Abstract not found

This paper develops a general equilibrium model of nonsequential employer search with recruiting selection and heterogeneous workers, and characterizes its equilibrium. I depart from the standard search model by allowing firms to simulta-neously meet several applicants and choose the best candidate. Recruiting selection is important: firms interview a median of 5 applicants per vacancy and spend 2.5% of their total labor cost –about US$4200 per recruit – in these activities. The model provides an endogenous matching process with heterogeneous work-ers in which the hazard rate out of unemployment increases in productivity. The model also accounts for the empirical evidence of negative duration dependence of both hazard rates and re-employment wages. Under recruiting selection, lifetime inequality increases relative to the sequential search benchmark because low wage workers go through longer and more volatile unemployment spells, and have less valuable outside options to bargain with firms. I also show that stronger recruiting selection worsens the productivity of the unemployed and may not generate a more efficient job assignment at the aggregate level. Search frictions coupled with re-cruiting selection generate new kinds of externalities that affect not only transition probabilities, but also the expected productivity of recruited workers. The calibrated model can replicate moments of the distribution of wages and unemployment durations in CPS data. Using this parametrization, I also show that an increase of screening costs reduces inequality and productive efficiency, and decreases negative externalities on other employers. ∗I am very grateful to Mark Aguiar for his constant advice and encouragement; to William Hawkins for innumerable suggestions and comments; to Yongsung Chang for very useful discussions, and to the

unemployment: estimation issues and an application to male-female unemployment differences in France

The empirical analysis in this paper adopts logit models to study the hazard rate of ceasing from work by the next year for Italian older employees. The speci…cations are estimated resorting to the framework proposed by Güell and Hu (2006), which extracts information from repeated independent cross-sections to recover the hazard rate of interest at the individual level. The sample is drawn from the ISTAT survey Aspects of Everyday Life and includes employees aged 50-65 in 1993-2002. Our results show that, even conditioning on a wide set of socioeconomic factors, the age pro…le of the hazard rate is increasing and con…rms the low labor market attachment of older workers. Further, the time evolution of the risk of becoming not employed appears to be hump-shaped and achieves its maximum for the cohorts of employees at work in the period 1996-1998, which is characterized by the introduction of important changes in the Social Security system aimed at extending the working life of the elderly.

This article studies whether the durations in unemployment and employment for immigrants and natives respond differently to changes in economic conditions and to the receipt of unemployment benefits. Using Spanish administrative data for the period 2000–2011, we estimate multi-spell duration models that disentangle unobserved heterogeneity from true duration dependence. Our findings suggest that immigrants are more sensitive to changes in economic conditions both in terms of unemployment and employment hazards. The effect of the business cycle is not constant but decreases with duration at a higher rate among immigrants. We provide evidence that the higher job separation rates and lower capital-labor complementarity of immigrants are mechanisms that are possibly compatible with these results. We also find evidence of a disincentive effect of unemployment benefits on unemployment duration, which is stronger for immigrants, but only at the beginning of the unemployment spell, especially under good economic conditions. Finally, unemployment benefits increase job match quality only for native workers with temporary contracts. (JEL J64, J61, C23, C41, J65) I.

In this paper we analyse residential mobility in Belgium based on information in the Belgian Household Budget Survey. The data on residential duration are 100 % right-censored such that the convential duration analysis techniques do not apply. We present an ad-hoc estimation technique based on non-linear least squares and concentrated max-imum likelihood. We also take into account possible time variation in explanatory variables. We use the estimated model to assess a recent policy change in residential property taxation in Flanders, Belgium.

2. Combining samples with some common variables from a single population 2.1. Reasons for sample combination

1 2 Contents Abstract 5