Introduction In most applications of formal models of categorization, category learning is portrayed as the building-up of a representation in memory for members of the category that have been observed. This assumption is perhaps the most basic that is made for models of categorization, that the representation of a category describes its observed members. Yet if category representations are to serve a purpose such as recognizing new members of a category, then simply relying on memory for known members would be a poor strategy in many situations. For example, if you are learning to distinguish the Smith family from the Jones family, and you have observed a tall, red-haired 45 year old woman who is the mother in the Smith family, and you then see another tall, red-haired 45 year old woman, you would probably classify her as belonging to the Jones family, despite her similarity to an observed member of the Smith family. This example highlights the point that when few members of a categor

In cognitive psychology, concepts are those bodies of knowledge that are stored in long-term memory and are used by default in human beings ’ higher cognitive processes (categorization, inductive and deductive reasoning, etc.). Most psychologists of concepts assume that these mental representations share many scientifically important properties, and the psychology of concepts is expected to describe those properties. Psychologists assume thereby that concepts constitute a natural kind. I call this assumption the natural kind assumption. This article challenges the natural kind assumption. It is argued that a growing body of evidence suggests that concepts do not constitute a natural kind. Hence, the notion of concept is inappropriate, if one aims at formulating scientifically relevant inductive generalizations about the human mind. 1. Introduction. In cognitive science

Over the last several years, researchers have begun to appreciate the ways in which questions of interest to personality and social psychologists can be addressed with neuropyschological case material (e.g., Klein & Kihlstrom, 1998; Klein, Loftus, &

According to the instantiation principle, the representation of a category includes detailed information about its diverse range of instances. Many accounts of categorization, including classical and standard prototype theories, do not follow the instantiation principle, because they assume that detailed, exemplar-level information is filtered out of category representations. Nevertheless, the instantiation principle can be implemented in a wide class of models, including both exemplar and abstraction models. To assess the instantiation principle empirically, a parameter-free exemplarbased model of instantiation was applied to typicality judgments for 16 simple categories (e.g., mammal, beverage) and 14 complex categories (e.g., dangerous mammal) in four superordinates (animal, food, small animal, dangerous animal). Across three studies, the model did an excellent job of predicting mean typicality judgments (correlations generally above .9) and a good job of predicting standard deviati...

this paper, our goals are to introduce and to discuss these issues. We argue for an essentially utilitarian view of computational modeling. We suggest that the main function of computational modeling is to support an interactive process of "probing and prediction" through which models can be interacted with in a way that provides both guidance for empirical research and also sufficient depth to support interactive modification of the underlying theory. We propose that models, just as the systems they are models of, can only be understood (and evaluated) with respect to a given level of description and a specific set of criteria associated with that level. We also claim that models gain explanatory power as well as practical usefulness when they are emergent, that is, when they provide an account of how the principles of organization at a given level of description constrain and define structure at a higher level of description. For this reason, connectionist models appear to provide the most fruitful modeling framework today.

Research has shown that the activation and application of a significant-other representation to a new person, or transference, occurs in everyday social perception (S. M. Andersen & A. Baum, 1994; S. M. Andersen & S. W. Cole, 1990). Using a combined idiographic and nomothetic experimental paradigm, two studies examined the role of chronic accessibility of significant-other representations in transference. After learning about 4 fictional people, 1 of whom resembled a significant other, participants ' recognition memory was assessed. Both studies showed greater false-positive memory in the significant-other condition, relative to control, even in the absence of priming. Study 2 showed that although the effect was greater when the significant-other representation was concretely applicable to the target information, it occurred even when no such applicability was present. Results implicate the chronic accessibility of significant-other representations in transference. Mental representations of significant others serve as storehouses of information about important individuals from one's life. Interestingly, these representations can also be triggered by a new person and applied to this person in the context of everyday interpersonal relations (Andersen & Baum, 1994; Andersen

Theories of object representation can be classified as structural, holistic or hybrid, depending on their approach to the mereology and compositionality of shapes. We tested the predictions of some of the current theories in three experiments, by quantifying the effects of various priming cues on response times to 3D objects. In experiment 1, there were two possible locations for the stimulus components: left-right and top-bottom. The prime could be identical to the stimulus, identical in location but with different parts, identical in the complement of differently located parts, or altogether different. Both location and part identity effects were significant. In experiment 2 we added a part-neutral (empty frame) prime condition; the effect of location, but not of part, remained significant. In experiment 3, which included an additional location-neutral prime condition, only the location effect, again, was significant. These findings are not entirely compatible either with the structu...

One of the major themes in categorization research during the past two decades has involved comparisons and contrasts between prototype and exemplar models

This paper examines the role of computational modeling in psychology. Since any model of a real world phenomenon will fail at some level of description, we suggest that models can only be understood (and evaluated) with respect to a given level of description and a specific set of criteria associated with that level. We suggest a pragmatic view of the main advantages of instantiating psychological theories as computer simulations. We suggest that the main function of computational modeling is to support a process of "probing and prediction" by which models can be interacted with in a way that provides both guidance for empirical research as well as sufficient depth to support interactive modification of the underlying theory. Within this framework we briefly develop a way of comparing the quality of different models of the same phenomenon. We argue that models gain explanatory power as well as practical usefulness when they are emergent, that is, when they provide an account...

Abstract. Conceptual modelling is central to information systems development. The design of information systems requires appropriate languages to conceptualize interactions between actors. Mostly, design languages are adopted to the application system to be modelled instead of being aligned with the nature of perception of the modeller. Perception and cognition are very different from computations on symbolic representations. Cognitive structures and processes emerge from continous sensorimotor interactions. Action-oriented languages already consider action and coordination in terms of speech acts. However, speech acts can not be foundational as a speech act itself is brought forth or enacted in movement, in particular through action in perception. In this paper, it will be argued for non-representational modelling. To address the problems of representations, an ecological approach based on quantum interaction is proposed with respect to both criteria action in language and action in perception.