• Documents
  • Authors
  • Tables
  • Log in
  • Sign up
  • MetaCart
  • Donate

CiteSeerX logo

Advanced Search Include Citations
Advanced Search Include Citations | Disambiguate

Auctions: a survey of experimental research, 1995 -- 2008 (2008)

by John H. Kagel, Dan Levin
Add To MetaCart

Tools

Sorted by:
Results 1 - 10 of 372
Next 10 →

Auction Theory: A Guide to the Literature

by Paul Klemperer - JOURNAL OF ECONOMIC SURVEYS , 1999
"... This paper provides an elementary, non-technical, survey of auction theory, by introducing and describing some of the critical papers in the subject. (The most important of these are reproduced in a companion book, The Economic Theory of Auctions, Paul Klemperer (ed.), Edward Elgar (pub.), forthco ..."
Abstract - Cited by 534 (5 self) - Add to MetaCart
This paper provides an elementary, non-technical, survey of auction theory, by introducing and describing some of the critical papers in the subject. (The most important of these are reproduced in a companion book, The Economic Theory of Auctions, Paul Klemperer (ed.), Edward Elgar (pub.), forthcoming.) We begin with the most fundamental concepts, and then introduce the basic analysis of optimal auctions, the revenue equivalence theorem, and marginal revenues. Subsequent sections address risk-aversion, affiliation, asymmetries, entry, collusion, multi-unit auctions, double auctions, royalties, incentive contracts, and other topics. Appendices contain technical details, some simple worked examples, and a bibliography for each section.

The Economist as Engineer: Game Theory, Experimentation, and Computation as Tools for Design Economics

by Alvin E. Roth - ECONOMETRICA , 2002
"... Economists have lately been called upon not only to analyze markets, but to design them. Market design involves a responsibility for detail, a need to deal with all of a market’s complications, not just its principle features. Designers therefore cannot work only with the simple conceptual models us ..."
Abstract - Cited by 265 (29 self) - Add to MetaCart
Economists have lately been called upon not only to analyze markets, but to design them. Market design involves a responsibility for detail, a need to deal with all of a market’s complications, not just its principle features. Designers therefore cannot work only with the simple conceptual models used for theoretical insights into the general working of markets. Instead, market design calls for an engineering approach. Drawing primarily on the design of the entry level labor market for American doctors (the National Resident Matching Program), and of the auctions of radio spectrum conducted by the Federal Communications Commission, this paper makes the case that experimental and computational economics are natural complements to game theory in the work of design. The paper also argues that some of the challenges facing both markets involve dealing with related kinds of complementarities, and that this suggests an agenda for future theoretical research.

Minimal-Intelligence Agents for Bargaining Behaviors in Market-Based Environments

by Dave Cliff , 1997
"... This report describes simple mechanisms that allow autonomous software agents to engage in bargaining behaviors in market-based environments. Groups of agents with such mechanisms could be used in applications including market-based control, internet commerce, and economic modelling. After an int ..."
Abstract - Cited by 159 (18 self) - Add to MetaCart
This report describes simple mechanisms that allow autonomous software agents to engage in bargaining behaviors in market-based environments. Groups of agents with such mechanisms could be used in applications including market-based control, internet commerce, and economic modelling. After an introductory discussion of the rationale for this work, and a brief overview of key concepts from economics, work in market-based control is reviewed to highlight the need for bargaining agents. Following this, the early experimental economics work of Smith (1962) and the recent results of Gode and Sunder (1993) are described.

Do explicit warnings eliminate the hypothetical bias in elicitation procedures? Evidence from field auctions for sportscards

by A. List, Ronald G. Cummings, Thank Laura Taylor, Ronald Cummings For Providing, I Thank Craig Gallet, Charles Holt, Matthew Rabin, Jason Shogren, Mark Strazicich - American Economic Review , 2001
"... The goal of environmental policy is to protect the well-being of humans and the ecosystems vital to human existence. Because benefit-cost analyses are now required at the federal level, and increasingly at the state level, much attention has been paid to the development of practical, credible approa ..."
Abstract - Cited by 144 (37 self) - Add to MetaCart
The goal of environmental policy is to protect the well-being of humans and the ecosystems vital to human existence. Because benefit-cost analyses are now required at the federal level, and increasingly at the state level, much attention has been paid to the development of practical, credible approaches for estimating the benefits and costs of environmental programs. Although policy makers have a good handle on measuring the explicit costs associated with increased environmental protection, at present several disparate approaches are utilized to measure economic values of environmental goods and services. Arguably the most contentious of these approaches is the Contingent Valuation Method (CVM), which allows the researcher to measure the total value of the commodity in question (see Peter A. Diamond and Jerry A. Hausman's [1994] critical review). Chief amongst these concems is whether hypothetical bias is inherent in CVM responses. Some recently published studies provide evidence that suggests important differences exist between responses from real and hypothetical valuation questions.1 Recognizing this shortcoming, researchers have adopted both ex ante and ex post techniques to overcome hypothetical bias. Although these attempts have not been completely successful in dealing with hypothetical

Quantal Response Equilibrium and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions

by Jacob K. Goeree, Charles A. Holt, Thomas R. Palfrey - Journal of Economic Theory , 2002
"... This paper reports the results of a private-values auction experiment in which expected costs of deviating from the Nash equilibrium bidding function are asymmetric, with the implication that upward deviations will be more likely in one treatment than in the other. Overbidding is observed in both tr ..."
Abstract - Cited by 108 (21 self) - Add to MetaCart
This paper reports the results of a private-values auction experiment in which expected costs of deviating from the Nash equilibrium bidding function are asymmetric, with the implication that upward deviations will be more likely in one treatment than in the other. Overbidding is observed in both treatments, but is more prevalent in the treatment where the costs of overbidding are lower. We specify and estimate a noisy (quantal response) model of equilibrium behavior. Estimated noise and risk aversion parameters are highly significant and consistent across treatments. The resulting two-parameter model tracks both the average bids and the distribution of bids remarkably well. Alternative explanations of overbidding are also considered. The estimates of parameters from a nonlinear probability weighting function yield a formulation that is essentially equivalent to risk aversion in this context. A model in which players experience a "joy of winning " provides a reasonable fit of the data but does significantly worse than the risk aversion model. 1.

Market power and efficiency in a computational electricity market with discriminatory double-auction pricing

by James Nicolaisen, Valentin Petrov, Leigh Tesfatsion - IEEE Transactions on Evolutionary Computation , 2001
"... Abstract-- This study reports experimental market power and efficiency outcomes for a computational wholesale electricity market operating in the short run under systematically varied concentration and capacity conditions. The pricing of electricity is determined by means of a clearinghouse double a ..."
Abstract - Cited by 93 (7 self) - Add to MetaCart
Abstract-- This study reports experimental market power and efficiency outcomes for a computational wholesale electricity market operating in the short run under systematically varied concentration and capacity conditions. The pricing of electricity is determined by means of a clearinghouse double auction with discriminatory midpoint pricing. Buyers and sellers use a modified Roth-Erev individual reinforcement learning algorithm to determine their price and quantity offers in each auction round. It is shown that high market efficiency is generally attained, and that market microstructure is strongly predictive for the relative market power of buyers and sellers, independently of the values set for the reinforcement learning parameters. Results are briefly compared against results from an earlier study in which buyers and sellers instead engage in social mimicry learning via genetic algorithms. Index Terms – Wholesale electricity market, restructuring, repeated double auction, market power, efficiency, concentration, capacity, individual reinforcement learning, genetic algorithm social learning, agent-based computational economics. I.
(Show Context)

Citation Context

...al learning. Our electricity buyers and sellers are assumed to learn in accordance with a modified version 3 of a reinforcement learning algorithm developed by Roth and 1 As discussed in [7] and [11]-=-=[13]-=-, researchers studying auctions by means of analytical tools and human-subject laboratory experiments have focused largely on simpler auction contexts in which the scope for opportunistic behavior is ...

Behavior in multi-unit demand auctions: experiments with uniform-price and dynamic Vickrey auctions

by John H. Kagel, Dan Levin - Econometrica , 2001
"... We experimentally investigate the sensitivity of bidders demanding multiple units of a homogeneous commodity to the demand reduction incentives inherent in uniform price auctions. There is substantial demand reduction in both sealed bid and ascending price clock auctions with feedback regarding riva ..."
Abstract - Cited by 81 (8 self) - Add to MetaCart
We experimentally investigate the sensitivity of bidders demanding multiple units of a homogeneous commodity to the demand reduction incentives inherent in uniform price auctions. There is substantial demand reduction in both sealed bid and ascending price clock auctions with feedback regarding rivals’ drop-out prices. Although both auctions have the same normal form representation, bidding is much closer to equilibrium in the ascending price auctions. We explore the behavioral process underlying these differences along with dynamic Vickrey auctions designed to eliminate the inefficiencies resulting from demand reduction in the uniform price auctions. Key words: multi-unit demand auctions, uniform price auction, dynamic Vickrey auction, demand reduction, experiment.
(Show Context)

Citation Context

...ng to lose money, since comparisons of the standing price with resale values should alert bidders that they are bound to lose money if they win with a price exceeding their value (Kagel et al., 1987; =-=Kagel, 1995-=-). These conjectures have not been followed by any systematic experimental investigations that we are aware of. It does, however, suggest that bidding will be closer to equilibrium in our multi-unit d...

Level-k Auctions: Can a Nonequilibrium Model of Strategic Thinking Explain the Winner’s Curse and Overbidding in Private-Value Auctions?

by Vincent P. Crawford, Nagore Iriberri - ECONOMETRICA , 2005
"... ..."
Abstract - Cited by 80 (3 self) - Add to MetaCart
Abstract not found

Public versus secret reserve prices in eBay auctions: Results from a Pokémon field experiment

by Rama Katkar, David Lucking-reiley , 2000
"... Sellers in eBay auctions have the opportunity to choose both a public minimum bid amount and a secret reserve price. We ask, empirically, whether the seller is made better or worse off by setting a secret reserve above a low minimum bid, versus the option of making the reserve public by using it as ..."
Abstract - Cited by 57 (1 self) - Add to MetaCart
Sellers in eBay auctions have the opportunity to choose both a public minimum bid amount and a secret reserve price. We ask, empirically, whether the seller is made better or worse off by setting a secret reserve above a low minimum bid, versus the option of making the reserve public by using it as the minimum bid level. In a field experiment, we auction 50 matched pairs of Pokémon cards on eBay, half with secret reserves and half with equivalently high public minimum bids. We find that secret reserve prices make us worse off as sellers, by reducing the probability of the auction resulting in a sale, deterring serious bidders from entering the auction, and lowering the expected transaction price of the auction.

The Spite Motive and Equilibrium Behavior in Auctions, Contributions to Economic Analysis & Policy 2, Article 5

by John Morgan, Ken Steiglitz, George Reis , 2003
"... We study auctions where bidders have independent private values but attach a disutility to the surplus of rivals, and derive symmetric equilibria for first-price, second-price, English, and Dutch auctions. We find that equilibrium bidding is more aggressive than standard predictions. Indeed, in seco ..."
Abstract - Cited by 53 (2 self) - Add to MetaCart
We study auctions where bidders have independent private values but attach a disutility to the surplus of rivals, and derive symmetric equilibria for first-price, second-price, English, and Dutch auctions. We find that equilibrium bidding is more aggressive than standard predictions. Indeed, in second-price auctions it is optimal to bid above one’s valuation; that is, bidding “frenzies ” can arise in equilibrium. Further, revenue equivalence between second-price and first-price auctions breaks down, with second-price outperforming first-price. We also find that strategic equivalence between second-price and English auctions no longer holds, although they remain revenue equivalent. We conclude that spiteful bidding rationalizes anomalies observed in laboratory experiments across the four auction forms better than the leading alternatives.
(Show Context)

Citation Context

...e most successful real-world applications of information economics, a number of puzzling discrepancies between the predictions of theory and behavior in laboratory experiments have been observed (see =-=Kagel, 1995-=- and Davis and Holt, 1993 for useful surveys of auction theory and laboratory experiments). In this paper we explore the consequences of a model for bidder behavior that incorporates, in addition to a...

Powered by: Apache Solr
  • About CiteSeerX
  • Submit and Index Documents
  • Privacy Policy
  • Help
  • Data
  • Source
  • Contact Us

Developed at and hosted by The College of Information Sciences and Technology

© 2007-2016 The Pennsylvania State University