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The faithfulness of abstract protocol analysis: Message authentication
- Journal of Computer Security
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Cited by 39 (5 self)
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Compositional analysis of authentication protocols
- In Proceedings of European Symposium on Programming (ESOP 2004
, 2004
"... We propose a new method for the static analysis of entity authentication protocols. We develop our approach based on a dialect of the spi-calculus as the underlying formalism for expressing protocol narrations. Our analysis validates the honest protocol participants against static (hence decidable) ..."
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Cited by 17 (10 self)
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We propose a new method for the static analysis of entity authentication protocols. We develop our approach based on a dialect of the spi-calculus as the underlying formalism for expressing protocol narrations. Our analysis validates the honest protocol participants against static (hence decidable) conditions that provide formal guarantees of entity authentication. The main result is that the validation of each component is provably sound and fully compositional: if all the protocol participants are successfully validated, then the protocol as a whole guarantees entity authentication in the presence of Dolev-Yao intruders. 1
Fast Automatic Synthesis of Security Protocols Using Backward Search
, 2003
"... An automatic security protocol generator is proposed that uses logic-based synthesis rules to guide it in a backward search for suitable protocols from protocol goals. The approach taken is unlike existing automatic protocol generators which typically carry out a forward search for candidate protoco ..."
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Cited by 8 (2 self)
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An automatic security protocol generator is proposed that uses logic-based synthesis rules to guide it in a backward search for suitable protocols from protocol goals. The approach taken is unlike existing automatic protocol generators which typically carry out a forward search for candidate protocols from the protocol assumptions. A prototype generator has been built that performs well in the automatic generation of authentication and key exchange protocols.
Term-based composition of security protocols
- IN THE PROCEEEDINGS OF THE 16 TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON AUTOMATION, QUALITY AND TESTING, ROBOTICS, AQTR
, 2008
"... In the context of security protocol parallel composition, where messages belonging to different protocols can intersect each other, we introduce a new paradigm: termbased composition (i.e. the composition of message components also known as terms). First, we create a protocol specification model by ..."
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Cited by 3 (1 self)
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In the context of security protocol parallel composition, where messages belonging to different protocols can intersect each other, we introduce a new paradigm: termbased composition (i.e. the composition of message components also known as terms). First, we create a protocol specification model by extending the original strand spaces. Then, we provide a term composition algorithm based on which new terms can be constructed. To ensure that security properties are maintained, we introduce the concept of term connections to express the existing connections between terms and encryption contexts. We illustrate the proposed composition process by using two existing protocols.
Formal Protocol Design of ESIKE Based on Authentication Tests
"... In this paper, we first present a concrete formal protocol design approach, which is based on authentication tests, to create an Efficient and Secure Internet Key Exchange (ESIKE) protocol. Then we formally prove the secure properties of ESIKE with strand space model and authentication tests. The ES ..."
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Cited by 2 (0 self)
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In this paper, we first present a concrete formal protocol design approach, which is based on authentication tests, to create an Efficient and Secure Internet Key Exchange (ESIKE) protocol. Then we formally prove the secure properties of ESIKE with strand space model and authentication tests. The ESIKE protocol overcomes the security shortages of the Internet Key Exchange (IKE), and can provide secure negotiation of session key and Security Association (SA), protection of endpoints ’ identities, and mutual authentication between the initiator and the responder. It needs only three messages and less computational load, so it is simple and efficient.
A Collaborative Approach to Autonomic Security Protocols ABSTRACT
"... This paper considers a new security protocol paradigm whereby principals negotiate and on-the-fly generate security protocols according to their needs. When principals wish to interact then, rather than offering each other a fixed menu of ‘known ’ protocols, they negotiate and, possibly with the col ..."
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Cited by 1 (0 self)
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This paper considers a new security protocol paradigm whereby principals negotiate and on-the-fly generate security protocols according to their needs. When principals wish to interact then, rather than offering each other a fixed menu of ‘known ’ protocols, they negotiate and, possibly with the collaboration of other principles, synthesise a new protocol that is tailored specifically to their current security environment and requirements. This approach provides a basis for autonomic security protocols. Such protocols are self-configuring since only principal assumptions and protocol goals need to be a-priori configured. The approach has the potential to survive security compromises that can be modelled as changes in the beliefs of the principals. A compromise of a key or a change in the trust relationships between principals can result in a principal self-healing and synthesising a new protocol to survive the event. 1.
Verifying the Independence of Security Protocols
"... Determining if two protocols can be securely run alongside each other requires analyzing the independence of the involved protocols. In this paper we construct a canonical model of security protocols that allows us to conduct a syntactical analysis on the independence of multiple security protocols. ..."
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Cited by 1 (0 self)
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Determining if two protocols can be securely run alongside each other requires analyzing the independence of the involved protocols. In this paper we construct a canonical model of security protocols that allows us to conduct a syntactical analysis on the independence of multiple security protocols. By integrating participant knowledge in the model, we are able to detect subtle multi-protocol attacks, where the types of certain message components can not be checked, also known as type-flaw attacks. Of special interest is the construction of messages in the proposed model, which is made by mapping each message component from the regular specification to a type. We provide a theorem for analyzing the independence of security protocols and illustrate its applicability by analyzing two protocols.
A NOVEL METHODOLOGY TO DESIGN SECURITY PROTOCOLS BASED ON A NEW SET OF DESIGN PRINCIPLES
"... This paper presents a novel design methodology based on a new set of design principles to develop step-by-step security protocols for up to three participants, guiding the designer on each step. It accompanies the designer through a succession of six abstraction levels proposed in this work: protoco ..."
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This paper presents a novel design methodology based on a new set of design principles to develop step-by-step security protocols for up to three participants, guiding the designer on each step. It accompanies the designer through a succession of six abstraction levels proposed in this work: protocol objectives, protocol constraints, security mechanisms, message flow, protocol conformation and authentication tests. The methodology proposed is based on a new set of design principles extracted from different sources and combined using the systemic approach, which considers the designer and client’s security and functional needs. The resulting model separates high-level tasks from implementation details, allowing the designer to specify the security requirements and functionality desired for each abstraction level. Consequently, the protocol design is linked with the best-fitting design principle. To corroborate the results of the methodology, the resulting protocol in the Alice and Bob notation in the fifth level is tested using the “Strand Spaces ” Model. The Needham-Schroeder protocol with symmetric keys was successfully used as a test. The security goals achieved were: authentication, confidentiality, integrity, and non-repudiation.