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A Composable Cryptographic Library with Nested Operations (Extended Abstract)
, 2003
"... Michael Backes mbc@zurich.ibm.com Birgit Pfitzmann bpf@zurich.ibm.com Michael Waidner wmi@zurich.ibm.com ABSTRACT We present the first idealized cryptographic library that can be used like the DolevYao model for automated proofs of cryptographic protocols that use nested cryptographic ..."
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Cited by 157 (28 self)
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Michael Backes mbc@zurich.ibm.com Birgit Pfitzmann bpf@zurich.ibm.com Michael Waidner wmi@zurich.ibm.com ABSTRACT We present the first idealized cryptographic library that can be used like the DolevYao model for automated proofs of cryptographic protocols that use nested cryptographic operations, while coming with a cryptographic implementation that is provably secure under active attacks.
A computationally sound mechanized prover for security protocols
 In IEEE Symposium on Security and Privacy
, 2006
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Soundness of formal encryption in the presence of active adversaries
 In Proc. 1st Theory of Cryptography Conference (TCC), volume 2951 of LNCS
, 2004
"... Abstract. We present a general method to prove security properties of cryptographic protocols against active adversaries, when the messages exchanged by the honest parties are arbitrary expressions built using encryption and concatenation operations. The method allows to express security properties ..."
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Cited by 102 (10 self)
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Abstract. We present a general method to prove security properties of cryptographic protocols against active adversaries, when the messages exchanged by the honest parties are arbitrary expressions built using encryption and concatenation operations. The method allows to express security properties and carry out proofs using a simple logic based language, where messages are represented by syntactic expressions, and does not require dealing with probability distributions or asymptotic notation explicitly. Still, we show that the method is sound, meaning that logic statements can be naturally interpreted in the computational setting in such a way that if a statement holds true for any abstract (symbolic) execution of the protocol in the presence of a DolevYao adversary, then its computational interpretation is also correct in the standard computational model where the adversary is an arbitrary probabilistic polynomial time program. This is the first paper providing a simple framework for translating security proofs from the logic setting to the standard computational setting for the case of powerful active adversaries that have total control of the communication network. 1
Symmetric Encryption in a Simulatable DolevYao Style Cryptographic Library
 In Proc. 17th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW
, 2004
"... Recently we solved the longstanding open problem of justifying a DolevYao type model of cryptography as used in virtually all automated protocol provers under active attacks. The justification was done by defining an ideal system handling DolevYaostyle terms and a cryptographic realization wi ..."
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Cited by 72 (19 self)
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Recently we solved the longstanding open problem of justifying a DolevYao type model of cryptography as used in virtually all automated protocol provers under active attacks. The justification was done by defining an ideal system handling DolevYaostyle terms and a cryptographic realization with the same user interface, and by showing that the realization is as secure as the ideal system in the sense of reactive simulatability. This definition encompasses arbitrary active attacks and enjoys general composition and propertypreservation properties. Security holds in the standard model of cryptography and under standard assumptions of adaptively secure primitives.
Universally Composable Cryptographic Library
 in Proceedings of the 10th ACM Conference on Computer and Communications Security
, 2003
"... Bridging the gap between formal methods and cryptography has recently received a lot of interest, i.e., investigating to what extent proofs of cryprographic protocols made with abstracted cryptographic operations are valid for real implementations. However, a major goal has not been achieved yet: ..."
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Cited by 65 (10 self)
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Bridging the gap between formal methods and cryptography has recently received a lot of interest, i.e., investigating to what extent proofs of cryprographic protocols made with abstracted cryptographic operations are valid for real implementations. However, a major goal has not been achieved yet: a soundness proof for an abstract cryprolibrary as needed for the cryptographic protocols typically proved with formal methods, e.g., authentication and key exchange protocols. Prior work that directly justifies the typical DolevYao abstraction is restricted to passive adversaries and certain protocol environments.
Symmetric Encryption in Automatic Analyses for Confidentiality against Active Adversaries
, 2004
"... In this article we present a technique for static analysis, correct with respect to complexitytheoretic definitions of security, of cryptographic protocols for checking whether these protocols satisfy confidentiality properties. The approach is similar to Abadi and Rogaway  we define patterns fo ..."
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Cited by 58 (3 self)
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In this article we present a technique for static analysis, correct with respect to complexitytheoretic definitions of security, of cryptographic protocols for checking whether these protocols satisfy confidentiality properties. The approach is similar to Abadi and Rogaway  we define patterns for cryptographic protocols (they did it for formal expressions), such that the protocol is secure iff the patterns are. We then statically analyse the patterns, they should be easier to analyse than the protocols themselves. We consider symmetric encryption as the cryptographic primitive in protocols. Handling this primitive has so far received comparatively less attention in approaches striving to unite the formal and computational models of cryptography.
Universally composable symbolic analysis of mutual authentication and keyexchange protocols
 In Shai Halevi and Tal Rabin, editors, TCC, volume 3876 of LNCS
, 2006
"... Abstract. Symbolic analysis of cryptographic protocols is dramatically simpler than fullfledged cryptographic analysis. In particular, it is simple enough to be automated. However, symbolic analysis does not, by itself, provide any cryptographic soundness guarantees. Following recent work on crypto ..."
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Cited by 49 (5 self)
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Abstract. Symbolic analysis of cryptographic protocols is dramatically simpler than fullfledged cryptographic analysis. In particular, it is simple enough to be automated. However, symbolic analysis does not, by itself, provide any cryptographic soundness guarantees. Following recent work on cryptographically sound symbolic analysis, we demonstrate how DolevYao style symbolic analysis can be used to assert the security of cryptographic protocols within the universally composable (UC) security framework. Consequently, our methods enable security analysis that is completely symbolic, and at the same time cryptographically sound with strong composability properties. More specifically, we concentrate on mutual authentication and keyexchange protocols. We restrict attention to protocols that use publickey encryption as their only cryptographic primitive and have a specific restricted format. We define a mapping from such protocols to DolevYao style symbolic protocols, and show that the symbolic protocol satisfies a certain symbolic criterion if and only if the corresponding cryptographic protocol is UCsecure. For mutual authentication, our symbolic criterion is similar to the traditional DolevYao criterion. For key exchange, we demonstrate that the traditional DolevYao style symbolic criterion is insufficient, and formulate an adequate symbolic criterion. Finally, to demonstrate the viability of our treatment, we use an existing tool to automatically verify whether some prominent keyexchange protocols are UCsecure. 1
A probabilistic polynomialtime calculus for analysis of cryptographic protocols
 Electronic Notes in Theoretical Computer Science
, 2001
"... We prove properties of a process calculus that is designed for analyzing security protocols. Our longterm goal is to develop a form of protocol analysis, consistent with standard cryptographic assumptions, that provides a language for expressing probabilistic polynomialtime protocol steps, a spec ..."
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Cited by 48 (8 self)
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We prove properties of a process calculus that is designed for analyzing security protocols. Our longterm goal is to develop a form of protocol analysis, consistent with standard cryptographic assumptions, that provides a language for expressing probabilistic polynomialtime protocol steps, a specification method based on a compositional form of equivalence, and a logical basis for reasoning about equivalence. The process calculus is a variant of CCS, with bounded replication and probabilistic polynomialtime expressions allowed in messages and boolean tests. To avoid inconsistency between security and nondeterminism, messages are scheduled probabilistically instead of nondeterministically. We prove that evaluation of any process expression halts in probabilistic polynomial time and define a form of asymptotic protocol equivalence that allows security properties to be expressed using observational equivalence, a standard relation from programming language theory that involves quantifying over possible environments that might interact with the protocol. We develop a form of probabilistic bisimulation and use it to establish the soundness of an equational proof system based on observational equivalences. The proof system is illustrated by a formation derivation of the assertion, wellknown in cryptography, that ElGamal encryption’s semantic security is equivalent to the (computational) Decision DiffieHellman assumption. This example demonstrates the power of probabilistic bisimulation and equational reasoning for protocol security.
Relating Symbolic and Cryptographic Secrecy
 IN PROC. IEEE SYMPOSIUM ON SECURITY AND PRIVACY
, 2004
"... We investigate the relation between symbolic and cryptographic secrecy properties for cryptographic protocols. Symbolic secrecy of payload messages or exchanged keys is arguably the most important notion of secrecy shown with automated proof tools. It means that an adversary restricted to symboli ..."
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Cited by 47 (9 self)
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We investigate the relation between symbolic and cryptographic secrecy properties for cryptographic protocols. Symbolic secrecy of payload messages or exchanged keys is arguably the most important notion of secrecy shown with automated proof tools. It means that an adversary restricted to symbolic operations on terms can never get the entire considered object into its knowledge set. Cryptographic secrecy essentially
Soundness of formal encryption in the presence of keycycles
 In Proc. 10th European Symposium on Research in Computer Security (ESORICS’05), volume 3679 of LNCS
, 2005
"... Abstract. Both the formal and the computational models of cryptography contain the notion of message equivalence or indistinguishability. An encryption scheme provides soundness for indistinguishability if, when mapping formal messages into the computational model, equivalent formal messages are map ..."
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Cited by 46 (5 self)
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Abstract. Both the formal and the computational models of cryptography contain the notion of message equivalence or indistinguishability. An encryption scheme provides soundness for indistinguishability if, when mapping formal messages into the computational model, equivalent formal messages are mapped to indistinguishable computational distributions. Previous soundness results are limited in that they do not apply when keycycles are present. We demonstrate that an encryption scheme provides soundness in the presence of keycycles if it satisfies the recentlyintroduced notion of keydependent message (KDM) security. We also show that soundness in the presence of keycycles (and KDM security) neither implies nor is implied by security against chosen ciphertext attack (CCA2). Therefore, soundness for keycycles is possible using a new notion of computational security, not possible using previous such notions, and the relationship between the formal and computational models extends beyond chosenciphertext security. 1