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The Java Virtual Machine Specification, http://java.sun.com/docs/books/vmspec
 In Proc. of GC’04, volume 3267 of Springer LNCS
, 2005
"... Abstract. Polynomial time adversaries based on a computational view of cryptography have additional capabilities that the classical DolevYao adversary model does not include. To relate these two different models of cryptography, in this paper we enrich a formal model for cryptographic expressions, ..."
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Cited by 3 (1 self)
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Abstract. Polynomial time adversaries based on a computational view of cryptography have additional capabilities that the classical DolevYao adversary model does not include. To relate these two different models of cryptography, in this paper we enrich a formal model for cryptographic expressions, originally based on the DolevYao assumptions, with computational aspects based on notions of probability and computational power. The obtained result is that if the cryptosystem is robust enough, then the two adversary models turn out to be equivalent. As an application of our approach, we show how to determine a secrecy property against the computational adversary. 1
Approximating Imperfect Cryptography in a Formal Model
 MEFISTO 2003 PRELIMINARY VERSION
, 2003
"... We present a formal view of cryptography that overcomes the usual assumptions of formal models for reasoning about security of computer systems, i.e. perfect cryptography and DolevYao adversary model. In our framework, equivalence among formal cryptographic expressions is parameterized by a computa ..."
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Cited by 3 (3 self)
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We present a formal view of cryptography that overcomes the usual assumptions of formal models for reasoning about security of computer systems, i.e. perfect cryptography and DolevYao adversary model. In our framework, equivalence among formal cryptographic expressions is parameterized by a computational adversary that may exploit weaknesses of the cryptosystem to cryptanalyze ciphertext with a certain probability of success. To validate our approach, we show that in the restricted setting of ideal cryptosystems, for which the probability of guessing information that the DolevYao adversary cannot derive is negligible, the computational adversary is limited to the allowed behaviors of the DolevYao adversary.
Message Equivalence and Imperfect Cryptography in a Formal Model
"... We present a formal view of cryptography that overcomes the usual assumptions of formal models for reasoning about security of computer systems, i.e. perfect cryptography and DolevYao adversary model. The use of formal methods for modeling and analyzing cryptographic operations is wellestablished. ..."
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We present a formal view of cryptography that overcomes the usual assumptions of formal models for reasoning about security of computer systems, i.e. perfect cryptography and DolevYao adversary model. The use of formal methods for modeling and analyzing cryptographic operations is wellestablished. Since the seminal paper by Dolev and Yao [4] introduced a simple and intuitive formalization of cryptographic operations, many alternative definitions have been proposed on the basis of several approaches, ranging from modal logics to process algebras. Key to success of such a theory was the very simple idea behind the definition of ciphertext, which is based on the assumption of perfect cryptography. Simply put, a message encrypted with a given key K can be decrypted if and only if K is known, while in each other case such a message is a black box. More formally, {M}K (representing the encryption of M with the key K) and ⊗ (representing an undecryptable ciphertext) are always equivalent if K is not known. On the basis of such an assumption, an adversary
MEFISTO 2003 Preliminary Version Approximating Imperfect Cryptography in a Formal Model
"... We present a formal view of cryptography that overcomes the usual assumptions of formal models for reasoning about security of computer systems, i.e. perfect cryptography and DolevYao adversary model. In our framework, equivalence among formal cryptographic expressions is parameterized by a computa ..."
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We present a formal view of cryptography that overcomes the usual assumptions of formal models for reasoning about security of computer systems, i.e. perfect cryptography and DolevYao adversary model. In our framework, equivalence among formal cryptographic expressions is parameterized by a computational adversary that may exploit weaknesses of the cryptosystem to cryptanalyze ciphertext with a certain probability of success. To validate our approach, we show that in the restricted setting of ideal cryptosystems, for which the probability of guessing information that the DolevYao adversary cannot derive is negligible, the computational adversary is limited to the allowed behaviors of the DolevYao adversary. 1 Introduction The use of formal methods for modeling and analyzing cryptographic operations is wellestablished. Since the seminal paper by Dolev and Yao [10] introduced a simple and intuitive formalization of cryptographic operations, many alternative definitions have been proposed on the basis of several approaches, ranging from modal logics to process algebras (see, e.g., [8,17,14,12,19,18,11]). Key to success of such a theory was the very simple idea behind the definition of ciphertext, which is based on the assumption of perfect cryptography.
A Formal Approach for Automatic Verification of Imperfect Cryptographic Protocols
, 2007
"... In simplest form, security protocols comprise messages exchanged between agents to achieve security goals such as confidentiality and integrity of data, or authentication of the identity. Despite that simple fact, designing security protocols has ..."
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In simplest form, security protocols comprise messages exchanged between agents to achieve security goals such as confidentiality and integrity of data, or authentication of the identity. Despite that simple fact, designing security protocols has