Results 1  10
of
601
The Evolution of Cooperation
 SCIENCE, NEW SERIES, VOL. 211, NO. 4489. (MAR. 27, 1981), PP. 13901396.
, 1981
"... ..."
(Show Context)
Bayesian Data Analysis
, 1995
"... I actually own a copy of Harold Jeffreys’s Theory of Probability but have only read small bits of it, most recently over a decade ago to confirm that, indeed, Jeffreys was not too proud to use a classical chisquared pvalue when he wanted to check the misfit of a model to data (Gelman, Meng and Ste ..."
Abstract

Cited by 2132 (59 self)
 Add to MetaCart
I actually own a copy of Harold Jeffreys’s Theory of Probability but have only read small bits of it, most recently over a decade ago to confirm that, indeed, Jeffreys was not too proud to use a classical chisquared pvalue when he wanted to check the misfit of a model to data (Gelman, Meng and Stern, 2006). I do, however, feel that it is important to understand where our probability models come from, and I welcome the opportunity to use the present article by Robert, Chopin and Rousseau as a platform for further discussion of foundational issues. 2 In this brief discussion I will argue the following: (1) in thinking about prior distributions, we should go beyond Jeffreys’s principles and move toward weakly informative priors; (2) it is natural for those of us who work in social and computational sciences to favor complex models, contra Jeffreys’s preference for simplicity; and (3) a key generalization of Jeffreys’s ideas is to explicitly include model checking in the process of data analysis.
Rationalizable Strategic Behavior and the Problem of Perfection
 ECONOMETRICA
, 1984
"... ..."
(Show Context)
Methods for Task Allocation Via Agent Coalition Formation
, 1998
"... Task execution in multiagent environments may require cooperation among agents. Given a set of agents and a set of tasks which they have to satisfy, we consider situations where each task should be attached to a group of agents that will perform the task. Task allocation to groups of agents is nece ..."
Abstract

Cited by 360 (21 self)
 Add to MetaCart
Task execution in multiagent environments may require cooperation among agents. Given a set of agents and a set of tasks which they have to satisfy, we consider situations where each task should be attached to a group of agents that will perform the task. Task allocation to groups of agents is necessary when tasks cannot be performed by a single agent. However it may also be beneficial when groups perform more efficiently with respect to the single agents' performance. In this paper we present several solutions to the problem of task allocation among autonomous agents, and suggest that the agents form coalitions in order to perform tasks or improve the efficiency of their performance. We present efficient distributed algorithms with low ratio bounds and with low computational complexities. These properties are proven theoretically and supported by simulations and an implementation in an agent system. Our methods are based on both the algorithmic aspects of combinatorics and approximat...
Decision field theory: A dynamiccognitive approach to decision making (Tech
, 1989
"... Decision field theory provides for a mathematical foundation leading to a dynamic, stochastic theory of decision behavior in an uncertain environment. This theory is used to explain (a) violations of stochastic dominance, (b) violations of strong stochastic transitivity, (c) violations of independ ..."
Abstract

Cited by 250 (14 self)
 Add to MetaCart
(Show Context)
Decision field theory provides for a mathematical foundation leading to a dynamic, stochastic theory of decision behavior in an uncertain environment. This theory is used to explain (a) violations of stochastic dominance, (b) violations of strong stochastic transitivity, (c) violations of independence between alternatives, (d) serial position effects on preference, (e) speedaccuracy tradeoff effects in decision making, (f) the inverse relation between choice probability and decision time, (g) changes in the direction of preference under time pressure, (h) slower decision times for avoidance as compared with approach conflicts, and (i) preference reversals between choice and selling price measures of preference. The proposed theory is compared with 4 other theories of decision making under uncertainty. Beginning with von Neumann and Morgenstern's (1947) classic expected utility theory, steady progress has been made in the development of formal theories of decision making under risk and uncertainty. For rational theorists, the goal has been to formulate a logical foundation for representing the preferences of an ideal decision maker (e.g., Machina, 1982; Savage,
Trust as a Commodity
, 2000
"... Trust is central to all transactions and yet economists rarely discuss the notion. It is treated... ..."
Abstract

Cited by 205 (6 self)
 Add to MetaCart
Trust is central to all transactions and yet economists rarely discuss the notion. It is treated...