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Term-based composition of security protocols
- IN THE PROCEEEDINGS OF THE 16 TH INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON AUTOMATION, QUALITY AND TESTING, ROBOTICS, AQTR
, 2008
"... In the context of security protocol parallel composition, where messages belonging to different protocols can intersect each other, we introduce a new paradigm: termbased composition (i.e. the composition of message components also known as terms). First, we create a protocol specification model by ..."
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In the context of security protocol parallel composition, where messages belonging to different protocols can intersect each other, we introduce a new paradigm: termbased composition (i.e. the composition of message components also known as terms). First, we create a protocol specification model by extending the original strand spaces. Then, we provide a term composition algorithm based on which new terms can be constructed. To ensure that security properties are maintained, we introduce the concept of term connections to express the existing connections between terms and encryption contexts. We illustrate the proposed composition process by using two existing protocols.
Verifying the Independence of Security Protocols
"... Determining if two protocols can be securely run alongside each other requires analyzing the independence of the involved protocols. In this paper we construct a canonical model of security protocols that allows us to conduct a syntactical analysis on the independence of multiple security protocols. ..."
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Cited by 1 (0 self)
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Determining if two protocols can be securely run alongside each other requires analyzing the independence of the involved protocols. In this paper we construct a canonical model of security protocols that allows us to conduct a syntactical analysis on the independence of multiple security protocols. By integrating participant knowledge in the model, we are able to detect subtle multi-protocol attacks, where the types of certain message components can not be checked, also known as type-flaw attacks. Of special interest is the construction of messages in the proposed model, which is made by mapping each message component from the regular specification to a type. We provide a theorem for analyzing the independence of security protocols and illustrate its applicability by analyzing two protocols.
A NOVEL METHODOLOGY TO DESIGN SECURITY PROTOCOLS BASED ON A NEW SET OF DESIGN PRINCIPLES
"... This paper presents a novel design methodology based on a new set of design principles to develop step-by-step security protocols for up to three participants, guiding the designer on each step. It accompanies the designer through a succession of six abstraction levels proposed in this work: protoco ..."
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This paper presents a novel design methodology based on a new set of design principles to develop step-by-step security protocols for up to three participants, guiding the designer on each step. It accompanies the designer through a succession of six abstraction levels proposed in this work: protocol objectives, protocol constraints, security mechanisms, message flow, protocol conformation and authentication tests. The methodology proposed is based on a new set of design principles extracted from different sources and combined using the systemic approach, which considers the designer and client’s security and functional needs. The resulting model separates high-level tasks from implementation details, allowing the designer to specify the security requirements and functionality desired for each abstraction level. Consequently, the protocol design is linked with the best-fitting design principle. To corroborate the results of the methodology, the resulting protocol in the Alice and Bob notation in the fifth level is tested using the “Strand Spaces ” Model. The Needham-Schroeder protocol with symmetric keys was successfully used as a test. The security goals achieved were: authentication, confidentiality, integrity, and non-repudiation.
Informal specification-based performance evaluation of security protocols
"... We propose a performance evaluation method for security protocols. Based on the informal specification, we construct a canonical model which includes, alongside protocol messages, cryptographic operations performed by participants in the process of message construction. Each cryptographic operation ..."
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We propose a performance evaluation method for security protocols. Based on the informal specification, we construct a canonical model which includes, alongside protocol messages, cryptographic operations performed by participants in the process of message construction. Each cryptographic operation is assigned a cost modeled as a function of the size of processed message components. We model not only the size of regular message components but also the size of ciphertext produced by various cryptographic operations. We illustrate the applicability of our method by comparatively analyzing the performance of the original CCITT X.509 protocol and a slightly modified version of the same protocol. 1.
Bindings for Security Protocol Message Composition
"... Abstract — We present a method for creating security protocols, based on message composition. The novelty of our approach is that it uses existent protocols to build new ones. Another benefit of the approach is that it maintains at the same time the security properties of all the involved protocols. ..."
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Abstract — We present a method for creating security protocols, based on message composition. The novelty of our approach is that it uses existent protocols to build new ones. Another benefit of the approach is that it maintains at the same time the security properties of all the involved protocols. The approach is based on an extension of the strand space model, which allows an atomic treatment applied on all messages. Using the proposed strand-based model and composition algorithms we illustrate the approach by creating a new protocol from two existing security protocols.
Syntactic Sequential Composition of Security Protocols
"... Determining if two protocols can be securely composed requires analyzing not only their additive properties but also their destructive properties. In this paper we construct an enriched protocol model for analyzing instancerelated properties and a canonical model for analyzing message structurerelat ..."
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Determining if two protocols can be securely composed requires analyzing not only their additive properties but also their destructive properties. In this paper we construct an enriched protocol model for analyzing instancerelated properties and a canonical model for analyzing message structurerelated properties. The protocol model provides for each participant the preconditions needed to run the protocol, the effects resulted from running the protocol, the generated message components and the transmitted and received message sequences. The canonical model integrates participant knowledge in the model reducing each message component to its basic type. This allows us to conduct a syntactical analysis on the canonical model and to detect multi-protocol attacks that can be constructed by attackers in case of composed protocols. The proposed method ensures the sequential composition of protocols with the satisfaction of preconditions and nondestructive effects. Security protocols, sequential composition, syntactic model verification.
Automated Composition of Security Protocols
"... Determining if two protocols can be securely composed requires analyzing not only their additive properties but also their destructive properties. In this paper we propose a new composition method for constructing protocols based on existing ones found in the literature that can be fully automatized ..."
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Determining if two protocols can be securely composed requires analyzing not only their additive properties but also their destructive properties. In this paper we propose a new composition method for constructing protocols based on existing ones found in the literature that can be fully automatized. The additive properties of the composed protocols are ensured by the composition of protocol preconditions and effects, denoting, respectively, the conditions that must hold for protocols to be executed and the conditions that hold after executing the protocols. The non-destructive property of the final composed protocol is verified by analyzing the independence of the involved protocols, a method proposed by the authors in their previous work. The fully automatized property is ensured by constructing a rich protocol model that contains explicit description of protocol preconditions, effects, generated terms and exchanged messages. The proposed method is validated by composing 17 protocol pairs and by verifying the correctness of the composed protocols with an existing tool.
AUTOMATED COMPARATIVE PERFORMANCE EVALUATION OF SECURITY PROTOCOLS
"... Abstract- We propose a comparative performance evaluation method for security protocols. We start by constructing a security protocol model where we assign a cost functions for each cryptographic operation. For each class of cryptographic operations (e.g. symmetric encryption, asymmetric decryption) ..."
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Abstract- We propose a comparative performance evaluation method for security protocols. We start by constructing a security protocol model where we assign a cost functions for each cryptographic operation. For each class of cryptographic operations (e.g. symmetric encryption, asymmetric decryption), we construct a polynomial function based on an exhaustive performance evaluation of cryptographic combinations including algorithms and key sizes. The proposed method is validated by a comparative analysis of 1000 generated protocols and 16 existing security protocols. Keywords – Security protocols, performance evaluation, OpenSSL, Cryptlib, Crypto++. Abstract – Propunem o metodă comparativă de evaluare a performanŃelor protocoalelor de securitate. Începem cu construirea unui model al protocoalelor de securitate în cadrul căruia ataşăm funcŃii cost pentru fiecare operaŃie criptografică. Pentru fiecare asemenea clasă de operaŃii (e.g. criptare simetrică, decriptare asimetrică), construim o funcŃie polinomială prin evaluarea exhaustivă a tuturor combinaŃiilor criptografice, printre care se numără algoritmi şi dimensiune a cheilor. Metoda propusă este validată prin analiza comparativă a 1000 de protocoale generate şi 16 protocoale existente.
Evolutionary Design of Secrecy Amplification Protocols for Wireless Sensor Networks
"... Abstract. We propose a new method for automatic generation of se-crecy amplification protocols for wireless sensor networks, utilizing evo-lutionary algorithms. We were able to rediscover all published protocols for secrecy amplification we are aware of, and found a new protocol that outperforms the ..."
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Abstract. We propose a new method for automatic generation of se-crecy amplification protocols for wireless sensor networks, utilizing evo-lutionary algorithms. We were able to rediscover all published protocols for secrecy amplification we are aware of, and found a new protocol that outperforms the existing ones. An alternative construction of se-crecy amplification protocols with a comparable fraction of secure links to that of the original “node-oriented ” approach was also designed. This new construction exhibits only linear (instead of exponential) increase of necessary messages when the number of communication neighbours grows. This efficient protocol can significantly reduce the sensor battery power consumption because of the decreased message transmission rate. We used a combination of linear genetic programming and a network simulator in this work. 1
