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492
Performance pay and top-management incentives’’,
- Journal of Political Economy,
, 1990
"... Abstract Our estimates of the pay-performance relation (including pay, options, stockholdings, and dismissal) for chief executive officers indicate CEO wealth changes $3.25 for every $1,000 change in shareholder wealth. Although the incentives generated by stock ownership are large relative to pay ..."
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Cited by 1137 (19 self)
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Abstract Our estimates of the pay-performance relation (including pay, options, stockholdings, and dismissal) for chief executive officers indicate CEO wealth changes $3.25 for every $1,000 change in shareholder wealth. Although the incentives generated by stock ownership are large relative to pay and dismissal incentives, most CEOs hold trivial fractions of their firm's stock and ownership levels have declined over the past 50 years. We hypothesize that public and private political forces impose constraints that reduce the pay-performance sensitivity. Declines in both the pay-performance relation and the level of CEO pay since the 1930s are consistent with this hypothesis. * We have benefited from the assistance of
The modern industrial revolution, exit, and the failure of internal control systems
- JOURNAL OF FINANCE
, 1993
"... Since 1973 technological, political, regulatory, and economic forces have been changing the worldwide economy in a fashion comparable to the changes experienced during the nineteenth century Industrial Revolution. As in the nineteenth century, we are experiencing declining costs, increaing average ( ..."
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Cited by 972 (6 self)
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Since 1973 technological, political, regulatory, and economic forces have been changing the worldwide economy in a fashion comparable to the changes experienced during the nineteenth century Industrial Revolution. As in the nineteenth century, we are experiencing declining costs, increaing average (but decreasing marginal) productivity of labor, reduced growth rates of labor income, excess capacity, and the requirement for downsizing and exit. The last two decades indicate corporate internal control systems have failed to deal effectively with these changes, especially slow growth and the requirement for exit. The next several decades pose a major challenge for Western firms and political systems as these forces continue to work their way through the worldwide economy.
Executive Compensation
, 1999
"... This paper summarizes the empirical and theoretical research on executive compensation and provides a comprehensive and up-to-date description of pay practices (and trends in pay practices) for chief executive officers (CEOs). Topics discussed include the level and structure of CEO pay (including de ..."
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Cited by 625 (17 self)
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This paper summarizes the empirical and theoretical research on executive compensation and provides a comprehensive and up-to-date description of pay practices (and trends in pay practices) for chief executive officers (CEOs). Topics discussed include the level and structure of CEO pay (including detailed analyses of annual bonus plans, executive stock options, and option valuation), international pay differences, the pay-setting process, the relation between CEO pay and firm performance (“pay-performance sensitivities”), the relation between sensitivities and subsequent firm performance, relative performance evaluation, executive turnover, and the politics of CEO pay.
Higher market valuation of companies with a small board of directors.
- Journal of Financial Economics
, 1996
"... Abstract I present evidence consistent with theories that small boards of directors are more effective, Using Tobin's Q as an approximation of market valuation, I find an inverse association between board size and firm value in a sample of 452 large U.S. industrial corporations between 1984 an ..."
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Cited by 416 (5 self)
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Abstract I present evidence consistent with theories that small boards of directors are more effective, Using Tobin's Q as an approximation of market valuation, I find an inverse association between board size and firm value in a sample of 452 large U.S. industrial corporations between 1984 and 1991. The result is robust to numerous controls for company size, industry membership, inside stock ownership, growth opportunities, and alternative corporate governance structures. Companies with small boards also exhibit more favorable values for financial ratios, and provide stronger CEO performance incentives from compensation and the threat of dismissal.
Information asymmetry, corporate disclosure, and the capital markets: A review of the empirical disclosure literature
, 2001
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Boards of Directors as an Endogenously Determined Institution: A Survey of the Economic Literature
, 2003
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Relative performance evaluation for chief executive officers
- Industrial and Labor Relations Review 43:30S–51S
, 1990
"... Measured individual performance often depends on random factors which also affect the performances of other workers in the same firm, industry, or market. In these cases, relative performance evaluation (RPE) can provide incentives while partially insulating workers from the common uncertainty. Basi ..."
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Cited by 231 (10 self)
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Measured individual performance often depends on random factors which also affect the performances of other workers in the same firm, industry, or market. In these cases, relative performance evaluation (RPE) can provide incentives while partially insulating workers from the common uncertainty. Basing pay on relative performance, however, generates incentives to sabotage the measured performance of co-workers, to collude with co-workers and shirk, and to apply for jobs with inept co-workers. RPE contracts also are less desirable when the output of co-workers is expensive to measure or in the presence of production externalities, as in the case of team production. The purpose of this paper is to review the benefits and costs of RPE and to test for the presence of RPE in one occupation where the benefits plausibly exceed the costs: toplevel management. Rewarding chief executive officers (CEOs) based on performance measured relative to the industry or market creates incentives to take actions increasing shareholder wealth while insuring executives against the vagaries of the stock and product markets that are beyond their control. We expect RPE to be a common feature of
Agency Problems, Equity Ownership, And Corporate Diversification
, 1995
"... Agency Problems, Equity Ownership, and Corporate Diversification We provide evidence on the agency cost explanation for corporate diversification by documenting three principal findings. First, there is a strong negative relation between the extent of diversification and managerial equity ownership ..."
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Cited by 188 (6 self)
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Agency Problems, Equity Ownership, and Corporate Diversification We provide evidence on the agency cost explanation for corporate diversification by documenting three principal findings. First, there is a strong negative relation between the extent of diversification and managerial equity ownership after controlling for other factors related to diversification. Second, there is a weak negative relation between the value loss from diversification and managerial ownership. Third, decreases in diversification are associated with external corporate control threats, financial distress, and management turnover. These findings are consistent with the hypotheses that agency problems are responsible for firms maintaining value-reducing diversification strategies and that the recent trend towards increased corporate focus is attributable to market disciplinary forces. 3 Agency Problems, Equity Ownership, and Corporate Diversification Several recent studies examine the valuation consequences ...
