Syntactic logics do not suffer from the problems of logical omniscience but are often thought to lack interesting properties relating to epistemic notions. By focusing on the case of rule-based agents, I develop a framework for modelling resource-bounded agents and show that the resulting models have a number of interesting properties.

Abstract. We propose a framework for modelling situated resource-bounded agents. The framework is based on an objective ascription of intentional modalities and can be easily tailored to the system we want to model and the properties we wish to specify. As an elaboration of the framework, we introduce a logic, OBA, for describing the observations, beliefs, goals and actions of simple agents, and show that OBA is complete, decidable and has an efficient model checking procedure, allowing properties of agents specified in OBA to be verified using standard theorem proving or model checking techniques.

Abstract not found

Abstract not found

We study a logic whose formulae are interpreted as properties of a finite set over some universe. The language is propositional, with two unary operators inclusion and extension, both taking a finite set as argument. We present a basic Hilbert-style axiomatisation, and study its completeness. The main results are syntactic and semantic characterisations of complete extensions of the logic.

Abstract. There exists a considerable body of work on epistemic logics for resource-bounded reasoners. In this paper, we concentrate on a less studied aspect of resource-bounded reasoning, namely, on the ascription of beliefs and inference rules by the agents to each other. We present a formal model of a system of bounded reasoners which reason about each other’s beliefs, and investigate the problem of belief ascription in a resource-bounded setting. We show that for agents whose computational resources and memory are bounded, correct ascription of beliefs cannot be guaranteed, even in the limit. We propose a solution to the problem of correct belief ascription for feasible agents which involves ascribing reasoning strategies, or preferences on formulas, to other agents, and show that if a resource-bounded agent knows the reasoning strategy of another agent, then its ascription of beliefs to the other agent is correct in the limit. 1.

Abstract not found

It is generally accepted that a rational belief must be grounded in the evidence available to an agent. However, there is much less agreement about the precise relationship between an agent’s beliefs and her evidence. Understanding this complex mechanism raises many interesting philosophical and technical issues. Modeling evidence requires richer structures than found in standard epistemic

grounded account of belief and awareness for AI agents