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37
Firm-Wide Incentives and Mutual Monitoring at Continental Airlines
- Journal of Labor Economics
, 2001
"... scheme that promised monthly bonuses to all 35,000 hourly em-ployees if the company achieved a firm-wide performance goal. Con-ventional wisdom suggests that free riding will render such schemes ineffective. We present evidence indicating that the incentive scheme raised employee performance despite ..."
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scheme that promised monthly bonuses to all 35,000 hourly em-ployees if the company achieved a firm-wide performance goal. Con-ventional wisdom suggests that free riding will render such schemes ineffective. We present evidence indicating that the incentive scheme raised employee performance despite the apparent threat of free rid-ing. To explain why the scheme may have been effective we argue that the organization of employees into autonomous work groups enabled Continental to induce mutual monitoring among employees within each work group. I.
Creating a Bigger Pie? The Effects of Employee Ownership
- Profit Sharing, and Stock Options on Workplace Performance, in Shared Capitalism at Work: Employee Ownership, Profit and Gain Sharing, and Broad-based Stock Options
, 2009
"... Blasi Shared Capitalism at Work: employee ownership, profit and gain sharing, and broadbased stock options, forthcoming 2009). I have made particular use of three co-authored ..."
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Blasi Shared Capitalism at Work: employee ownership, profit and gain sharing, and broadbased stock options, forthcoming 2009). I have made particular use of three co-authored
Corporate Governance Objectives of Labor Union Shareholders: Evidence from Proxy Voting. Working Paper
"... Labor union shareholders have become increasingly vocal in matters of corporate governance, however, their motives have been subject to much debate in the academic literature and business press. I examine the proxy votes of AFL-CIO pension funds in ..."
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Labor union shareholders have become increasingly vocal in matters of corporate governance, however, their motives have been subject to much debate in the academic literature and business press. I examine the proxy votes of AFL-CIO pension funds in
Employee Stock Ownership Plans: Union In¯uence and Stakeholder Interests
"... This article extends understanding of how institutional factors influence the degree to which employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) are or are not democratically structured. It examines how factors such as union member participation, industry, age of the ESOP, ownership structure and firm size infl ..."
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This article extends understanding of how institutional factors influence the degree to which employee stock ownership plans (ESOPs) are or are not democratically structured. It examines how factors such as union member participation, industry, age of the ESOP, ownership structure and firm size influence a range of ESOP attributes, including: level of employee ownership, stock allocations, vesting and voting practices and the extent of employee participation in administration and decision-making. Based on a survey of 68 ESOPs, we found that when bargaining unit workers participated in an ESOP, the plan tended to be more participative and egalitarian. By contrast, the other factors examined had relatively little impact. These findings have important implications for unions, managers and policy-makers around what form of ESOP to advance.
HRM, employee share ownership and corporate performance: research and practice in human resource management. Retrieved from http://www.unibz.it/web4archiv/objects/pdf/standard/cvoughton.christine.pdf
, 2003
"... A great deal of interest has been generated on understanding linkages between work commitment, job motivation and productivity. The purpose of this paper is to consider the link between employee commitment and motivation, on the one hand, and productivity on the other, and in particular whether empl ..."
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A great deal of interest has been generated on understanding linkages between work commitment, job motivation and productivity. The purpose of this paper is to consider the link between employee commitment and motivation, on the one hand, and productivity on the other, and in particular whether employee share ownership can play a positive role in this regard. The focus is, therefore, on the effects of employee share ownership and employee participation on corporate performance. A departure point is the UK government’s policies to promote employee share ownership, which has been presented explicitly as a means to boost productivity via enhanced employee commitment and motivation. How employee share ownership may enhance corporate performance in terms of impacting on corporate governance is also discussed.
Employee Stock Ownership and Job Attitudes
- Does Culture Matter? », Human Resource Management Review
, 2007
"... Abstract The large majority of the existing research on the attitudinal effects of employee stock ownership is Anglo-Saxon by nature. Considering that the cultural relativity of management practices is largely documented in the cross-cultural management literature, the international external validi ..."
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Abstract The large majority of the existing research on the attitudinal effects of employee stock ownership is Anglo-Saxon by nature. Considering that the cultural relativity of management practices is largely documented in the cross-cultural management literature, the international external validity of existing evidence can be questioned.
Strategic Human Resource Management:
"... This paper has not undergone formal review or approval of the faculty of the ILR School. It is intended to make results of Center research available to others interested in preliminary form to encourage discussion and suggestions. Page 1Measuring Organizational Performance WP 98-24 A major challenge ..."
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This paper has not undergone formal review or approval of the faculty of the ILR School. It is intended to make results of Center research available to others interested in preliminary form to encourage discussion and suggestions. Page 1Measuring Organizational Performance WP 98-24 A major challenge for Strategic Human Resource Management research in the next decade will be to establish a clear, coherent and consistent construct for organizational performance. This paper describes the variety of measures used in current empirical research linking human resource management and organizational performance. Implications for future research are discussed amidst the challenges of construct definition, divergent stakeholder criteria and the temporal dynamics of performance. A model for performance information markets to address these challenges is introduced. The model uses a multi-dimensional weighted performance measurement system and a free information flow exchange mechanism for determining performance achievement criteria.
Forthcoming in Journal of Finance
, 2013
"... Firms with broad-based employee share ownership plans often claim ESOPs increase productivity by improving employee incentives. Do they? The answer depends on the number of employees and the size of ESOP. Small ESOPs comprising less than 5 % of shares, granted by firms with moderate employee size, i ..."
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Firms with broad-based employee share ownership plans often claim ESOPs increase productivity by improving employee incentives. Do they? The answer depends on the number of employees and the size of ESOP. Small ESOPs comprising less than 5 % of shares, granted by firms with moderate employee size, increase the economic pie, benefitting both employees and shareholders. The effects are much weaker when there are too many employees to mitigate free-riding. Although some large ESOPs increase productivity and employee compensation, the average impacts are small, because they are often implemented for non-incentive purposes, such as conserving cash by substituting wages with employee shares or forming a worker-management
