We examine the separation of ownership and control for 2,980 corporations in nine East Asian countries. In all countries, voting rights frequently exceed cash-#ow rights via pyramid structures and cross-holdings. The separation of ownership and control is most pronounced among family-controlled "rms and small "rms. More than two-thirds of "rms are controlled by a single shareholder. Managers of closely held "rms tend to be relatives of the controlling shareholder's family. Older "rms are generally family-controlled, dispelling the notion that ownership becomes dispersed over time. Finally, signi"cant corporate wealth in East Asia is concentrated among a few families. � 2000 Elsevier Science S.A. All rights reserved. JEL classixcation: G32; L22

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Much of the literature on the role and function of the modern firm is based on the assumption of the prevalence of widely dispersed ownership. The dispersion of ownership has resulted in the notion that “the owner of industrial wealth is left a mere symbol of ownership ” (Berle and Means, 1932, p.68), as the control over companies is

This paper investigates the relation between the ownership structure and the performance of corporations if ownership is made multi-dimensional and also is treated as an endogenous variable. To our knowledge, no prior study has treated the corporate control problem this way. We find no statistically significant relation between ownership structure and firm performance. This finding is consistent with the view that diffuse ownership, while it may exacerbate some agency problems, also yields compensating advantages that generally offset such problems. Consequently, for data that reflect market-mediated ownership structures, no systematic relation between ownership structure and firm performance is

This study provides a unique use of abnormal profits from insider trading to measure a specific form of agency cost between outside shareholder and insiders—the agency cost of insider trading. Cross-sectional differences in the utilization of various bonding and monitoring mechanisms are examined to determine the relative effectiveness of alternative strategies in controlling such agency cost. Institutional shareholders and separation of the CEO and board chairman positions are shown to be effective in minimizing the agency cost of insider trading.