a b s t r a c t Mindfulness training has proven to be an efficacious therapeutic tool for a variety of clinical and nonclinical health problems and a booster of well-being. In this paper we propose a multi-level metacognitive model of mindfulness. We postulate and discuss following hypothesis: (1) mindfulness is related to the highest level of metacognition; (2) mindfulness depends on dynamic cooperation of three main components of the metacognition (metacognitive knowledge, metacognitive experiences and metacognitive skills); (3) a mindful meta-level is always conscious while the other meta-cognitive processes can occur implicitly; (4) intentionally practiced mindfulness decreases dissociations between awareness and meta-awareness; (5) components of mindful meta-level develop and change during continuous practice. The current model is discussed in the light of empirical data and other theoretical approaches to mindfulness concept. We believe that presented model provides some helpful avenues for future research and theoretical investigations into mindfulness and the mechanisms of its actions.

Abstract: The main aim of this paper is to clarify the relation between epistemic feel-ings, mental action, and self-ascription. Acting mentally and/or thinking about one’s mental states are two possible outcomes of epistemic or metacognitive feelings. Our men-tal actions are often guided by our E-feelings, such as when we check what we just saw based on a feeling of visual uncertainty; but thought about our own perceptual states and capacities can also be triggered by the same E-feelings. The first section of the pa-per presents Dokic’s argument for the insufficiency of the “ascent routine ” to account for non-transparent cases of self-ascription, as well as his account of E-feelings. The second section then presents a two-level model of metacognition that builds on Dokic’s account and my own view of the issue. The two-level model links E-feelings to a min-dreading capacity in order to account for non-transparent self-ascriptions. Finally, the third section develops a deeper characterization of the relation among E-feelings, mental action, and self-ascription of mental states based on epistemic rules. In the context of self-knowledge, these remarks suggest the existence of means of forming self-ascriptions other than the ascent routine. 1.