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One of the most important contributions of A. Church to logic is his invention of the lambda calculus. We present the genesis of this theory and its two major areas of application: the representation of computations and the resulting functional programming languages on the one hand and the representation of reasoning and the resulting systems of computer mathematics on the other hand. Acknowledgement. The following persons provided help in various ways. Erik Barendsen, Jon Barwise, Johan van Benthem, Andreas Blass, Olivier Danvy, Wil Dekkers, Marko van Eekelen, Sol Feferman, Andrzej Filinski, Twan Laan, Jan Kuper, Pierre Lescanne, Hans Mooij, Robert Maron, Rinus Plasmeijer, Randy Pollack, Kristoffer Rose, Richard Shore, Rick Statman and Simon Thompson. Partial support came from the European HCM project Typed lambda calculus (CHRXCT-92-0046), the Esprit Working Group Types (21900) and the Dutch NWO project WINST (612-316-607). 1. Introduction This paper is written to honor Church's gr...

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Abstract. In this article, we study the prehistory of type theory up to 1910 and its development between Russell and Whitehead’s Principia Mathematica ([71], 1910–1912) and Church’s simply typed λ-calculus of 1940. We first argue that the concept of types has always been present in mathematics, though nobody was incorporating them explicitly as such, before the end of the 19th century. Then we proceed by describing how the logical paradoxes entered the formal systems of Frege, Cantor and Peano concentrating on Frege’s Grundgesetze der Arithmetik for which Russell applied his famous paradox 1 and this led him to introduce the first theory of types, the Ramified Type Theory (rtt). We present rtt formally using the modern notation for type theory and we discuss how Ramsey, Hilbert and Ackermann removed the orders from rtt leading to the simple theory of types stt. We present stt and Church’s own simply typed λ-calculus (λ→C 2) and we finish by comparing rtt, stt and λ→C. §1. Introduction. Nowadays, type theory has many applications and is used in many different disciplines. Even within logic and mathematics, there are many different type systems. They serve several purposes, and are formulated in various ways. But, before 1903 when Russell first introduced

In "Principia Mathematica " [17], B. Russell and A.N. Whitehead propose a type system for higher order logic. This system has become known under the name "ramified type theory". It was invented to avoid the paradoxes, which could be conducted from Frege's "Begriffschrift" [7]. We give a formalization of the ramified type theory as described in the Principia Mathematica, trying to keep it as close as possible to the ideas of the Principia. As an alternative, distancing ourselves from the Principia, we express notions from the ramified type theory in a lambda calculus style, thus clarifying the type system of Russell and Whitehead in a contemporary setting. Both formalizations are inspired by current developments in research on type theory and typed lambda calculus; see e.g. [3]. In these formalizations, and also when defining "truth", we will need the notion of substitution. As substitution is not formally defined in the Principia, we have to define it ourselves. Finally, the reaction by Hilbert and Ackermann in [10] on the

In Russell's Ramified Theory of Types rtt, two hierarchical concepts dominate: orders and types. The use of orders has as a consequence that the logic part of rtt is predicative. The concept of order however, is almost dead since Ramsey eliminated it from rtt. This is why we find Church's simple theory of types (which uses the type concept without the order one) at the bottom of the Barendregt Cube rather than rtt. Despite the disappearance of orders which have a strong correlation with predicativity, predicative logic still plays an influential role in Computer Science. An important example is the proof checker Nuprl, which is based on Martin-Löf's Type Theory which uses type universes. Those type universes, and also degrees of expressions in Automath, are closely related to orders. In this paper, we show that orders have not disappeared from modern logic and computer science, rather, orders play a crucial role in understanding the hierarchy of modern systems. In order to achieve our goal, we concentrate on a subsystem of Nuprl. The novelty of our paper lies in: 1) a modest revival of Russell's orders, 1 2) the placing of the historical system rtt underlying the famous Principia Mathematica in a context with a modern system of computer mathematics (Nuprl) and modern type theories (Martin-Löf's type theory and PTSs), and 3) the presentation of a complex type system (Nuprl) as a simple and compact PTS.

This paper presents an extended version of Church's simple type theory called Basic Extended Simple Type Theory (bestt). By adding type variables and support for reasoning with tuples, lists, and sets to simple type theory, it is intended to be a practical logic for formalized mathematics. 1

Both in Kripke's Theory of Truth ktt [8] and Russell's Ramified Type Theory rtt [16, 9] we are confronted with some hierarchy. In rtt, we have a double hierarchy of orders and types. That is, the class of propositions is divided into different orders where a propositional function can only depend on objects of lower orders and types. Kripke on the other hand, has a ladder of languages where the truth of a proposition in language Ln can only be made in Lm where m ? n. Kripke finds a fixed point for his hierarchy (something Russell does not attempt to do). We investigate in this paper the similarities of both hierarchies: At level n of ktt the truth or falsehood of all order-n-propositions of rtt can be established. Moreover, there are order-n-propositions that get a truth value at an earlier stage in ktt. Furthermore, we show that rtt is more restrictive than ktt, as some type restrictions are not needed in ktt and more formulas can be expressed in the latter. Looking back at the dou...

The systems K of transnite cumulative types up to are extended to systems K 1 that include a natural innitary inference rule, the so-called limit rule. For countable a semantic completeness theorem for K 1 is proved by the method of reduction trees, and it is shown that every model of K 1 is equivalent to a cumulative hierarchy of sets. This is used to show that several axiomatic rst-order set theories can be interpreted in K 1 , for suitable . Keywords: cumulative types, innitary inference rule, logical foundations of set theory. MSC: 03B15 03B30 03E30 03F25 1 Introduction The idea of founding mathematics on a theory of types was rst proposed by Russell [20] (foreshadowed already in [19]), and subsequently implemented by Whitehead and Russell [26]. The formal systems presented in these works were later simplied and cast into their modern shape by Ramsey [18]. Godel [9] and Tarski [25] were the rst to restrict the type structure to types of unary predi...

In philosophy of logic and elsewhere, it is generally thought that similar problems should be solved by similar means. This advice is sometimes elevated to the status of a principle: the principle of uniform solution. In this paper I will explore the question of what counts as a similar problem and consider reasons for subscribing to the principle of uniform solution. 1 Introducing the Principle of Uniform Solution It would be very odd to give different responses to two paradoxes depending on minor, seemingly-irrelevant details of their presentation. For example, it would be unacceptable to deal with the paradox of the heap by invoking a multi-valued logic, ̷L∞, say, and yet, when faced with the paradox of the bald man, invoke a supervaluational logic. Clearly these two paradoxes are of a kind—they are both instances of the sorites paradox. And whether the sorites paradox is couched in terms of heaps and grains of sand, or in terms of baldness and the number of hairs on the head, it is essentially the same problem and therefore must be solved by the same means. More generally, we might suggest that similar paradoxes should be resolved by similar means. This advice is sometimes elevated to the status of a principle, which usually goes by the name of the principle of uniform solution. This principle and its motivation will occupy us for much of the discussion in this paper. In particular, I will defend a rather general form of this principle. I will argue that two paradoxes can be thought to be of the same kind because (at a suitable level of abstraction) they share a similar internal structure, or because of external considerations such as the relationships of the paradoxes in question to other paradoxes in the vicinity, or the way they respond to proposed solutions. I will then use this reading of the principle of uniform solution to make a case for the sorites and the liar paradox being of a kind.