Abstract: We study the implications of imperfect information for term structures of credit spreads on corporate bonds. We suppose that bond investors cannot observe the issuer’s assets directly, and receive instead only periodic and imperfect accounting reports. For a setting in which the assets of the firm are a geometric Brownian motion until informed equityholders optimally liquidate, we derive the conditional distribution of the assets, given accounting data and survivorship. Contrary to the perfect-information case, there exists a default-arrival intensity process. That intensity is calculated in terms of the conditional distribution of assets. Credit yield spreads are characterized in terms of accounting information. Generalizations are provided. 1 We are exceptionally grateful to Michael Harrison for his significant contributions to this paper, which are noted within. We are also grateful for insightful research assistance

This paper empirically tests five structural models of corporate bond pricing: those of Merton (1974), Geske (1977), Leland and Toft (1996), Longsta# and Schwartz (1995), and Collin-Dufresne and Goldstein (2001). We implement the models using a sample of 182 bond prices from firms with simple capital structures during the period 1986-1997. The conventional wisdom is that structural models do not generate spreads as high as those seen in the bond market, and true to expectations we find that the predicted spreads in our implementation of the Merton model are too low. However, most of the other structural models predict spreads that are too high on average. Nevertheless, accuracy is a problem, as the newer models tend to severely overstate the credit risk of firms with high leverage or volatility and yet su#er from a spread underprediction problem with safer bonds. The Leland and Toft model is an exception in that it overpredicts spreads on most bonds, particularly those with high coupons. More accurate structural models must avoid features that increase the credit risk on the riskier bonds while scarcely a#ecting the spreads of the safest bonds.

Motivated by recent financial crises in East Asia and the United States where the downfall of a small number of firms had an economy-wide impact, this paper generalizes existing reduced-form models to include default intensities dependent on the default of a counterparty. In this model, firms have correlated defaults due not only to an exposure to common risk factors, but also to firm-specific risks that are termed “counterparty risks.” Numerical examples illustrate the effect of counterparty risk on the pricing of defaultable bonds and credit derivatives such as default swaps.

This paper analyzes the association between aggregate default and recovery rates on credit assets, and seeks to empirically explain this critical relationship. We examine recovery rates on corporate bond defaults, over the period 1982-2002. Our econometric univariate and multivariate models explain a significant portion of the variance in bond recovery rates aggregated across all seniority and collateral levels. The central thesis is that aggregate recovery rates are basically a function of supply and demand for the securities, with default rates playing a pivotal role. Such a link would bring about a significant increase in both expected and unexpected losses as measured by some widespread credit risk models, and would affect the procyclicality effects of the New Basel Capital Accord. Our results have also important implications for investors in corporate bonds and bank loans, and for all markets (e.g., securitizations, credit derivatives, etc.) which depend on recovery rates as a key variable.

In this paper we present a new approach to incorporate dynamic default dependency in intensity-based default risk models. The model uses an arbitrary default dependency structure which is specified by the Copula of the times of default, this is combined with individual intensity-based models for the defaults of the obligors without loss of the calibration of the individual default-intensity models. The dynamics of the survival probabilities and credit spreads of individual obligors are derived and it is shown that in situations with positive dependence, the default of one obligor causes the credit spreads of the other obligors to jump upwards, as it is experienced empirically in situations with credit contagion. For the

We identify and estimate the sources of risk that cause corporate bonds to earn an excess return over default-free bonds. In particular, we estimate the risk premium associated with a default event. Default is modelled using a jump process with stochastic intensity. For a large set of firms, we model the default intensity of each firm as a function of common and firm-specific factors. In the model, corporate bond excess returns can be due to risk premia on factors driving the intensities and due to a risk premium on the default jump risk. The model is estimated using data on corporate bond prices for 104 US firms and historical default rate data. We find significant risk premia on the factors that drive intensities. However, these risk premia cannot fully explain the size of corporate bond excess returns. Next, we estimate the size of the default jump risk premium, correcting for possible tax and liquidity effects. The estimates show that this event risk premium is a significant and economically important determinant of excess corporate bond returns.

We propose a reduced-form model where jumps-to-default are priced because they generate a market-wide jump in credit spreads. While this framework is consistent with a counterparty risk interpretation (e.g., Jarrow and Yu (2001)), it is most naturally interpreted as an updating of beliefs due to an unexpected event. Simple analytic solutions are obtained for the prices of risky debt regardless of the number of firms that share in the contagious response. As a special case, we show that the contagious response can be induced via a liquidity-shock, with no impact on actual default intensities. Empirically, we find that credit events of large firms generate a market wide increase in credit spreads and a significant ‘flight-to-quality ’ response in the Treasury market. A calibration argument suggests that the premium associated with jump-to-default risk for a typical investment grade firm has an upper bound of a few basis points per year, but that the risk premium for contagion-risk may be considerably larger.

This paper is a critical survey of models designed for pricing fixed income securities and their associated term structures of market yields. Our primary focus is on the interplay between the theoretical specification of dynamic term structure models and their empirical fit to historical changes in the shapes of yield curves. We begin by overviewing the dynamic term structure models that have been fit to treasury or swap yield curves and in which the risk factors follow diffusions, jump-diffusion, or have “switching regimes. ” Then the goodness-of-fits of these models are assessed relative to their abilities to: (i) match linear projections of changes in yields onto the slope of the yield curve; (ii) match the persistence of conditional volatilities, and the shapes of term structures of unconditional volatilities, of yields; and (iii) to reliably price caps, swaptions, and other fixed-income derivatives. For the case of defaultable securities we explore the relative fits to historical yield spreads. 1

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