In this paper we propose a new variance estimator for OLS as well as for nonlinear estimators such as logit, probit and GMM. This variance estimator enables cluster-robust inference when there is two-way or multi-way clustering that is nonnested. The variance estimator extends the standard cluster-robust variance estimator or sandwich estimator for one-way clustering (e.g. Liang and Zeger (1986), Arellano (1987)) and relies on similar relatively weak distributional assumptions. Our method is easily implemented in statistical packages, such as Stata and SAS, that already offer cluster-robust standard errors when there is one-way clustering. The method is demonstrated by a Monte Carlo analysis for a two-way random effects model; a Monte Carlo analysis of a placebo law that extends the state-year effects example of Bertrand et al. (2004) to two dimensions; and by application to two studies in the empirical public/labor literature where two-way clustering is present.

We examine the dynamic behavior of corporate capital structures in order to determine the empirical relevance of recent theories. We begin by showing that capital structure is highly persistent, so much so that the cross-sectional distribution of leverage in the year prior to the IPO is largely unchanged almost twenty years later. Moreover, our analysis suggests that market timing (Baker and Wurgler (2002)) and inertia (Welch (2004)) are unlikely explanations for the observed cross-sectional variation in capital structures, which exists prior to firms ’ IPOs. Rather, our results indicate that factors associated with debt policy have significant and long lasting effects on capital structure, as opposed to factors associated with equity policy. Further analysis of capital structures at the time of and prior to the IPO reveal heterogeneity in private financing decisions and debt contracts consistent with segmented capital markets. While suggestive, ultimately our results suggest a critical need for understanding variation in corporate debt policies and the determination of private firms ’ capital structures in order to better understand public firms ’ capital structures, the latter of which are largely a reflection of the former. A common theme among recent investigations into corporate capital structure is the

In the presence of frictions, firms adjust their capital structure infrequently. As a consequence, in a dynamic economy the leverage of most firms is likely to differ from the “optimum ” leverage at the time of readjustment. This paper explores the empirical implications of this observation. I use a calibrated dynamic trade-off model to simulate firms ’ capital structure paths. The results of standard cross-sectional tests on these data are consistent with those reported in the empirical literature. In particular, the standard interpretation of some test results leads to the rejection of the underlying model. Taken together, the results suggest a rethinking of the way capital structure tests are conducted. RECENT EMPIRICAL RESEARCH IN CAPITAL STRUCTURE focuses on regularities in the cross section of leverage to discriminate between various theories of financing policy. In this research, book and market leverage are related to profitabil-ity, book-to-market, and firm size. Changes in market leverage are largely ex-plained by changes in equity value. Past book-to-market ratios predict current

We identify a specific channel (debt covenants) and the corresponding mechanism (transfer of control rights) through which financing frictions impact corporate invest-ment. Using a regression discontinuity design, we show that capital investment de-clines sharply following a financial covenant violation, when creditors use the threat of accelerating the loan to intervene in management. Further, the reduction in in-vestment is concentrated in situations in which agency and information problems are relatively more severe, highlighting how the state-contingent allocation of control rights can help mitigate investment distortions arising from financing frictions. WHILE PREVIOUS RESEARCH HAS CLEARLY ANSWERED THE QUESTION of whether financ-ing and investment are related, it has been much less clear on how financing and investment are related (Stein (2003)). In other words, the precise mech-anisms behind this relationship are largely unknown. Further, the extent to which these mechanisms mitigate or exacerbate investment distortions arising from underlying financing frictions is largely unknown as well. The goal of this

When estimating finance panel regressions, it is common practice to adjust stan-dard errors for correlation either across firms or across time. These procedures are valid only if the residuals are correlated either across time or across firms, but not across both. This note shows that it is very easy to calculate standard errors that are robust to simultaneous correlation along two dimensions, such as firms and time. The covariance estimator is equal to the estimator that clusters by firm, plus the the estimator that clusters by time, minus the usual heteroskedasticity-robust OLS covariance matrix. Any statistical package with a clustering command can be used to easily calculate these standard errors.

In this paper, we investigate how corporate governance impacts firm value by examining both the value and the use of cash holdings in poorly and well governed firms. Cash represents a large and growing fraction of corporate assets and generally is at the discretion of management. We use several measures of corporate governance and show that governance has a substantial impact on firm value through its impact on cash: $1.00 of cash in a poorly governed firm is valued by the market at only $0.42 to $0.88, depending on the measure of governance. Good governance approximately doubles this value of cash. Furthermore, governance has a significant impact on how firms use cash. We show that firms with poor corporate governance dissipate cash quickly and in ways that significantly reduce operating performance. This negative impact of large cash holdings on future operating performance is cancelled out if the firm is well governed. All of our results hold after controlling for the level of acquisitions undertaken by cash rich firms, indicating that acquisitions are not solely responsible for the value destruction in poorly governed, cash rich firms. The findings presented in this paper provide direct evidence of how governance can improve or destroy firm value and insight into the importance of

We are grateful to Philipp Hartmann and Frank Smets for helpful comments. We thank Marco lo Duca for excellent research assistance. Ongena acknowledges the hospitality of the European Central Bank. Any views expressed are only those of the authors and should not be attributed to the Bank of Spain, the European We investigate the impact of the stance and path of monetary policy on the level of credit risk of individual bank loans and on lending standards. We employ the Credit Register of the Bank of Spain that contains detailed monthly information on virtually all loans granted by all credit institutions operating in Spain during the last twenty-two years – generating almost twenty-three million bank loan records in total. Spanish monetary conditions were exogenously determined during the entire sample period. Using a variety of duration models we find that lower short-term interest rates prior to loan origination result in banks granting more risky new loans. Banks also soften their lending standards – they lend more to borrowers with a bad credit history and with high uncertainty. Lower interest rates, by contrast, reduce the credit risk of outstanding loans. Loan credit risk is maximized when both interest rates are very low prior to loan origination and interest

We examine whether a simple quantitative measure of language can be used to predict individual firms ’ accounting earnings and stock returns. Our three main findings are: (1) the fraction of negative words in firm-specific news stories forecasts low firm earnings; (2) firms ’ stock prices briefly underreact to the information embedded in negative words; and (3) the earnings and return predictability from negative words is largest for the stories that focus on fundamentals. Together these findings suggest that linguistic media content captures otherwise hard-to-quantify aspects of firms ’ fundamentals, which investors quickly incorporate in stock prices.

University (Corporate Law Seminar) for helpful comments on a previous draft of this paper.

We study the effect of the financial crisis that began in August 2007 on corporate investment. The crisis represents an unexplored negative shock to the supply of external finance for non-financial firms. We find that corporate investment declines significantly following the onset of the crisis, controlling for firm fixed effects and time-varying measures of investment opportunities. Consistent with a causal effect of a supply shock, the decline is greatest for firms that have low cash reserves or high net short-term debt, are financially constrained, or operate in industries dependent on external finance. To address concerns about the endogeneity of firms ’ finances to changes in investment opportunities, we measure these financial positions as much as four years prior to the crisis and confirm that we do not find similar results following placebo crises in the summers of 2003-2006. We also do not find similar results following the negative demand shock caused by the events of September 11. These effects weaken considerably beginning in the third quarter of 2008, when the demand-side effects of the crisis became apparent, suggesting that supply constraints may no longer have been binding. Additional analysis suggests an important precautionary savings motive for seemingly excess cash that has not been emphasized in the literature.