There is an active debate within the field of phonology concerning the cognitive status of substantive phonetic factors such as ease of articulation and perceptual distinctiveness. A new framework is proposed in which substance acts as a bias, or prior, on phonological learning. Two experiments tested this framework with a method in which participants are first provided highly impoverished evidence of a new phonological pattern, and then tested on how they extend this pattern to novel contexts and novel sounds. Participants were found to generalize velar palatalization (e.g., the change from [k]asinkeep to [t�ʃ]asincheap) in a way that accords with linguistic typology, and that is predicted by a cognitive bias in favor of changes that relate perceptually similar sounds. Velar palatalization was extended from the mid front vowel context (i.e., before [e]asincape) to the high front vowel context (i.e., before [i]asin keep), but not vice versa. The key explanatory notion of perceptual similarity is quantified with a psychological model of categorization, and the substantively biased framework is formalized as a conditional random field. Implications of these results for the debate on substance, theories of phonological generalization, and the formalization of similarity are discussed.

conducted. Forty years of research has assumed that category learning often involves learning to selectively attend to only those stimulus dimensions useful for classification. We confirmed that participants learned to allocate their attention optimally. We also found that learners tend to fixate all stimulus dimensions early in learning. This result obtained despite evidence that participants were also testing one-dimensional rules during this period. Finally, the restriction of eye movements to only relevant dimensions tended to occur only after errors were largely (or completely) eliminated. We interpret these findings as consistent with multiple-systems theories of learning which maximize information input in order to maximize the number of learning modules involved, and which focus solely on relevant information only after one module has solved the learning problem.

A memory-based scaling model—ANCHOR—is proposed and tested. The perceived magnitude of the target stimulus is compared with a set of anchors in memory. Anchor selection is probabilistic and sensitive to similarity, base-level strength, and recency. The winning anchor provides a reference point near the target and thereby converts the global scaling problem into a local comparison. An explicit correction strategy determines the final response. Two incremental learning mechanisms update the locations and base-level activations of the anchors. This gives rise to sequential, context, transfer, practice, and other dynamic effects. The scale unfolds as an adaptive map. A hierarchy of models is tested on a battery of quantitative measures from 2 experiments in absolute identification and category rating. Category rating is a widely used method of data collection in experimental psychology. Ratings come in a wide variety of guises: psychophysical scales, similarity judgments, typicality judgments, confidence ratings, attitude questionnaires, health selfreports, and many others. The participants in all these tasks are asked to rate things using an ordered set of categories such as 1,..., 7 or strongly agree,..., strongly disagree. Most people

What brain mechanisms underlie autism and how do they give rise to autistic behavioral symptoms? This article describes a neural model, called the iSTART model, which proposes how cognitive, emotional, timing, and motor processes that involve brain regions like prefrontal and temporal cortex, amygdala, hippocampus, and cerebellum may interact together to create and perpetuate autistic symptoms. These model processes were originally developed to explain data concerning how the brain controls normal behaviors. The iSTART model shows how autistic behavioral symptoms may arise from prescribed breakdowns in these brain processes, notably a combination of underaroused emotional depression in the amygdala and related affective brain regions, learning of hyperspecific recognition categories in temporal and prefrontal cortices, and breakdowns of adaptively timed attentional and motor circuits in the hippocampal system and cerebellum. The model clarifies how malfunctions in a subset of these mechanisms can, though a system-wide vicious circle of environmentally mediated feedback, cause and maintain problems with them all. ii

conducted. Over 30 studies have shown that the exemplar-based generalized context model (GCM) usually provides a better quantitative account of 5–4 learning data as compared with the prototype model. However, J. D. Smith and J. P. Minda (2000) argued that the GCM is a psychologically implausible account of 5–4 learning because it implies suboptimal attention weights. To test this claim, the authors recorded undergraduates ’ eye movements while the students learned the 5–4 category structure. Eye fixations matched the attention weights estimated by the GCM but not those of the prototype model. This result confirms that the GCM is a realistic model of the processes involved in learning the 5–4 structure and that learners do not always optimize attention, as commonly supposed. The conditions under which learners are likely to optimize attention during category learning are discussed.

Speeded perceptual classification experiments were conducted to distinguish among the predictions of exemplar-retrieval, decision-boundary, and prototype models. The key manipulation was that across conditions, individual stimuli received either probabilistic or deterministic category feedback. Regardless of the probabilistic feedback, however, an ideal observer would always classify the stimuli by using an identical linear decision boundary. Subjects classified the probabilistic stimuli with lower accuracy and longer response times than they classified the deterministic stimuli. These results are in accord with the predictions of the exemplar model and challenge the predictions of the prototype and decision-boundary models. A fundamental issue in the field of perceptual classification concerns the manner in which people represent categories in memory and the decision processes that they use for making classification judgments. Among the major formal models of perceptual classification are exemplar-retrieval, prototype, and decision-boundary models. According to exemplar-retrieval models (Hintzman, 1986; Medin & Schaffer, 1978; Nosofsky, 1986), people represent categories by storing individual exemplars of categories in memory, and they make classification decisions on the basis of the similarity of test items to these stored exemplars. According to prototype models (Posner & Keele, 1968; Reed,

The authors develop and test generalized versions of take-the-best (TTB) and rational (RAT) models of multiattribute paired-comparison inference. The generalized models make allowances for subjective attribute weighting, probabilistic orders of attribute inspection, and noisy decision making. A key new test involves a response-time (RT) approach. TTB predicts that RT is determined solely by the expected time required to locate the 1st discriminating attribute, whereas RAT predicts that RT is determined by the difference in summed evidence between the 2 alternatives. Critical test pairs are used that partially decouple these 2 factors. Under conditions in which ideal observer TTB and RAT strategies yield equivalent decisions, both the RT results and the estimated attribute weights suggest that the vast majority of subjects adopted the generalized TTB strategy. The RT approach is also validated in an experimental condition in which use of a RAT strategy is essentially forced upon subjects.

Rational models of cognition typically consider the abstract computational problems posed by the environment, assuming that people are capable of optimally solving those problems. This differs from more traditional formal models of cognition, which focus on the psychological processes responsible for behavior. A basic challenge for rational models is thus explaining how optimal solutions can be approximated by psychological processes. We outline a general strategy for answering this question, namely to explore the psychological plausibility of approximation algorithms developed in computer science and statistics. In particular, we argue that Monte Carlo methods provide a source of “rational process models” that connect optimal solutions to psychological processes. We support this argument through a detailed example, applying this approach to Anderson’s (1990, 1991) Rational Model of Categorization (RMC), which involves a particularly challenging computational problem. Drawing on a connection between the RMC and ideas from nonparametric Bayesian statistics, we propose two alternative algorithms for approximate inference in this model. The algorithms we consider include Gibbs sampling, a procedure

Exemplar theories of categorization depend on similarity for explaining subjects’ ability to generalize to new stimuli. A major criticism of exemplar theories concerns their lack of abstraction mechanisms and thus, seemingly, of generalization ability. Here, we use insights from machine learning to demonstrate that exemplar models can actually generalize very well. Kernel methods in machine learning are akin to exemplar models and are very successful in real-world applications. Their generalization performance depends crucially on the chosen similarity measure. Although similarity plays an important role in describing generalization behavior, it is not the only factor that controls generalization performance. In machine learning, kernel methods are often combined with regularization techniques in order to ensure good generalization. These same techniques are easily incorporated in exemplar models. We show that the generalized context model (Nosofsky, 1986) and ALCOVE (Kruschke, 1992) are closely related to a statistical model called kernel logistic regression. We argue that generalization is central to the enterprise of understanding categorization behavior, and we suggest some ways in which insights from machine learning can offer guidance.

Kernel methods are among the most successful tools in machine learning and are used in challenging data-analysis problems in many disciplines. Here we provide examples where kernel methods have proven to be powerful tools for analyzing behavioral data, especially for identifying features in categorization experiments. We also demonstrate that kernel methods relate to perceptrons and exemplar models of categorization. Hence, we argue that kernel methods have neural and psychological plausibility and theoretical results about their behavior are therefore potentially relevant for human category learning. In particular, we think that kernel methods show the prospect of providing explanations ranging from the implementational via the algorithmic to the computational level.