Abstract not found

We propose a dialogue-game protocol of purchase negotiation dialogues which identifies appropriate speech acts, defines constraints on their utterances, and specifies the different sub-tasks agents need to perform in order to engage in dialogues according to this protocol. Our formalism combines a dialogue game from the philosophy of argumentation with a model of rational consumer purchase decision behaviour adopted from marketing theory. In addition to the dialogue formalism, we present a portfolio of decision mechanisms for the participating agents engaged in the dialogue and use these to provide our formalism with an operational semantics.

This paper analyzes the process of automated negotiation between two competitive agents that have firm deadlines and incomplete information about their opponent. Generally speaking, the outcome of a negotiation depends on many parameters---including the agents' preferences, their reservation limits, their attitude toward time and the strategies they use. Although in most realistic situations it is not possible for agents to have complete information about each of these parameters for its opponent, it is not uncommon for agents to have partial information about some of them. Under such uncertainty, our aim is to determine how an agent can exploit its available information to select an optimal strategy.

Global communication networks and advances in information technology enable the design of information systems facilitating effective formulation and efficient resolution of negotiation problems. Increasingly, these systems guide negotiators in clarifying the relevant issues, provide media for offer formulation and exchange, and help in achieving an agreement. In practice, the task of analysing, modelling, designing and implementing electronic negotiation media demands a systematic, traceable and reproducible approach. An engineering approach to media specification and construction has these characteristics. In this paper, we provide a rationale for the engineering approach that allows pragmatic adoption of economic and social sciences perspectives on negotiated decisions for the purpose of supporting and undertaking electronic negotiations. Similarities and differences of different theories that underlie on-going studies of electronic negotiations are identified. This provides a basis for integration of different theories and approaches for the specific purpose of the design of effective electronic negotiations. Drawing on diverse streams of literature in different fields such as economics, management, computer, and behavioural sciences, we present an example of an integration of three significant streams of theoretical and applied research involving negotiations, traditional auctions and on-line auctions.

This paper presents a new model for multi-issue negotiation under time constraints in an incomplete information setting. In this model the order in which issues are bargained over and agreements are reached is determined endogenously as part of the bargaining equilibrium. We show that the sequential implementation of the equilibrium agreement gives a better outcome than a simultaneous implementation when agents have like, as well as conflicting, time preferences. We also show that the equilibrium solution possesses the properties of uniqueness and symmetry, although it is not always Pareto-optimal.

We articulate a dialectical argumentation framework for qualitative representation of epistemic uncertainty in scientific domains. The framework is grounded in specific philosophies of science and theories of rational mutual discourse. We study the formal properties of our framework and provide it with a game theoretic semantics. With this semantics, we examine the relationship between the snaphots of the debate in the framework and the long run position of the debate, and prove a result directly analogous to the standard (Neyman-Pearson) approach to statistical hypothesis testing. We believe this formalism for representating uncertainty has value in domains with only limited knowledge, where experimental evidence is ambiguous or conflicting, or where agreement between different stakeholders on the quantification of uncertainty is difficult to achieve. All three of these conditions are found in assessments of carcinogenic risk for new chemicals.

This paper presents a new model for multi-issue negotiation under time constraints in an incomplete information setting. The issues to be bargained over can be associated with a single good/service or multiple goods/services. In our agenda-based model, the order in which issues are bargained over and agreements are reached is determined endogenously, as part of the bargaining equilibrium. In this context we determine the conditions under which agents have similar preferences over the implementation scheme and the conditions under which they have conflicting preferences. Our analysis shows the existence of equilibrium even when both players have uncertain information about each other, and each agent's information is its private knowledge. We also study the properties of the equilibrium solution and determine conditions under which it is unique, symmetric, and Pareto-optimal.

This paper presents a new model for multi-issue negotiation under time constraints in an incomplete information setting. The issues to be bargained over can be associated with a single good/service or multiple goods/services. In our agenda based model, the order in which issues are bargained over and agreements are reached is determined endogenously, as part of the bargaining equilibrium. In this context we determine the conditions under which agents have similar preferences over the implementation scheme and the conditions under which they have conflicting preferences. Our analysis shows the existence of equilibrium even when both players have uncertain information about each other, and each agent's information is its private knowledge. We also study the properties of the equilibrium solution and determine conditions under which it is unique, symmetric, and Pareto-optimal.

Abstract not found

To secure good deals, an agent may engage in multiple concurrent negotiations for a particular good or service. However for this to be effective, the agent needs to carefully coordinate its negotiations. At a basic level, such coordination should ensure the agent does not procure more of the good than is needed. But to really derive benefit from such an approach, the agent needs the concurrent encounters to mutually influence one another (e.g. a good price with one opponent should enable an agent to negotiate more strongly in the other interactions). To this end, this paper presents a novel heuristic model for coordinating multiple bilateral negotiations. The model is empirically evaluated and shown to be effective and robust in a range of negotiation scenarios. 1.