Abstract: This paper presents a summary overview of the fast-developing field of artificial life, stressing aspects especially relevant for the study of decentralized market economies. In particular, a recently developed trade network game (TNG) is used to illustrate how the basic artificial life paradigm might be specialized to economics. The TNG traders choose and refuse trade partners on the basis of continually updated expected utility and evolve their trade behavior over time. Analytical and simulation work is reported to indicate how the TNG is currently being used to study the evolutionary implications of alternative market structures at three different levels: individual trade behavior; trade network formation; and social welfare. 1
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