Abstract not found

A theory of analogical mapping between source and target analogs based upon Interacting structural, semantic, and pragmatic constraints is proposed here. The structural constraint of isomorphism encourages mappings that maximize the consistency of relational corresondences between the elements of the two analogs. The constraint of semantic similarity supports mapping hypotheses to the degree that mapped predicates have similar meanings. The constraint of prog-mafic central/! / favors mappings involving elements the analogist believes to be Important in order to achieve the purpose for which the analogy Is being used. The theory is implemented in a computer program called ACME (Analogical Constraint Mapping Engine), which represents constraints by means of a network of supporting and competing hypotheses regarding what elements to map. A coop-erative algorithm for parallel constraint satisfaction identifies mapping hypotheses that collectively represent the overall mapping that best fits the interacting constraints. ACME has been applied to a wide range of examples that include problem analogies, analogical arguments, explanatory analogies, story analogies, formal analogies, and metaphors. ACME is sensitive to semantic and pragmatic Information if it Is available,.and yet able to compute mappings between formally Isomorphic analogs without any similar or identical elements. The theory Is able to account for empirical findings regarding the impact of consistency and similarity on human processing of analogies.

Analogy and similarity are often assumed to be distinct psychological processes. In contrast to this position, the authors suggest that both similarity and analogy involve a process of structural alignment and mapping, that is, that similarity is like analogy. In this article, the authors first describe the structure-mapping process as it has been worked out for analogy. Then, this view is extended to similarity, where it is used to generate new predictions. Finally, the authors explore broader implications of structural alignment for psychological processing.

We discuss external and internal graphical and linguistic representational systems. We argue that a cognitive theory of peoples' reasoning performance must account for (a) the logical equivalence of inferences expressed in graphical and linguistic form; and (b) the implementational differences that affect facility of inference. Our theory proposes that graphical representations limit abstraction and thereby aid processibility. We discuss the ideas of specificity and abstraction, and their cognitive relevance. Empirical support comes from tasks involving (i) the manipulation of external graphics; and (ii) no external graphics. For (i), we take Euler's Circles, provide a novel computational reconstruction, show how it captures abstractions, and contrast it with earlier construals, and with Mental Models' representations. We demonstrate equivalence of the graphical Euler system, and the non-graphical Mental Models system. For (ii), we discuss text comprehension, and the mental ...

Advanced perceptual systems are faced with the problem of securing a principled relationship between the world and its internal representation. I propose a unified approach to visual representation, based on Shepard's (1968) notion of second-order isomorphism. According to the proposed theory, a shape is represented internally by the responses of a few tuned modules, each of which is broadly selective for some reference shape, whose similarity to the stimulus it measures. The result is a philosophically appealing, computationally feasible, biologically credible, and formally veridical representation of a distal shape space. This approach supports representation of and discrimination among shapes radically different from the reference ones, while bypassing the need for the computationally problematic decomposition into parts; it also addresses the needs of shape categorization, and can be used to derive a range of models of perceived similarity. Representation is Representation of Sim...

Officer praised dog for barking at object." Enables Detect Drugs out FK Initiates Retrieval 5 6 Missing Figure 10. Forgetting to fill the tank with gas A=actual intention; E=expectation; Q=question; C=context; I=index; G=goal Tank Out of Gas Tank Full Tank Low Fill Tank Should have filled up with gas when tank low Expectation What Action to Do? KEY: G = goal; I = index; C = context; Q = question; E = expectation; A = actual intention Results At Store connections with related concepts. Other learning goals take multiple arguments. For instance, a knowledge differentiation goal (Cox & Ram, 1995) is a goal to determine a change in a body of knowledge such that two items are separated conceptually. In contrast, a knowledge reconciliation goal (Cox & Ram, 1995) is one that seeks to merge two items that were mistakenly considered separate entities. Both expansion goals and reconciliation goals may include or spawn a knowledge organization goal (Ram, 1993) that seeks to reorganize the existing knowledge so that it is made available to the reasoner at the appropriate time, as well as modify the structure or content of a concept itself. Such reorganization of knowledge affects the conditions under which a particular piece of knowledge is retrieved or the kinds of indexes associated with an item in memory.

This article pursues the possibility that perceivers are sensitive to implicit dynamic information even when they are not able to observe real-time change. Recent empirical results in the domains of handwriting recognition and picture perception are discussed in support of the hypothesis that perception involves acquiring information about transitions, whether the stimuli are static or dynamic. It is then argued that dynamic information has a special status in mental representation as well as in perception. In particular I propose that some mental representations may be dynamic, in that a temporal dimension is necessary to the representation. Recent evidence that mental representations may exhibit a form of momentum is discussed in support of this claim. There has been a growing appreciation of the impressive ability that the human mind has for perceiving events that take place over time. J. J. Gibson (1979), Johansson (1975), and others have noted that we are particularly receptive to information contained in patterns of change in the environment, as opposed to static information (such as that contained in a snapshot). In this article I will first propose that people perceive dynamic information even when the stimuli being inspected (such as snapshots) are not changing in real time. I will then propose that the importance of dynamic information to perception has implications for mental representation. In particular I will argue that mental representations may sometimes contain a temporal dimension and may thus themselves he dynamic. Perceiving Transitions I pr~ose that in oerception, acquiring information about transitions between states is as important as acquiring information about the states themselves. I believe that the proclivity oeople show for picking up transitional information extends to situations in which the stimuli are static. A more precise proposition can be stated as follows: When the perceptual system cannot directly perceive change over time it will seek out implicit Sections of this article are based on portions of a dissertation I submitted

. We present an approach to modeling human interpretation of (real) geographic maps. While in Geographic Information Systems (GIS) the limitations for describing geographic knowledge mainly stem from the limitations of this knowledge itself, paper maps pose additional constraints on the representation of spatial configurations. We examine maps as representation media with respect to cartographic restrictions involved in the map making process. Some cognitive factors of cartographic generalization are indicated. We present our aspect map approach allowing for describing maps formally as pictorial representations. The approach postulates the use of meta-knowledge to enable adequate map interpretation. Phenomena of cartographic interpretation and misinterpretation are illustrated employing two kinds of hierarchic structures of spatial aspects of maps. The notions we present can be employed in augmenting the 'cognitive adequacy' of automated map making and map reading. 1 Intr...

This paper describes the aspect map approach to model the processing of geographic maps. Geographic maps are described as spatial representation media which play an important role in many processes of human spatial cognition. We focus on the aspectuality of representation and therefore deal with aspect maps: spatial organization structures in which one or more aspects of geographic entities are represented. The aspect map architecture is presented, an AI model of processing geographic maps. Two processes contained in this model are investigated in more detail. The first is the transformation of one aspect map into another aspect map which only retains selected entities and aspects (extraction). The second process is the combination of two aspect maps, in order to obtain a third aspect map. The results of an empirical study show that the formal approach can describe and distinguish the ways in which people solve this task.

Abstract (Long) When cognitive scientists apply computational theory to the problem of phenomenal consciousness, as many of them have been doing recently, there are two fundamentally distinct approaches available. Either consciousness is to be explained in terms of the nature of the representational vehicles the brain deploys; or it is to be explained in terms of the computational processes defined over these vehicles. We call versions of these two approaches vehicle and process theories of consciousness, respectively. However, while there may be space for vehicle theories of consciousness in cognitive science, they are relatively rare. This is because of the influence exerted, on the one hand, by a large body of research which purports to show that the explicit representation of information in the brain and conscious experience are dissociable, and on the other, by the classical computational theory of mind – the theory that takes human cognition to be a species of symbol manipulation. But two recent developments in cognitive science combine to suggest that a reappraisal of this situation is in order. First, a number of theorists have recently been highly critical of the experimental methodologies employed in the dissociation studies – so critical, in fact, it’s no longer reasonable to assume that the dissociability of conscious experience and explicit representation has been adequately demonstrated. Second, classicism, as a theory of human cognition, is no longer as dominant in