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...ng and communication equipment. Third and perhaps the most unique, sensor nodes are distributed in the field in-situ and therefore lack physical security that is available to most wired and other forms of wireless networks. As a result, WSNs are highly susceptible to the physical compromise of one or more sensor nodes. Once compromised, the sensor node(s) can be exploited by an intruder to damage the WSN through DOS, jamming, spoofing and several other attacks. Several salient forms of attacks on WSN routing protocols have been described, including the sinkhole attack [20], the rushing attack [18], the wormhole attack [19], and the Sybil attack [14]. These attacks try to induce incorrect routing information in the network to prevent sensor nodes from sending their data to the correct destination. In a sinkhole attack [20], a malicious node claims that it has the shortest path to a well-known destination, e.g. a base station. If a routing scheme allows sensor nodes to select their routing path based on neighborhood routing information, a sinkhole attack can result in several sensor nodes setting their routing path towards the malicious node. In a rushing attack [18], a malicious node ge...

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...des. • Routing Layer Attacks - Malicious nodes can disrupt routing behavior by advertising false routing information, injecting incorrect routing packets, or even luring all packets and dropping them =-=[2, 10, 11, 12, 13, 16, 27]-=-. Some routing layer attacks can be used to mount a simple denial-of-service attack if the attacker can either block or reroute all of the victim’s packets. The MOCA framework uses a set of routing pr...

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...ute query-flood attacks [17]; and “rushing attack prevention” that seeks to inhibit malicious nodes from attracting an excessive number of routes, which would increase their ability to inflict dam=-=age [20]. Ye-=-t, there remains an indefinite “arms race” in system and protocol design: attackers (or researchers anticipating the moves of attackers) will continually introduce increasingly sophisticated attac...

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...d by attackers) exists between the two ends of the wormhole, the tunneled packets can propagate faster than those through a normal multi-hop route. This forms the “rushing attack” studied by Hu et al =-=[14]-=-. Wormhole attacks put severe threats to both routing protocols and some security enhancements in sensor networks. For example, the sensors may depend on the neighbor discovery procedures to construct...

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...protects the communication. Hence, a wormhole attack is implemented with few resources and is difficult to detect. Several approaches have been presented for defending against the wormhole attack [1]–=-=[3]-=-. The solutions proposed attempt to bound the distance that any message can travel using time-based methods [1], [3], cryptography [2], or exploiting location information [1]. Time-based methods eithe...

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...een proposed as a protective measure for wireless networks, where relaying attacks (in this context also known as wormhole attacks) could be used to circumvent key establishment and routing protocols =-=[4,5,6]-=- if an adversary tunnels messages across the network using a low latency, out-of-band channel [5,7]. This emulates nodes at either end of the wormhole being closer than they actually are. L. Buttyan, ...

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...ltiple times. An attacker can defeat an insecure (i.e., a simple unique identifier for each broadcast consisting of a sequence number) duplicate-suppression technique by performing the rushing attack =-=[14]-=-. In this attack, two or more malicious nodes are assumed to have a means of communicating which is faster than ordinary broadcast propagation. Alternatively, the malicious nodes can use a denial-of-s...