Implicit and explicit attitude tests are often weakly correlated, leading some theorists to conclude that implicit and explicit cognition are independent. Popular implicit and explicit tests, however, differ in many ways beyond implicit and explicit cognition. The authors examined in 4 studies whether correlations between implicit and explicit tests were influenced by the similarity in task demands (i.e., structural fit) and, hence, the processes engaged by each test. Using an affect misattribution procedure, they systematically varied the structural fit of implicit and explicit tests of racial attitudes. As test formats became more similar, the implicit–explicit correlation increased until it became higher than in most previous research. When tests differ in structure, they may underestimate the relationship between implicit and explicit cognition. The authors propose a solution that uses procedures to maximize structural fit.

In the present research, the authors examined the effect of a message recipient’s power on attitude change and introduced a new mechanism by which power can affect social judgment. In line with prior research that suggested a link between power and approach tendencies, the authors hypothesized that having power increases confidence relative to being powerless. After demonstrating this link in Experiment 1, in 4 additional studies, they examined the role of power in persuasion as a function of when power is infused into the persuasion process. On the basis of the idea that power validates whatever mental content is accessible, they hypothesized that power would have different effects on persuasion depending on when power was induced. Specifically, the authors predicted that making people feel powerful prior to a message would validate their existing views and thus reduce the perceived need to attend to subsequent information. However, it was hypothesized that inducing power after a message has been processed would validate one’s recently generated thoughts and thus influence the extent to which people rely upon their thoughts in determining their attitudes.

Attitude certainty has been the subject of considerable attention in the attitudes and persuasion literature. The present research identifies 2 aspects of attitude certainty and provides evidence for the distinctness of the constructs. Specifically, it is proposed that attitude certainty can be conceptualized, and empirically separated, in terms of attitude clarity (the subjective sense that one knows what one’s attitude is) and attitude correctness (the subjective sense that one’s attitude is correct or valid). Experiment 1 uses factor analysis and correlational data to provide evidence for viewing attitude clarity and attitude correctness as separate constructs. Experiments 2 and 3 demonstrate that attitude clarity and attitude correctness can have distinct antecedents (repeated expression and consensus feedback, respectively). Experiment 4 reveals that these constructs each play an independent role in persuasion and resistance situations. As clarity and correctness increase, attitudes become more resistant to counterattitudinal persuasive mes-sages. These findings are discussed in relation to the existing attitude strength literature.

ABSTRACT—Experimental paradigms designed to assess ‘‘implicit’ ’ representations are currently very popular in many areas of psychology. The present article addresses the validity of three widespread assumptions in research using these paradigms: that (a) implicit measures reflect unconscious or introspectively inaccessible representa-tions; (b) the major difference between implicit measures and self-reports is that implicit measures are resistant or less susceptible to social desirability; and (c) implicit measures reflect highly stable, older representations that have their roots in long-term socialization experiences. Drawing on a review of the available evidence, we con-clude that the validity of all three assumptions is equivocal and that theoretical interpretations should be adjusted accordingly. We discuss an alternative conceptualization

Gaining insight into the nature and consequences of people’s global self-evaluations (i.e., their self-esteem) has been fraught with difficulty. Nearly 2 decades ago, researchers suggested that such difficulties might be addressed by the development of a new class of measures designed to uncover implicit self-esteem. In this article, we evaluate the construct validity of the 2 most common measures of implicit self-esteem, the Implicit Association Test (IAT) and Name–Letter Test (NLT). Our review indicates that the research literature has not provided strong or consistent support for the validity of either measure. We conclude that both tests are impoverished measures of self-esteem that are better understood as measures of either generalized implicit affect (IAT) or implicit egotism (NLT). However, we suggest that there surely are aspects of self-esteem that people are unwilling or unable to report and suggest a general approach that may allow researchers to tap these unspoken aspects of self-esteem.

Abstract Multiculturalism, or the belief that racial and ethnic differences should be acknowledged and appreciated, has been met with both positive reactions (e.g., decreased prejudice) and negative reactions (e.g., perceptions of threat) from dominant group members. The present research proposes that multiculturalism can either positively or negatively influence White Americans' intergroup attitudes depending on their degree of ethnic identification. In Studies 1 and 2, White Americans primed with multiculturalism exhibited higher social dominance orientation (Study 1) and greater prejudice (Study 2), especially when they identified strongly with their ethnicity. In Study 3, perceptions of threat to group values were found to mediate the relation between multiculturalism, ethnic identification, and prejudice among White Americans. The results are discussed in terms of their implications for threat perceptions, ethnic identification, and conceptions of diversity.

To maintain religious standards, individuals must frequently endure aversive or forsake pleasurable experiences. Yet religious individuals on average display higher levels of emotional well-being compared to nonreligious individuals. The present article seeks to resolve this paradox by suggesting that many forms of religion may facilitate a self-regulatory mode that is flexible, efficient, and largely unconscious. In this implicit mode of self-regulation, religious individuals may be able to strive for high standards and simultaneously maintain high emotional well-being. A review of the empirical literature confirmed that religious stimuli and practices foster implicit self-regulation, particularly among individuals who fully internalized their religion’s standards. The present work suggests that some seemingly irrational aspects of religion may have important psychological benefits by promoting implicit self-regulation. Keywords automatic process, implicit process, self-regulation, religion Take my yoke upon you, and learn of me For my yoke is easy, and my burdens are light Edwin Hawkins Singers, after Matthew 11:29-30 Virtually all religions teach their members to uphold sacred

The persuasion literature has examined several mechanisms that have contributed to understanding the effectiveness of credible, attractive, similar, and powerful sources. These traditionally studied processes focus on how persuasive sources can affect attitudes by serving as peripheral cues or by influencing the direction or the amount of thoughts generated. After describing these processes that operate at the primary level of cognition, we review research on self-validation that demonstrates how and when source factors can affect a secondary cognition—thought confidence. Thought confidence refers to a metacognitive form of cognition. This recently discovered mechanism can account for some already established persuasion outcomes (e.g., more persuasion with high- than low-credibility or similar sources), but by a completely different process than postulated previously. Moreover, under some circumstances we have also been able to obtain findings opposite to those typically observed (e.g., more persuasion with low- than high-credible or similar sources). Our research reveals that a consideration of self-validation processes provides an integrative mechanism for understanding many other unexplored source variables, such as oneself as a source, source matching and mimicry, and threatening sources. Social influence through persuasion is the most prevalent as well as the most civil means of social control available to governments as well as to individuals. In contrast to satisfying wants and needs by using force, violence, terror or threats, persuasion provides an option that is more likely to be successful, lasting, satisfying, and rewarding for everyone. Thus, persuasion is likely to be the most frequent and ultimately efficient approach

a b s t r a c t The manual gestures that hearing children produce when explaining their answers to math problems predict whether they will profit from instruction in those problems. We ask here whether gesture plays a similar role in deaf children, whose primary communication system is in the manual modality. Forty ASL-signing deaf children explained their solutions to math problems and were then given instruction in those problems. Children who produced many gestures conveying different information from their signs (gesture-sign mismatches) were more likely to succeed after instruction than children who produced few, suggesting that mismatch can occur within-modality, and paving the way for using gesture-based teaching strategies with deaf learners.

A metacognitive model (MCM) is presented to describe how automatic (implicit) and deliberative (explicit) measures of attitudes respond to change attempts. The model assumes that contemporary implicit measures tap quick evaluative associations, whereas explicit measures also consider the per-ceived validity of these associations (and other factors). Change in explicit measures is greater than implicit measures when new evaluative associations are formed and old associations are rejected. Implicit measure change is greater than explicit when newly formed evaluative associations are rejected. When implicit and explicit evaluations conflict, implicit ambivalence can occur. The authors relate the MCM to the associative-propositional evaluation model and explain how the MCM builds on the attitude strength assumptions of the elaboration likelihood model of persuasion.