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Approximate Signal Processing
, 1997
"... It is increasingly important to structure signal processing algorithms and systems to allow for trading off between the accuracy of results and the utilization of resources in their implementation. In any particular context, there are typically a variety of heuristic approaches to managing these tra ..."
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Cited by 516 (2 self)
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It is increasingly important to structure signal processing algorithms and systems to allow for trading off between the accuracy of results and the utilization of resources in their implementation. In any particular context, there are typically a variety of heuristic approaches to managing these tradeoffs. One of the objectives of this paper is to suggest that there is the potential for developing a more formal approach, including utilizing current research in Computer Science on Approximate Processing and one of its central concepts, Incremental Refinement. Toward this end, we first summarize a number of ideas and approaches to approximate processing as currently being formulated in the computer science community. We then present four examples of signal processing algorithms/systems that are structured with these goals in mind. These examples may be viewed as partial inroads toward the ultimate objective of developing, within the context of signal processing design and implementation,...
Coalition Structure Generation with Worst Case Guarantees
, 1999
"... Coalition formation is a key topic in multiagent systems. One may prefer a coalition structure that maximizes the sum of the values of the coalitions, but often the number of coalition structures is too large to allow exhaustive search for the optimal one. Furthermore, finding the optimal coalition ..."
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Cited by 266 (10 self)
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Coalition formation is a key topic in multiagent systems. One may prefer a coalition structure that maximizes the sum of the values of the coalitions, but often the number of coalition structures is too large to allow exhaustive search for the optimal one. Furthermore, finding the optimal coalition structure is NPcomplete. But then, can the coalition structure found via a partial search be guaranteed to be within a bound from optimum? We show that none of the previous coalition structure generation algorithms can establish any bound because they search fewer nodes than a threshold that we show necessary for establishing a bound. We present an algorithm that establishes a tight bound within this minimal amount of search, and show that any other algorithm would have to search strictly more. The fraction of nodes needed to be searched approaches zero as the number of agents grows. If additional time remains, our anytime algorithm searches further, and establishes a progressively lower tight bound. Surprisingly, just searching one more node drops the bound in half. As desired, our algorithm lowers the bound rapidly early on, and exhibits diminishing returns to computation. It also significantly outperforms its obvious contenders. Finally, we show how to distribute the desired
Coalitions Among Computationally Bounded Agents
 Artificial Intelligence
, 1997
"... This paper analyzes coalitions among selfinterested agents that need to solve combinatorial optimization problems to operate e ciently in the world. By colluding (coordinating their actions by solving a joint optimization problem) the agents can sometimes save costs compared to operating individua ..."
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Cited by 202 (26 self)
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This paper analyzes coalitions among selfinterested agents that need to solve combinatorial optimization problems to operate e ciently in the world. By colluding (coordinating their actions by solving a joint optimization problem) the agents can sometimes save costs compared to operating individually. A model of bounded rationality is adopted where computation resources are costly. It is not worthwhile solving the problems optimally: solution quality is decisiontheoretically traded o against computation cost. A normative, application and protocolindependent theory of coalitions among boundedrational agents is devised. The optimal coalition structure and its stability are signi cantly a ected by the agents ' algorithms ' performance pro les and the cost of computation. This relationship is rst analyzed theoretically. Then a domain classi cation including rational and boundedrational agents is introduced. Experimental results are presented in vehicle routing with real data from ve dispatch centers. This problem is NPcomplete and the instances are so large thatwith current technologyany agent's rationality is bounded by computational complexity. 1
Using Anytime Algorithms in Intelligent Systems
, 1996
"... Anytime algorithms give intelligent systems the capability to trade deliberation time for quality of results. This capability is essential for successful operation in domains such as signal interpretation, realtime diagnosis and repair, and mobile robot control. What characterizes these domains i ..."
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Cited by 192 (8 self)
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Anytime algorithms give intelligent systems the capability to trade deliberation time for quality of results. This capability is essential for successful operation in domains such as signal interpretation, realtime diagnosis and repair, and mobile robot control. What characterizes these domains is that it is not feasible (computationally) or desirable (economically) to compute the optimal answer. This article surveys the main control problems that arise when a system is composed of several anytime algorithms. These problems relate to optimal management of uncertainty and precision. After a brief introduction to anytime computation, I outline a wide range of existing solutions to the metalevel control problem and describe current work that is aimed at increasing the applicability of anytime computation.
Negotiation Among Selfinterested Computationally Limited Agents
, 1996
"... A Dissertation Presented by TUOMAS W. SANDHOLM ..."
Rationality and intelligence
 Artificial Intelligence
, 1997
"... The longterm goal of our field is the creation and understanding of intelligence. Productive research in AI, both practical and theoretical, benefits from a notion of intelligence that is precise enough to allow the cumulative development of robust systems and general results. This paper outlines a ..."
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Cited by 106 (1 self)
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The longterm goal of our field is the creation and understanding of intelligence. Productive research in AI, both practical and theoretical, benefits from a notion of intelligence that is precise enough to allow the cumulative development of robust systems and general results. This paper outlines a gradual evolution in our formal conception of intelligence that brings it closer to our informal conception and simultaneously reduces the gap between theory and practice. 1 Artificial Intelligence AI is a field in which the ultimate goal has often been somewhat illdefined and subject to dispute. Some researchers aim to emulate human cognition, others aim at the creation of
Costly valuation computation in auctions
 IN IN PROCEEDINGS OF THE EIGHTH CONFERENCE OF THEORETICAL ASPECTS OF KNOWLEDGE AND RATIONALITY (TARK VIII), SIENNA
, 2001
"... We investigate deliberation and bidding strategies of agents with unlimited but costly computation who are participating in auctions. The agents do not a priori know their valuations for the items begin auctioned. Instead they devote computational resources to compute their valuations. We present a ..."
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Cited by 61 (29 self)
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We investigate deliberation and bidding strategies of agents with unlimited but costly computation who are participating in auctions. The agents do not a priori know their valuations for the items begin auctioned. Instead they devote computational resources to compute their valuations. We present a normative model of bounded rationality where deliberation actions of agents are incorporated into strategies and equilibria are analyzed for standard auction protocols. We show that even in settings such as English auctions where information about other agents ’ valuations is revealed for free by the bidding process, agents may still compute on opponents’ valuation problems, incurring a cost, in order to determine how to bid. We compare the costly computation model of bounded rationality with a different model where computation is free but limited. For some auction mechanisms the equilibrium strategies are substantially different. It can be concluded that the model of bounded rationality impacts the agents’ equilibrium strategies and must be considered when designing mechanisms for computationally limited agents.
Agents in electronic commerce: component technologies for automated negotiation and coalition formation
 Autonomous Agents and MultiAgent Systems
"... Abstract. Automated negotiation and coalition formation among selfinterested agents are playing an increasingly important role in electronic commerce. Such agents cannot be coordinated by externally imposing their strategies. Instead the interaction protocols have to be designed so that each agent ..."
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Cited by 56 (1 self)
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Abstract. Automated negotiation and coalition formation among selfinterested agents are playing an increasingly important role in electronic commerce. Such agents cannot be coordinated by externally imposing their strategies. Instead the interaction protocols have to be designed so that each agent is motivated to follow the strategy that the protocol designer wants it to follow. This paper reviews six component technologies that we have developed for making such interactions less manipulable and more efficient in terms of the computational processes and the outcomes: 1. OCSMcontracts in marginal cost based contracting, 2. leveled commitment contracts, 3. anytime coalition structure generation with worst case guarantees, 4. trading off computation cost against optimization quality within each coalition, 5. distributing search among insincere agents, and 6. unenforced contract execution. Each of these technologies represents a different way of battling selfinterest and combinatorial complexity simultaneously. This is a key battle when multiagent systems move into largescale open settings.