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278
A metanotation for protocol analysis
 in: Proc. CSFW’99
, 1999
"... Most formal approaches to security protocol analysis are based on a set of assumptions commonly referred to as the “DolevYao model. ” In this paper, we use a multiset rewriting formalism, based on linear logic, to state the basic assumptions of this model. A characteristic of our formalism is the w ..."
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Cited by 167 (38 self)
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Most formal approaches to security protocol analysis are based on a set of assumptions commonly referred to as the “DolevYao model. ” In this paper, we use a multiset rewriting formalism, based on linear logic, to state the basic assumptions of this model. A characteristic of our formalism is the way that existential quantification provides a succinct way of choosing new values, such as new keys or nonces. We define a class of theories in this formalism that correspond to finitelength protocols, with a bounded initialization phase but allowing unboundedly many instances of each protocol role (e.g., client, server, initiator, or responder). Undecidability is proved for a restricted class of these protocols, and PSPACEcompleteness is claimed for a class further restricted to have no new data (nonces). Since it is a fragment of linear logic, we can use our notation directly as input to linear logic tools, allowing us to do proof search for attacks with relatively little programming effort, and to formally verify protocol transformations and optimizations. 1
An NP decision procedure for protocol insecurity with XOR
 THEORETICAL COMPUTER SCIENCE
, 2005
"... ..."
On the Reachability Problem in Cryptographic Protocols
, 2000
"... We study the verification of secrecy and authenticity properties for cryptographic protocols which rely on symmetric shared keys. The verification can be reduced to check whether a certain parallel program which models the protocol and the specification can reach an erroneous state while interacting ..."
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Cited by 97 (0 self)
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We study the verification of secrecy and authenticity properties for cryptographic protocols which rely on symmetric shared keys. The verification can be reduced to check whether a certain parallel program which models the protocol and the specification can reach an erroneous state while interacting with the environment. Assuming finite principals, we present a simple decision procedure for the reachability problem which is based on a `symbolic' reduction system.
Athena: a novel approach to efficient automatic security protocol analysis
 Journal of Computer Security
, 2001
"... protocol analysis ..."
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Types and Effects for Asymmetric Cryptographic Protocols
, 2002
"... We present the first type and effect system for proving authenticity properties of security protocols based on asymmetric cryptography. The most significant new features of our type system are: (1) a separation of public types (for data possibly sent to the opponent) from tainted types (for data pos ..."
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Cited by 84 (10 self)
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We present the first type and effect system for proving authenticity properties of security protocols based on asymmetric cryptography. The most significant new features of our type system are: (1) a separation of public types (for data possibly sent to the opponent) from tainted types (for data possibly received from the opponent) via a subtype relation; (2) trust effects, to guarantee that tainted data does not, in fact, originate from the opponent; and (3) challenge/response types to support a variety of idioms used to guarantee message freshness. We illustrate the applicability of our system via protocol examples.
From Secrecy to Authenticity in Security Protocols
 In 9th International Static Analysis Symposium (SAS’02
, 2002
"... We present a new technique for verifying authenticity in cryptographic protocols. This technique is fully automatic, it can handle an unbounded number of sessions of the protocol, and it is efficient in practice. It significantly extends a previous technique for the verification of secrecy. The prot ..."
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Cited by 78 (8 self)
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We present a new technique for verifying authenticity in cryptographic protocols. This technique is fully automatic, it can handle an unbounded number of sessions of the protocol, and it is efficient in practice. It significantly extends a previous technique for the verification of secrecy. The protocol is represented in an extension of the pi calculus with fairly arbitrary cryptographic primitives. This protocol representation includes the authentication specification to be verified, but no other annotation. Our technique has been proved correct, implemented, and tested on various protocols from the literature. The experimental results show that we can verify these protocols in less than 1 s.
Non Interference for the Analysis of Cryptographic Protocols
, 2000
"... Many security properties of cryptographic protocols can be all seen as specific instances of a general property, we called Non Deducibility on Composition (NDC), that we proposed a few years ago for studying information flow properties in computer systems. The advantage of our unifying theory is tha ..."
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Cited by 76 (28 self)
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Many security properties of cryptographic protocols can be all seen as specific instances of a general property, we called Non Deducibility on Composition (NDC), that we proposed a few years ago for studying information flow properties in computer systems. The advantage of our unifying theory is that formal comparison among these properties is now easier and that the full generality of NDC has helped us in finding a few new attacks on cryptographic protocols.
Multiset Rewriting and the Complexity of Bounded Security Protocols
 Journal of Computer Security
, 2002
"... We formalize the DolevYao model of security protocols, using a notation based on multiset rewriting with existentials. The goals are to provide a simple formal notation for describing security protocols, to formalize the assumptions of the DolevYao model using this notation, and to analyze the ..."
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Cited by 74 (9 self)
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We formalize the DolevYao model of security protocols, using a notation based on multiset rewriting with existentials. The goals are to provide a simple formal notation for describing security protocols, to formalize the assumptions of the DolevYao model using this notation, and to analyze the complexity of the secrecy problem under various restrictions. We prove that, even for the case where we restrict the size of messages and the depth of message encryption, the secrecy problem is undecidable for the case of an unrestricted number of protocol roles and an unbounded number of new nonces. We also identify several decidable classes, including a dexpcomplete class when the number of nonces is restricted, and an npcomplete class when both the number of nonces and the number of roles is restricted. We point out a remaining open complexity problem, and discuss the implications these results have on the general topic of protocol analysis.
Symmetric Encryption in a Simulatable DolevYao Style Cryptographic Library
 In Proc. 17th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop (CSFW
, 2004
"... Recently we solved the longstanding open problem of justifying a DolevYao type model of cryptography as used in virtually all automated protocol provers under active attacks. The justification was done by defining an ideal system handling DolevYaostyle terms and a cryptographic realization wi ..."
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Cited by 72 (19 self)
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Recently we solved the longstanding open problem of justifying a DolevYao type model of cryptography as used in virtually all automated protocol provers under active attacks. The justification was done by defining an ideal system handling DolevYaostyle terms and a cryptographic realization with the same user interface, and by showing that the realization is as secure as the ideal system in the sense of reactive simulatability. This definition encompasses arbitrary active attacks and enjoys general composition and propertypreservation properties. Security holds in the standard model of cryptography and under standard assumptions of adaptively secure primitives.