This paper derives the conditions under which property rights can arise in an anarchy equilibrium. The creation of property rights requires that players devote part of their endowment to the public good. In the Nash equilibrium, no player contributes to the provision of property rights protection. Therefore, players are left with two alternatives. A king who provides property rights protection paid for by a tax on endowments completely eliminates conflict. However, a king who can eliminate conflict can also take the surplus for himself. As a despotic king inefficiently taxes endowments, players have an incentive to find a solution that keeps power in their own hands. Thus in a social contract, players first credibly commit part of their endowments to providing property rights and then allocate the balance of their endowments between production and conflict. A social contract can also drive conflict to zero. However, as the number of players rises, the private provision of property rights through a social contract results in positive levels of conflict and lower levels of aggregate welfare than under a benevolent king. 1

A broad nontechnical coverage of many of the developments in game theory since the 1950s is given together with some comments on important open problems and where some of the developments may take place. The nearly 90 references given serve only as a minimal guide to the many thousands of books and articles that have been written. The purpose here is to present a broad brush picture of the many areas of study and application that have come into being. The use of deep techniques flourishes best when it stays in touch with application. There is a vital symbiotic relationship between good theory and practice. The breakneck speed of development of game theory calls for an appreciation of both the many realities of conflict, coordination and cooperation and the abstract investigation of all of them.