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399
A logic of authentication
- ACM TRANSACTIONS ON COMPUTER SYSTEMS
, 1990
"... Questions of belief are essential in analyzing protocols for the authentication of principals in distributed computing systems. In this paper we motivate, set out, and exemplify a logic specifically designed for this analysis; we show how various protocols differ subtly with respect to the required ..."
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Cited by 1332 (22 self)
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Questions of belief are essential in analyzing protocols for the authentication of principals in distributed computing systems. In this paper we motivate, set out, and exemplify a logic specifically designed for this analysis; we show how various protocols differ subtly with respect to the required initial assumptions of the participants and their final beliefs. Our formalism has enabled us to isolate and express these differences with a precision that was not previously possible. It has drawn attention to features of protocols of which we and their authors were previously unaware, and allowed us to suggest improvements to the protocols. The reasoning about some protocols has been mechanically verified. This paper starts with an informal account of the problem, goes on to explain the formalism to be used, and gives examples of its application to protocols from the literature, both with shared-key cryptography and with public-key cryptography. Some of the examples are chosen because of their practical importance, while others serve to illustrate subtle points of the logic and to explain how we use it. We discuss extensions of the logic motivated by actual practice -- for example, in order to account for the use of hash functions in signatures. The final sections contain a formal semantics of the logic and some conclusions.
A calculus for cryptographic protocols: The spi calculus
- Information and Computation
, 1999
"... We introduce the spi calculus, an extension of the pi calculus designed for the description and analysis of cryptographic protocols. We show how to use the spi calculus, particularly for studying authentication protocols. The pi calculus (without extension) suffices for some abstract protocols; the ..."
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Cited by 898 (50 self)
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We introduce the spi calculus, an extension of the pi calculus designed for the description and analysis of cryptographic protocols. We show how to use the spi calculus, particularly for studying authentication protocols. The pi calculus (without extension) suffices for some abstract protocols; the spi calculus enables us to consider cryptographic issues in more detail. We represent protocols as processes in the spi calculus and state their security properties in terms of coarsegrained notions of protocol equivalence.
An Efficient Cryptographic Protocol Verifier Based on Prolog Rules
- IN 14TH IEEE COMPUTER SECURITY FOUNDATIONS WORKSHOP (CSFW-14
, 2001
"... We present a new automatic cryptographic protocol verifier based on a simple representation of the protocol by Prolog rules, and on a new efficient algorithm that determines whether a fact can be proved from these rules or not. This verifier proves secrecy properties of the protocols. Thanks to its ..."
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Cited by 391 (11 self)
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We present a new automatic cryptographic protocol verifier based on a simple representation of the protocol by Prolog rules, and on a new efficient algorithm that determines whether a fact can be proved from these rules or not. This verifier proves secrecy properties of the protocols. Thanks to its use of unification, it avoids the problem of the state space explosion. Another advantage is that we do not need to limit the number of runs of the protocol to analyze it. We have proved the correctness of our algorithm, and have implemented it. The experimental results show that many examples of protocols of the literature, including Skeme [24], can be analyzed by our tool with very small resources: the analysis takes from less than 0.1 s for simple protocols to 23 s for the main mode of Skeme. It uses less than 2 Mb of memory in our tests.
Secrecy by Typing in Security Protocols
- Journal of the ACM
, 1998
"... We develop principles and rules for achieving secrecy properties in security protocols. Our approach is based on traditional classification techniques, and extends those techniques to handle concurrent processes that use shared-key cryptography. The rules have the form of typing rules for a basic co ..."
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Cited by 273 (10 self)
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We develop principles and rules for achieving secrecy properties in security protocols. Our approach is based on traditional classification techniques, and extends those techniques to handle concurrent processes that use shared-key cryptography. The rules have the form of typing rules for a basic concurrent language with cryptographic primitives, the spi calculus. They guarantee that, if a protocol typechecks, then it does not leak its secret inputs.
An Attack on the Needham-Schroeder Public-Key Authentication Protocol
- INFORMATION PROCESSING LETTERS
, 1995
"... In this paper we present an attack upon the Needham-Schroeder publickey authentication protocol. The attack allows an intruder to impersonate another agent. ..."
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Cited by 264 (6 self)
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In this paper we present an attack upon the Needham-Schroeder publickey authentication protocol. The attack allows an intruder to impersonate another agent.
TCP congestion control with a misbehaving receiver
- Computer Communication Review
, 1999
"... In this paper, we explore the operation of TCP congestion control when the receiver can misbehave, as might occur with a greedy Web client. We first demonstrate that there are simple attacks that allow a misbehaving receiver to drive a standard TCP sender arbitrarily fast, without losing end-to-end ..."
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Cited by 181 (13 self)
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In this paper, we explore the operation of TCP congestion control when the receiver can misbehave, as might occur with a greedy Web client. We first demonstrate that there are simple attacks that allow a misbehaving receiver to drive a standard TCP sender arbitrarily fast, without losing end-to-end reliability. These attacks are widely applicable because they stem from the sender behavior specified in RFC 2581 rather than implementation bugs. We then show that it is possible to modify TCP to eliminate this undesirable behavior entirely, without requiring assumptions of any kind about receiver behavior. This is a strong result: with our solution a receiver can only reduce the data transfer rate by misbehaving, thereby eliminating the incentive to do so. 1
Proving Properties of Security Protocols by Induction
- In 10th IEEE Computer Security Foundations Workshop
, 1997
"... Informal justifications of security protocols involve arguing backwards that various events are impossible. Inductive definitions can make such arguments rigorous. The resulting proofs are complicated, but can be generated reasonably quickly using the proof tool Isabelle/HOL. There is no restriction ..."
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Cited by 167 (8 self)
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Informal justifications of security protocols involve arguing backwards that various events are impossible. Inductive definitions can make such arguments rigorous. The resulting proofs are complicated, but can be generated reasonably quickly using the proof tool Isabelle/HOL. There is no restriction to finite-state systems and the approach is not based on belief logics. Protocols are inductively defined as sets of traces, which may involve many interleaved protocol runs. Protocol descriptions model accidental key losses as well as attacks. The model spy can send spoof messages made up of components decrypted from previous traffic. Several key distribution protocols have been studied, including NeedhamSchroeder, Yahalom and Otway-Rees. The method applies to both symmetrickey and public-key protocols. A new attack has been discovered in a variant of Otway-Rees (already broken by Mao and Boyd). Assertions concerning secrecy and authenticity have been proved. CONTENTS i Contents 1 Intro...
Analysis of the SSL 3.0 Protocol
- IN PROCEEDINGS OF THE SECOND UNIX WORKSHOP ON ELECTRONIC COMMERCE
, 1996
"... The SSL protocol is intended to provide a practical, application-layer, widely applicable connectionoriented mechanism for Internet client/server communications security. This note gives a detailed technical analysis of the cryptographic strength of the SSL 3.0 protocol. A number of minor flaws in t ..."
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Cited by 150 (3 self)
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The SSL protocol is intended to provide a practical, application-layer, widely applicable connectionoriented mechanism for Internet client/server communications security. This note gives a detailed technical analysis of the cryptographic strength of the SSL 3.0 protocol. A number of minor flaws in the protocol and several new active attacks on SSL are presented; however, these can be easily corrected without overhauling the basic structure of the protocol. We conclude that, while there are still a few technical wrinkles to iron out, on the whole SSL 3.0 is a valuable contribution towards practical communications security.
Robustness Principles for Public Key Protocols
, 1995
"... We present a number of attacks, some new, on public key protocols. We also advance a number of principles which may help designers avoid many of the pitfalls, and help attackers spot errors which can be exploited. ..."
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Cited by 131 (9 self)
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We present a number of attacks, some new, on public key protocols. We also advance a number of principles which may help designers avoid many of the pitfalls, and help attackers spot errors which can be exploited.
