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168
An integrated theory of the mind
- PSYCHOLOGICAL REVIEW
, 2004
"... There has been a proliferation of proposed mental modules in an attempt to account for different cognitive functions but so far there has been no successful account of their integration. ACT-R (Anderson & Lebiere, 1998) has evolved into a theory that consists of multiple modules but also explain ..."
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Cited by 780 (73 self)
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There has been a proliferation of proposed mental modules in an attempt to account for different cognitive functions but so far there has been no successful account of their integration. ACT-R (Anderson & Lebiere, 1998) has evolved into a theory that consists of multiple modules but also explains how they are integrated to produce coherent cognition. The perceptual-motor modules, the goal module, and the declarative memory module are presented as examples of specialized systems in ACT-R. These modules are associated with distinct cortical regions. These modules place chunks in buffers where they can be detected by a production system that responds to patterns of information in the buffers. At any point in time a single production rule is selected to respond to the current pattern. Subsymbolic processes serve to guide the selection of rules to fire as well as the internal operations of some modules. Much of learning involves tuning of these subsymbolic processes. Empirical examples are presented that illustrate the predictions of ACT-R’s modules. In addition, two models of complex tasks are described to illustrate how these modules result in strong predictions when they are brought together. One of these models is concerned with complex patterns of behavioral data in a dynamic task and the other is concerned with fMRI data obtained in a study of symbol manipulation.
Similarity and induction
- Review of Philosophy and Psychology
, 2010
"... An argument is categorical if its premises and conclusion are of the form All members ofC have property F, where C is a natural category like FALCON or BIRD, and P remains the same across premises and conclusion. An example is Grizzly bears love onions. Therefore, all bears love onions. Such an argu ..."
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Cited by 258 (10 self)
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An argument is categorical if its premises and conclusion are of the form All members ofC have property F, where C is a natural category like FALCON or BIRD, and P remains the same across premises and conclusion. An example is Grizzly bears love onions. Therefore, all bears love onions. Such an argument is psychologically strong to the extent that belief in its premises engenders belief in its conclusion. A subclass of categorical arguments is examined, and the following hypothesis is advanced: The strength of a categorical argument increases with (a) the degree to which the premise categories are similar to the conclusion category and (b) the degree to which the premise categories are similar to members of the lowest level category that includes both the premise and the conclusion categories. A model based on this hypothesis accounts for 13 qualitative phenomena and the quantitative results of several experiments. The Problem of Argument Strength Fundamental to human thought is the confirmation relation, joining sentences P,... Pn to another sentence C just in case belief in the former leads to belief in the latter. Theories of confirmation may be cast in the terminology of argument strength,
Emobdiment in attitudes, social perception, and emotion
- Personality and Social Psychology Review
, 2005
"... Findings in the social psychology literatures on attitudes, social perception, and emo-tion demonstrate that social information processing involves embodiment, where em-bodiment refers both to actual bodily states and to simulations of experience in the brain's modality-specific systems for per ..."
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Cited by 185 (28 self)
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Findings in the social psychology literatures on attitudes, social perception, and emo-tion demonstrate that social information processing involves embodiment, where em-bodiment refers both to actual bodily states and to simulations of experience in the brain's modality-specific systems for perception, action, and introspection. We show that embodiment underlies social information processing when the perceiver inter-acts with actual social objects (online cognition) and when the perceiver represents social objects in their absence (offline cognition). Although many empirical demon-strations ofsocial embodiment exist, no particularly compelling account ofthem has been offered. We propose that theories ofembodied cognition, such as the Perceptual Symbol Systems (PSS) account (Barsalou, 1999), explain and integrate these find-ings, and that they also suggest exciting new directionsfor research. We compare the PSS account to a variety of related proposals and show how it addresses criticisms that have previously posed problems for the general embodiment approach. Consider the following findings. Wells and Petty (1980) reported that nodding the head (as in agree-ment) while listening to persuasive messages led to more positive attitudes toward the message content than shaking the head (as in disagreement). Caciop-po, Priester, and Berntson (1993) observed that novel Chinese ideographs presented during arm flexion (an action associated with approach) were subsequently evaluated more favorably than ideographs presented during arm extension (an action associated with avoid-ance). Duclos et al. (1989) led participants to adopt The authors thank Vic Ferreira, Art Glenberg, Danny McIntosh, Randy O'Reilly, and Cathy Reed for their helpful comments on vari-
A computational model of semantic memory impairment: Modality specificity and emergent category specificity
- JOURNAL OF EXPERIMENTAL PSYCHOLOGY: GENERAL
, 1991
"... It is demonstrated how a modality-specific semantic memory system can account for category-specific impairments after brain damage. In Experiment 1, the hypothesis that visual and functional knowledge play different roles in the representation of living things and nonliving things is tested and conf ..."
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Cited by 158 (8 self)
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It is demonstrated how a modality-specific semantic memory system can account for category-specific impairments after brain damage. In Experiment 1, the hypothesis that visual and functional knowledge play different roles in the representation of living things and nonliving things is tested and confirmed. A parallel distributed processing model of semantic memory in which knowledge is subdivided by modality into visual and functional components is described. In Experiment 2, the model is lesioned, and it is confirmed that damage to visual semantics primarily impairs knowledge of living things, and damage to functional semantics primarily impairs knowledge of non!iving things. In Experiment 3, it is demonstrated that the model accounts naturally for a finding that had appeared problematic for a modality-specific architec-ture, namely, impaired retrieval of functional knowledge about living things. Finally, in Experiment 4, it is shown how the model can account for a recent observation of impaired knowledge of living things only when knowledge is probed verbally.
Alternative strategies of categorization
- Cognition
, 1998
"... Psychological studies of categorization often assume that all concepts are of the same general kind, and are operated on by the same kind of categorization process. In this paper, we argue against this unitary view, and for the existence of qualitatively different categoriza-tion processes. In parti ..."
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Cited by 110 (2 self)
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Psychological studies of categorization often assume that all concepts are of the same general kind, and are operated on by the same kind of categorization process. In this paper, we argue against this unitary view, and for the existence of qualitatively different categoriza-tion processes. In particular, we focus on the distinction between categorizing an item by: (a) applying a category-defining rule to the item vs. (b) determining the similarity of that item to remembered exemplars of a category. We begin by characterizing rule application and simi-larity computations as strategies of categorization. Next, we review experimental studies that have used artificial categories and shown that differences in instructions or time pressure can lead to either rule-based categorization or similarity-based categorization. Then we consider studies that have used natural concepts and again demonstrated that categorization can be done by either rule application or similarity calculations. Lastly, we take up evidence from cognitive neuroscience relevant to the rule vs. similarity issue. There is some indirect evi-dence from brain-damaged patients for neurological differences between categorization based on rules vs. that based on similarity (with the former involving frontal regions, and the latter relying more on posterior areas). For more direct evidence, we present the results of a recent neuroimaging experiment, which indicates that different neural circuits are involved when people categorize items on the basis of a rule as compared with when they categorize the same items on the basis of similarity. Ó 1998 Elsevier Science B.V.
Double Dissociation Without Modularity: Evidence from Connectionist Neuropsychology
- Journal of Clinical and Experimental Neuropsychology
, 1995
"... Many theorists assume that the cognitive system is composed of a collection of encapsulated processing components or modules, each dedicated to performing a particular cognitive function. On this view, selective impairments of cognitive tasks following brain damage, as evidenced by double dissociati ..."
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Cited by 95 (15 self)
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Many theorists assume that the cognitive system is composed of a collection of encapsulated processing components or modules, each dedicated to performing a particular cognitive function. On this view, selective impairments of cognitive tasks following brain damage, as evidenced by double dissociations, are naturally interpreted in terms of the loss of particular processing components. By contrast, the current investigation examines in detail a double dissociation between concrete and abstract word reading after damage to a connectionist network that pronounces words via meaning and yet has no separable components (Plaut & Shallice, 1993). The functional specialization in the network that gives rise to the double dissociation is not transparently related to the network's structure, as modular theories assume. Furthermore, a consideration of the distribution of effects across quantitatively equivalent individual lesions in the network raises specific concerns about the interpretation of...
The similarity-in-topography principle: reconciling theories of conceptual deficits
- Cognitive Neuropsychology
, 2003
"... Three theories currently compete to explain the conceptual deficits that result from brain damage: sensory-functional theory, domain-specific theory, and conceptual structure theory. We argue that all three theories capture important aspects of conceptual deficits, and offer different insights into ..."
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Cited by 80 (15 self)
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Three theories currently compete to explain the conceptual deficits that result from brain damage: sensory-functional theory, domain-specific theory, and conceptual structure theory. We argue that all three theories capture important aspects of conceptual deficits, and offer different insights into their origins. Conceptual topography theory (CTT) integrates these insights, beginning with A. R. Damasio’s (1989) convergence zone theory and elaborating it with the similarity-in-topography (SIT) principle. According to CTT, feature maps in sensory-motor systems represent the features of a category’s exemplars. A hierarchical system of convergence zones then conjoins these features to form both property and category representations. According to the SIT principle, the proximity of two conjunctive neurons in a convergence zone increases with the similarity of the features they conjoin. As a result, conjunctive neurons become topographically organised into local regions that represent properties and categories. Depending on the level and location of a lesion in this system, a wide variety of deficits is possible. Consistent with the literature, these deficits range from the loss of a single category to the loss of multiple categories that share sensory-motor properties.
Decisions and the evolution of memory: Multiple systems, multiple functions. Psychological Review
, 2002
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