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Does Overconfidence Affect Corporate Investment? CEO Overconfidence Measures Revisited
, 2005
"... This article presents the growing research area of Behavioural Corporate Finance in the context of one specific example: distortions in corporate investment due to CEO overconfidence. We first ..."
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This article presents the growing research area of Behavioural Corporate Finance in the context of one specific example: distortions in corporate investment due to CEO overconfidence. We first
In designin...
, 2010
"... Miscalibration is a form of overconfidence examined in both psychology and economics. Although it is often analyzed in lab experiments, there is scant evidence about the effects of miscalibration in practice. We test whether top corporate executives are miscalibrated, and study the determinants of t ..."
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Miscalibration is a form of overconfidence examined in both psychology and economics. Although it is often analyzed in lab experiments, there is scant evidence about the effects of miscalibration in practice. We test whether top corporate executives are miscalibrated, and study the determinants of their miscalibration. We study a unique panel of over 11,600 probability distributions provided by top financial executives and spanning nearly a decade of stock market expectations. Our results show that financial executives are severely miscalibrated: realized market returns are within the executives ’ 80 % confidence intervals only 33 % of the time. We show that miscalibration improves following poor market performance periods because forecasters extrapolate past returns when forming their lower forecast bound (“worst case scenario”), while they do not update the upper bound (“best case scenario”) as much. Finally, we link stock market miscalibration to miscalibration about own-firm project forecasts and increased corporate investment.
Financing Decisions and Discretionary Accruals: Managerial Manipulation or Managerial Overoptimism
, 2007
"... We examine whether discretionary accruals of firms obtaining substantial external financing can be explained by managerial manipulation or managerial overoptimism. Consistent with Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998b), we find that discretionary current accruals peak when firms obtain equity financing. Howe ..."
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We examine whether discretionary accruals of firms obtaining substantial external financing can be explained by managerial manipulation or managerial overoptimism. Consistent with Teoh, Welch, and Wong (1998b), we find that discretionary current accruals peak when firms obtain equity financing. However, we also find that discretionary accruals peak when firms obtain debt financing. Furthermore, discretionary accruals are higher for firms that rely on debt financing rather than equity financing. The results are robust to controlling for firm characteristics, excluding small and distressed firms, and using alternative measures of discretionary accruals. These findings support the hypothesis that managerial overoptimism distorts financial statements of firms.
For evaluation only. Managerial biases and selective hedging ∗
, 2007
"... effect; overconfidence. We thank Ted Reeve for providing us with his derivative surveys of gold mining firms and Leung Kam Ming for excellent research assistance. We also thank Jesus Salas for valuable assistance and seminar participants at the University of Oklahoma for their comments. We are respo ..."
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effect; overconfidence. We thank Ted Reeve for providing us with his derivative surveys of gold mining firms and Leung Kam Ming for excellent research assistance. We also thank Jesus Salas for valuable assistance and seminar participants at the University of Oklahoma for their comments. We are responsible for any errors. Generated by Foxit PDF Creator © Foxit Software

