selling spectrum rights. - McMillan - 1994
265 Approximation algorithms for scheduling unrelated parallel machines. - Lenstra, Shmoys, et al. - 1990
236 Pricing in Computer Networks: Reshaping the Research Agenda. - Shenker, Clark, et al. - 1996
157 Auction protocols for decentralized scheduling. - Wellman, Walsh, et al. - 2001
139 Architecting noncooperative networks - Korilis, Lazar, et al. - 1995
124 Limitations of the vickrey auction in computational multiagent systems. - Sandholm - 1996
111 Exact and approximate algorithms for scheduling non-identical processors,” - Horowitz, Sahni - 1976
91 Algorithmic mechanism design (extended abstract)” - Nisan, Ronen - 1999
89 A Market Protocol for Decentralized Task Allocation,” - Walsh, Wellman - 1998
88 Rosenschein and Gilad Zlotkin. Rules of Encounter: Designing Conventions for Automated Negotiation Among Computers - Jeffrey - 1994
48 Algorithms for selfish agents. - Nisan - 1999
40 The progressive second price auction mechanism for network resource sharing,” - Lazar, Semret - 1998
36 Distributed Computation as an Economic System. - Huberman, Hogg - 1995
21 The characterization of implementable choise rules - Roberts - 1979
14 Rosenschein and Gilad Zlotkin. Rules of Encounter: Designing Conventions for Automated Negotiation Among Computers - S - 1994
13 M.: On the value of information in distributed decision-making - Papadimitriou, Yannakakis - 1991
12 Computational aspects of organization theory - Papadimitriou - 1997
11 A dynamic theory of incentives in multi-agent systems (preliminary report - Shoham, Tanaka - 1997
8 Papadimitriou and Mihalis Yannakakis. Linear programming without the matrix - Christos - 1993
4 Christos Nikolaou, and Yechiam Yemini. Economic models for allocating resources in computer systems - Ferguson - 1995
4 Game theoretic aspects of computing - Lineal - 1994
4 design inc. Web - Market
4 Algorithms for sel sh agents - Nisan
3 The clarke tax as a concensus mechanism among automated agents - Ephrati, Rosenschein - 1991
1 Algorithms for selfish agents. To appear - Nisan - 1999
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