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30
Very fast containment of scanning worms
- In Proceedings of the 13th USENIX Security Symposium
, 2004
"... Permission is granted for noncommercial reproduction of the work for educational or research purposes. ..."
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Cited by 125 (7 self)
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Permission is granted for noncommercial reproduction of the work for educational or research purposes.
The Top Speed of Flash Worms
, 2004
"... Flash worms follow a precomputed spread tree using prior knowledge of all systems vulnerable to the worm's exploit. In previous work we suggested that a flash worm could saturate one million vulnerable hosts on the Internet in under 30 seconds [18]. We grossly over-estimated. ..."
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Cited by 80 (0 self)
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Flash worms follow a precomputed spread tree using prior knowledge of all systems vulnerable to the worm's exploit. In previous work we suggested that a flash worm could saturate one million vulnerable hosts on the Internet in under 30 seconds [18]. We grossly over-estimated.
Countering Network Worms through Automatic Patch Generation
, 2003
"... The ability of worms to spread at rates that effectively preclude human-directed reaction has elevated them to a first-class security threat to distributed systems. We propose an architecture for automatically repairing software flaws that are exploited by network worms. Our approach relies on sourc ..."
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Cited by 52 (4 self)
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The ability of worms to spread at rates that effectively preclude human-directed reaction has elevated them to a first-class security threat to distributed systems. We propose an architecture for automatically repairing software flaws that are exploited by network worms. Our approach relies on source code transformations to quickly apply automatically-created (and tested) localized patches to vulnerable segments of the targeted application. To determine these susceptible portions, we use a sandboxed instance of the application as a "clean room" laboratory that runs in parallel with the production system and exploit the fact that a worm must reveal its infection vector to achieve its goal (i.e., further infection). We believe our approach to be the first end-point solution to the problem of malicious self-replicating code. The primary benefits of our approach are (a) its low impact on application performance, (b) its ability to respond to attacks without human intervention, and (c) its capacity to deal with "zero-day" worms (for which no known patches exist). Furthermore, our approach does not depend on a centralized update repository, which can be the target of a concerted attack similar to the Blaster worm. Finally, our approach can also be used to protect against lower intensity attacks, such as intrusion ("hack-in") attempts. To experimentally evaluate the efficacy of our approach, we use our prototype implementation to test a number of applications with known vulnerabilities. Our preliminary results indicate a success rate of 82%, and a maximum repair time of 8.5 seconds.
A Cooperative Immunization System for an Untrusting Internet
- In Proceedings of the 11th IEEE International Conference on Networks (ICON
, 2003
"... Abstract — Viruses and worms are one of the most common causes of security problems in computer systems today. Users attempt to protect machines from such attacks by using antivirus programs and firewalls, with a mixed record of success at best. One of the main problems with these solutions is that ..."
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Cited by 44 (9 self)
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Abstract — Viruses and worms are one of the most common causes of security problems in computer systems today. Users attempt to protect machines from such attacks by using antivirus programs and firewalls, with a mixed record of success at best. One of the main problems with these solutions is that they rely on manual configurations and human intervention, and may fail to react in time to defend against an attack. We present a cooperative immunization system that helps defend against these types of attacks. The nodes in our system cooperate and inform each other of ongoing attacks and the actions necessary to defend. To evaluate our proposal, we discuss a simple virus model and evaluate our system using simulation. Our measurements show that our algorithm is more effective against viruses and more robust against malicious participants in the immunization system. I.
Epidemic Profiles and Defense of Scale-Free Networks
- in Proceedings of ACM CCS Workshop on Rapid Malcode (WORM’03
, 2003
"... In this paper, we study the defensibility of large scale-free networks against malicious rapidly self-propagating code such as worms and viruses. We develop a framework to investigate the profiles of such code as it infects a large network. Based on these profiles and large-scale network percolation ..."
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Cited by 20 (2 self)
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In this paper, we study the defensibility of large scale-free networks against malicious rapidly self-propagating code such as worms and viruses. We develop a framework to investigate the profiles of such code as it infects a large network. Based on these profiles and large-scale network percolation studies, we investigate features of networks that render them more or less defensible against worms. However, we wish to preserve mission-relevant features of the network, such as basic connectivity and resilience to normal nonmalicious outages. We aim to develop methods to help design networks that preserve critical functionality and enable more e#ective defenses.
A Holistic Approach to Service Survivability
- In Proceedings of the 1st ACM Workshop on Survivable and Self-Regenerative Systems (SSRS
, 2003
"... We present SABER (Survivability Architecture: Block, Evade, React) , a proposed survivability architecture that blocks, evades and reacts to a variety of attacks by using several security and survivability mechanisms in an automated and coordinated fashion. Contrary to the ad hoc manner in which con ..."
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Cited by 17 (7 self)
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We present SABER (Survivability Architecture: Block, Evade, React) , a proposed survivability architecture that blocks, evades and reacts to a variety of attacks by using several security and survivability mechanisms in an automated and coordinated fashion. Contrary to the ad hoc manner in which contemporary survivable systems are built--using isolated, independent security mechanisms such as firewalls, intrusion detection systems and software sandboxes-- SABER integrates several different technologies in an attempt to provide a unified framework for responding to the wide range of attacks malicious insiders and outsiders can launch.
Analyzing cooperative containment of fast scanning worms
- In Proceedings of USENIX Steps to Reducing Unwanted Traffic on the Internet Workshop (SRUTI
, 2005
"... Fast scanning worms, that can infect nearly the entire vulnerable population in order of minutes, are among the most serious threats to the Internet today. In this work, we investigate the efficacy of cooperation among Internet firewalls in containing such worms. We first propose a model for firewal ..."
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Cited by 13 (1 self)
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Fast scanning worms, that can infect nearly the entire vulnerable population in order of minutes, are among the most serious threats to the Internet today. In this work, we investigate the efficacy of cooperation among Internet firewalls in containing such worms. We first propose a model for firewall-level cooperation and then study the containment in our model of cooperation using analysis and simulation. Our results suggest that, with moderate overhead, cooperation among Internet firewalls can provide 95 % containment under 10 % deployment while being resilient to 100-1000 malicious firewalls. 1
Robust reactions to potential day-zero worms through cooperation and validation
- In Proceedings of the 9th Information Security Conference (ISC
, 2006
"... Abstract. Cooperative defensive systems communicate and cooperate in their response to worm attacks, but determine the presence of a worm attack solely on local information. Distributed worm detection and immunization systems track suspicious behavior at multiple cooperating nodes to determine wheth ..."
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Cited by 6 (1 self)
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Abstract. Cooperative defensive systems communicate and cooperate in their response to worm attacks, but determine the presence of a worm attack solely on local information. Distributed worm detection and immunization systems track suspicious behavior at multiple cooperating nodes to determine whether a worm attack is in progress. Earlier work has shown that cooperative systems can respond quickly to day-zero worms, while distributed defensive systems allow detectors to be more conservative (i.e. paranoid) about potential attacks because they manage false alarms efficiently. In this paper we begin a preliminary investigation into the complex tradeoffs in such systems between communication costs, computation overhead, accuracy of the local tests, estimation of viral virulence, and the fraction of the network infected before the attack crests. We evaluate the effectiveness of different system configurations in various simulations. Our experiments show that distributed algorithms are better able to balance effectiveness against viruses with reduced cost in computation and communication when faced with false alarms. Furthermore, cooperative, distributed systems seem more robust against malicious participants in the immunization system than earlier cooperative but non-distributed approaches. 1
A Firewall Network System for Worm Defense in Enterprise Networks
"... From a security point of view, the Internet is too open. The central idea of a traditional "firewall" is to constrain service requests from the Internet to a local network. As an enterprise network becomes larger and more flexible, an Internet worm can easily find a way to enter it. Based on the "de ..."
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Cited by 4 (1 self)
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From a security point of view, the Internet is too open. The central idea of a traditional "firewall" is to constrain service requests from the Internet to a local network. As an enterprise network becomes larger and more flexible, an Internet worm can easily find a way to enter it. Based on the "defense-in-depth" principle, we present a "Firewall Network System" for worm defense in enterprise networks, which uses internal firewalls to divide an enterprise network into many isolated subnetworks. Computers in an enterprise network are classified as either clients or servers: all service requests sent to internal IP addresses of an enterprise network will be blocked by internal firewalls if they target non-server computers or servers that do not provide the corresponding service. In this way, the Firewall Network System removes most worm infection paths in an enterprise network and makes worm detection much easier. All internal firewalls are designed to have the same set of firewall rules, which means the Firewall Network System is scalable and easily managed. In addition, we propose a five-level feedback worm defense strategy based on the US homeland defense "color" system [11] and present models of several worm defense techniques including active patching and individual quarantine.
Cooperative automated worm response and detection immune algorithm (cardinal) inspired by t-cell immunity and tolerance
- In ICARIS-04, LNCS 3239
, 2005
"... Abstract. The role of T-cells within the immune system is to confirm and assess anomalous situations and then either respond to or tolerate the source of the effect. To illustrate how these mechanisms can be harnessed to solve real-world problems, we present the blueprint of a T-cell inspired algori ..."
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Cited by 4 (1 self)
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Abstract. The role of T-cells within the immune system is to confirm and assess anomalous situations and then either respond to or tolerate the source of the effect. To illustrate how these mechanisms can be harnessed to solve real-world problems, we present the blueprint of a T-cell inspired algorithm for computer security worm detection. We show how the three central T-cell processes, namely T-cell maturation, differentiation and proliferation, naturally map into this domain and further illustrate how such an algorithm fits into a complete immune inspired computer security system and framework. 1

