Abstract not found

This paper investigates whether individuals feel worse off when others around them earn more. In other words, do people care about relative position, and does “lagging behind the Joneses ” diminish well-being? To answer this question, I match individual-level data containing various indicators of well-being to information about local average earnings. I find that, controlling for an individual’s own income, higher earnings of neighbors are associated with lower levels of self-reported happiness. The data’s panel nature and rich set of measures of well-being and behavior indicate that this association is not driven by selection or by changes in the way people define happiness. There is suggestive evidence that the negative effect of increases in neighbors ’ earnings on own well-being is most likely caused by interpersonal preferences, that is, people having utility functions that depend on relative consumption in addition to absolute consumption. I.

Psychologists and sociologists usually interpret happiness scores as cardinal and comparable across respondents, and thus run OLS regressions on happiness and changes in happiness. Economists usually assume only ordinality and have mainly used ordered latent response models, thereby not taking satisfactory account of fixed individual traits. We address this problem by developing a conditional estimator for the fixed-effect ordered logit model. We find that assuming ordinality or cardinality of happiness scores makes little difference, whilst allowing for fixed-effects does change results substantially. We call for more research into the determinants of the personality traits making up these fixed-effects. The empirical economic literature on self-reported happiness, also termed life satisfaction, seems to be taking off. Whereas in the 1970s and 1980s there was only a trickle of articles on happiness,1 the last couple of years witnessed a spate of empirical studies on this subject.2,3 Next to the economic literature, there are more than 3000 studies done in the last 30 years by psychologists and sociologists (Veenhoven, 1994; Veenhoven, 1997). This means that there is now a large com-bined literature on what causes happiness.

Policy decisions at the organizational, corporate, and governmental levels should be more heavily influenced by issues related to well-being––people’s evaluations and feelings about their lives. Domestic policy currently focuses heavily on economic outcomes, although economic indicators omit, and even mislead about, much of what society values. We show that economic indicators have many shortcomings, and that measures of well-being point to important conclusions that are not apparent from economic indicators alone. For example, although economic output has risen steeply over the past decades, there has been no rise in life satisfaction during this period, and there has been a substantial increase in depression and distrust. We argue that economic indicators were extremely important in the early stages of economic development, when the fulfillment of basic needs was the main issue. As societies grow wealthy,

Abstract. This paper explores the possibility of basing economic appraisal on the measurement of experienced utility (utility as hedonic experience) rather than decision utility (utility as a representation of preference). Because of underestimation of the extent of hedonic adaptation to changed circumstances and because of the ‘‘focusing illusion’ ’ (exaggerating the importance of the current focus of one’s attention), individuals ’ forecasts of experienced utility are subject to systematic error. Such errors induce preference anomalies which the experienced utility approach might circumvent. The ‘‘day reconstruction method’ ’ of measuring experienced utility is considered as a possible alternative to stated preference methods.

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Abstract The Easterlin Paradox refers to the fact that happiness data are typically stationary in spite of considerable increases in income. This amounts to a rejection of the hypothesis that current income is the only argument in the utility function. We find that the happiness responses of around 350,000 people living in the OECD between 1975 and 1997 are positively correlated with the level of income, the welfare state and (weakly) with life expectancy; they are negatively correlated with the average number of hours worked, environmental degradation (measured by SOx emissions), crime, openness to trade, inflation and unemployment; all controlling for country and year dummies. These effects separate across groups in a pattern that appears broadly plausible (e.g., the rich suffer environmental degradation more than the poor). Based on actual changes from 1975 to 1997, small contributions to happiness can be attributed to the increase in income in our sample. Interestingly, the actual changes in several of the 'omitted variables' such as life expectancy, hours worked, inflation and unemployment also contribute to happiness over this time period since life expectancy has risen and the others have, on average, fallen. Consequently the unexplained trend in happiness is even bigger than would be predicted if income was the only argument in the utility function. In other words, introducing omitted variables worsens the income-without-happiness paradox.

This article provides unprecedented direct evidence from large-scale survey data on both the intensity (how much?) and direction (to whom?) of income comparisons. Income comparisons are considered to be at least somewhat important by three-quarters of Europeans. They are associated with both lower levels of subjective well-being and a greater demand for income redistribution. The rich compare less and are happier than average when they do, which latter is consistent with relative income theory. With respect to the direction of comparisons, colleagues are the most frequentlycited reference group. Those who compare to colleagues are happier than those who compare to other benchmarks. In two eponymous articles (1974, 1995), Easterlin famously asked ÔWill raising the incomes of all improve the happiness of all? ’ and ÔDoes economic growth improve the human lot? ’ To explain his (negative) empirical answer, he appealed to the phenomena of social comparisons and adaptation to income. The Easterlin paradox has subsequently produced a very lively empirical and theoretical literature revolving around the evidence for, and the implications of, income comparisons (either to others or to oneself in the past). Both social comparisons and adaptation imply that utility is relative with respect to income, in the sense that individual well-being depends on the gap between the individual’s actual income and some reference benchmark. There is by now a substantial empirical literature regarding the existence and composition of reference groups. However, outside of the laboratory, where the reference group can be directly controlled (Falk and Ichino, 2006; McBride, 2006; Clark, et al., in press), the vast majority of empirical papers have simply imposed a certain reference group as

The “Hedonistic Paradox” states that homo economicus, or someone who seeks happiness for him- or herself, will not find it, but the person who helps others will. This study examines two questions in connection with happiness and generosity. First, do more generous people, as identified in dictator experiments, report on average greater happiness, or subjective well-being (SWB), as measured by responses to various questionnaires? Second, if the answer is affirmative, what is the causal relationship between generosity and happiness? We find a favorable correlation between generosity and happiness (i.e., SWB is directly related to several measures of happiness and inversely related to unhappiness) and examine various possible explanations, including that material well-being causes both happiness and generosity. The evidence from this experiment, however, indicates that a tertiary personality variable, sometimes called psychological well-being, is the primary cause of both happiness and greater generosity. In contrast to field studies, the experimental method of this inquiry permits anonymity measures designed to minimize subject misrepresentation of intrinsic generosity (e.g., due to social approval motives) and of actual happiness (e.g., because of social desirability biases) and produces a rich data set with multiple measures of subjective, psychological and material well-being. The results of this and other studies raise the question of whether greater attention should be paid to the potential benefits (beyond solely the material

Happiness and transition...................................................................................................... 3