The concept of an agent has become important in both Artificial Intelligence (AI) and mainstream computer science. Our aim in this paper is to point the reader at what we perceive to be the most important theoretical and practical issues associated with the design and construction of intelligent agents. For convenience, we divide these issues into three areas (though as the reader will see, the divisions are at times somewhat arbitrary). Agent theory is concerned with the question of what an agent is, and the use of mathematical formalisms for representing and reasoning about the properties of agents. Agent architectures can be thought of as software engineering models of agents; researchers in this area are primarily concerned with the problem of designing software or hardware systems that will satisfy the prop-erties specified by agent theorists. Finally, agent languages are software systems for programming and experimenting with agents; these languages may embody principles proposed by theorists. The paper is not intended to serve as a tutorial introduction to all the issues mentioned; we hope instead simply to identify the most important issues, and point to work that elaborates on them. The article includes a short review of current and potential applications of agent technology.

The concept of an agent has recently become important in Artificial Intelligence (AI), and its relatively youthful subfield, Distributed AI (DAI). Our aim in this paper is to point the reader at what we perceive to be the most important theoretical and practical issues associated with the design and construction of intelligent agents. For convenience, we divide the area into three themes (though as the reader will see, these divisions are at times somewhat arbitrary). Agent theory is concerned with the question of what an agent is, and the use of mathematical formalisms for representing and reasoning about the properties of agents. Agent architectures can be thought of as software engineering models of agents; researchers in this area are primarily concerned with the problem of constructing software or hardware systems that will satisfy the properties specified by agent theorists. Finally, agent languages are software systems for programming and experimenting with agents; these languages typically embody principles proposed by theorists. The paper is not intended to serve as a tutorial introduction to all the issues mentioned; we hope instead simply to identify the key issues, and point to work that elaborates on them. The paper closes with a detailed bibliography, and some bibliographical remarks. 1

In a multi-agent environment, where self-motivated agents try to pursue their own goals, cooperation cannot be taken for granted. Cooperation must be planned for and achieved through communication and negotiation. We present a logical model of the mental states of the agents based on a representation of their beliefs, desires, intentions, and goals. We present argumentation as an iterative process emerging from exchanges among agents to persuade each other and bring about a change in intentions. We look at argumentation as a mechanism for achieving cooperation and agreements. Using categories identified from human multi-agent negotiation, we demonstrate how the logic can be used to specify argument formulation and evaluation. We also illustrate how the developed logic can be used to describe different types of agents. Furthermore, we present a general Automated Negotiation Agent which we implemented, based on the logical model. Using this system, a user can analyze and explore differe...

Computational efficiency is a central concern in the design of knowledge representation systems. In order to obtain efficient systems, it has been suggested that one should limit the form of the statements in the knowledge base or use an incomplete inference mechanism. The former approach is often too restrictive for practical applications, whereas the latter leads to uncertainty about exactly what can and cannot be inferred from the knowledge base. We present a third alternative, in which knowledge given in a general representation language is translated (compiled) into a tractable form — allowing for efficient subsequent query answering. We show how propositional logical theories can be compiled into Horn theories that approximate the original information. The approximations bound the original theory from below and above in terms of logical strength. The procedures are extended to other tractable languages (for example, binary clauses) and to the first-order case. Finally, we demonstrate the generality of our approach by compiling concept descriptions in a general framebased language into a tractable form.

We specify authentication protocols as formal objects with precise syntax and semantics, and define a semantic model that characterizes protocol executions. We have identified two basic types of correctness properties, namely, correspondence and secrecy, that underlie the correctness concerns of authentication protocols. We define assertions for specifying these properties, and a formal semantics for their satisfaction in the semantic model. The Otway-Rees protocol is used to illustrate the semantic model and the basic correctness properties. 1 Introduction Authentication is a fundamental concern in the design of secure distributed systems [14, 25]. In distributed systems, authentication is typically carried out by protocols, called authentication protocols. The primary goal of an authentication protocol is to establish the identities of the parties (referred to as principals in the security literature) who participate in the protocol. Many authentication protocols, however, also acc...

We argue that rather than representing an agent's knowledge as a collection of formulas, and then doing theorem proving to see if a given formula follows from an agent's knowledge base, it may be more useful to represent this knowledge by a semantic model, and then do model checking to see if the given formula is true in that model. We discuss how to construct a model that represents an agent's knowledge in a number of different contexts, and then consider how to approach the model-checking problem.

The economic theory of rationality promises to equal mathematical logic in its importance for the mechanization of reasoning. We survey the growing literature on how the basic notions of probability, utility, and rational choice, coupled with practical limitations on information and resources, influence the design and analysis of reasoning and representation systems. 1 Introduction People make judgments of rationality all the time, usually in criticizing someone else's thoughts or deeds as irrational, or in defending their own as rational. Artificial intelligence researchers construct systems and theories to perform or describe rational thought and action, criticizing and defending these systems and theories in terms similar to but more formal than those of the man or woman on the street. Judgments of human rationality commonly involve several different conceptions of rationality, including a logical conception used to judge thoughts, and an economic one used to judge actions or...

Several new logics for belief and knowledge are introduced and studied, all of which have the property that agents are not logically omniscient. In particular, in these logics, the set of beliefs of an agent does not necessarily contain all valid formulas. Thus, these logics are more suitable than traditional logics for modelling beliefs of humans (or machines) with limited reasoning capabilities. Our first logic is essentially an extension of Levesque's logic of implicit and explicit belief, where we extend to allow multiple agents and higher-level belief (i.e., beliefs about beliefs). Our second logic deals explicitly with "awareness," where, roughly speaking, it is necessary to be aware of a concept before one can have beliefs about it. Our third logic gives a model of "local reasoning," where an agent is viewed as a "society of minds," each with its own cluster of beliefs, which may contradict each other.

The needs of a real-time reasoner situated in an environment may make it appropriate to view error-correction and non-monotonicity as much the same thing. This has led us to formulate situated (or step) logic, an approach to reasoning in which the formalism has a kind of real-time self-reference that affects the course of deduction itself. Here we seek to motivate this as a useful vehicle for exploring certain issues in commonsensereasoning. In particular, a chief drawback of more traditional logics is avoided: from a contradiction we do not have all wffs swamping the (growing) conclusion set. Rather, we seek potentially inconsistent, but nevertheless useful, logics where the real-time self-referential feature allows a direct contradiction to be spotted and corrective action taken, as part of the same system of reasoning. Some specific inference mechanisms for real-time default reasoning are suggested, notably a form of introspection relevant to default reasoning. Special treatment of ...

Most known computational approaches to reasoning have problems when facing inconsistency, so they assume that a given logical system is consistent. Unfortunately, the latter is difficult to verify and very often is not true. It may happen that addition of data to a large system makes it inconsistent, and hence destroys the vast amount of meaningful information. We present a logic, called APC (annotated predicate calculus; cf. annotated logic programs of [3], that treats any set of clauses, either consistent or not, in a uniform way. In this logic, consequences of a contradiction are not nearly as damaging as in the standard predicate calculus, and meaningful information can still be extracted from an inconsistent set of formulae. APC has a resolution-based sound and complete proof procedure. We also introduce a novel notion of "epistemic entailment" and show its importance for investigating inconsistency in predicate calculus as well as its application to nonmonotonic reasoning. Most importantly, our claim that a logical theory is an adequate model of human perception of inconsistency, is actually backed by rigorous arguments.