The Kanger-Lindahl theory of normative positions attempts to use a combination of deontic logic (the logic of obligation and permission) and a logic of action/agency to give a formal account of obligations, duties, rights, and other complex normative concepts. This paper presents a generalisation and further development of this theory, together with methods for its automation and application to practical examples. The resulting theory is intended to be applied in the representation and analysis of laws, regulations, and contracts, in the specification of aspects of computer systems, in multi-agent systems, and as a contribution to the formal theory of organisations. Particular attention is paid to representations at varying levels of detail and the relationships that hold between them. The last part presents Norman-G, an automated support system intended to facilitate application of the theory to the analysis of practical problems, with a small example to illustrate its use.

Abstract. We propose a computationally oriented non-monotonic multi-modal logic arising from the combination of agency, intention and obligation. We argue about the defeasible nature of these notions and then we show how to represent and reason with them in the setting of defeasible logic. 1

work contained in this document has been submitted in support of an application for a degree or qualification of this or any other university or other institution of learning. All verbatim extracts have been distinguished by quotation marks, and all sources of information have been specifically acknowledged. Signed: Date: January 2005 This thesis describes a model of norm-governed practical reasoning agents and demonstrates the implementation of this model in the form of the NoA Normative Agent language and architecture. The introduction of normative concepts such as obligations, permissions and prohibitions into the practical reasoning of an agent is motivated by the need for effective coordination mechanisms in open systems. These are typically “multi-vendor ” scenarios, where independently designed agents, as representatives of human organisations and individuals, form short to medium term coalitions and collaborate in the performance of specific tasks. Electronic commerce is one of the most prominent examples of such scenarios. The use of autonomous software agents provides the

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In this paper we show that the Hilbert system of agency and ability presented by Dag Elgesem is incomplete with respect to the intended semantics. We argue that completeness result may be easily regained. Finally, we shortly discuss some issues related to the philosophical intuition behind his approach. This is done by examining Elgesem’s modal logic of agency and ability using semantics with different flavours. 1

We shall introduce a set basic legal concepts, providing a logical definition of them. This basic set will include, beside the usual deontic modalities (obligations, prohibitions and permissions), the following notions: right as protected interest (obligational right), normative conditional, different kinds of legal power, the intentional production of legal determinations (proclamation), source of the law. The presentation will be as precise as possible, while keeping the logical notions at a minimum. 1