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Strategy-Proofness and Arrow’s Conditions: Existence and Correspondence Theorems for Voting Procedures and Social Welfare Functions.” Journal of Economic Theory 10(2):187–217 (1975)

by Mark A Satterthwaite
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Truthful Mechanisms for One-Parameter Agents

by Aron Archer, Eva Tardos
"... In this paper, we show how to design truthful (dominant strategy) mechanisms for several combinatorial problems where each agent’s secret data is naturally expressed by a single positive real number. The goal of the mechanisms we consider is to allocate loads placed on the agents, and an agent’s sec ..."
Abstract - Cited by 232 (3 self) - Add to MetaCart
In this paper, we show how to design truthful (dominant strategy) mechanisms for several combinatorial problems where each agent’s secret data is naturally expressed by a single positive real number. The goal of the mechanisms we consider is to allocate loads placed on the agents, and an agent’s secret data is the cost she incurs per unit load. We give an exact characterization for the algorithms that can be used to design truthful mechanisms for such load balancing problems using appropriate side payments. We use our characterization to design polynomial time truthful mechanisms for several problems in combinatorial optimization to which the celebrated VCG mechanism does not apply. For scheduling related parallel machines (QjjCmax), we give a 3-approximation mechanism based on randomized rounding of the optimal fractional solution. This problem is NP-complete, and the standard approximation algorithms (greedy load-balancing or the PTAS) cannot be used in truthful mechanisms. We show our mechanism to be frugal, in that the total payment needed is only a logarithmic factor more than the actual costs incurred by the machines, unless one machine dominates the total processing power. We also give truthful mechanisms for maximum flow, Qjj P Cj (scheduling related machines to minimize the sum of completion times), optimizing an affine function over a fixed set, and special cases of uncapacitated facility location. In addition, for Qjj P wjCj (minimizing the weighted sum of completion times), we prove a lower bound of 2 p 3 for the best approximation ratio achievable by a truthful mechanism.
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...sm design, also called implementation theory or the theory of incentives. See [22, ch. 23] or [26, ch. 10] for an introduction to the field, or the surveys [20, 13]. The Gibbard-Satterthwaite theorem =-=[8, 28]-=- is the main negative result, which states that truthful non-dictatorial mechanisms do not exist, when the players' domain of possible preferences is sufficiently rich. In light of this, it is common ...

Distributed Rational Decision Making

by Tuomas W. Sandholm , 1999
"... Introduction Automated negotiation systems with self-interested agents are becoming increasingly important. One reason for this is the technology push of a growing standardized communication infrastructure---Internet, WWW, NII, EDI, KQML, FIPA, Concordia, Voyager, Odyssey, Telescript, Java, etc---o ..."
Abstract - Cited by 191 (0 self) - Add to MetaCart
Introduction Automated negotiation systems with self-interested agents are becoming increasingly important. One reason for this is the technology push of a growing standardized communication infrastructure---Internet, WWW, NII, EDI, KQML, FIPA, Concordia, Voyager, Odyssey, Telescript, Java, etc---over which separately designed agents belonging to different organizations can interact in an open environment in realtime and safely carry out transactions. The second reason is strong application pull for computer support for negotiation at the operative decision making level. For example, we are witnessing the advent of small transaction electronic commerce on the Internet for purchasing goods, information, and communication bandwidth [29]. There is also an industrial trend toward virtual enterprises: dynamic alliances of small, agile enterprises which together can take advantage of economies of scale when available (e.g., respond to mor

Mechanism Theory

by Matthew O. Jackson , 2001
"... ..."
Abstract - Cited by 168 (1 self) - Add to MetaCart
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Iterative Combinatorial Auctions: Achieving Economic and Computational Efficiency

by David Christopher Parkes - DEPARTMENT OF COMPUTER AND INFORMATION SCIENCE, UNIVERSITY OF PENNSYLVANIA , 2001
"... This thesis presents new auction-based mechanisms to coordinate systems of selfinterested and autonomous agents, and new methods to design such mechanisms and prove their optimality... ..."
Abstract - Cited by 159 (19 self) - Add to MetaCart
This thesis presents new auction-based mechanisms to coordinate systems of selfinterested and autonomous agents, and new methods to design such mechanisms and prove their optimality...

When are elections with few candidates hard to manipulate?

by Vincent Conitzer, TUOMAS SANDHOLM, Jérôme Lang - JOURNAL OF THE ACM , 2007
"... In multiagent settings where the agents have different preferences, preference aggregation is a central issue. Voting is a general method for preference aggregation, but seminal results have shown that all general voting protocols are manipulable. One could try to avoid manipulation by using protoco ..."
Abstract - Cited by 158 (18 self) - Add to MetaCart
In multiagent settings where the agents have different preferences, preference aggregation is a central issue. Voting is a general method for preference aggregation, but seminal results have shown that all general voting protocols are manipulable. One could try to avoid manipulation by using protocols where determining a beneficial manipulation is hard. Especially among computational agents, it is reasonable to measure this hardness by computational complexity. Some earlier work has been done in this area, but it was assumed that the number of voters and candidates is unbounded. Such hardness results lose relevance when the number of candidates is small, because manipulation algorithms that are exponential only in the number of candidates (and only slightly so) might be available. We give such an algorithm for an individual agent to manipulate the Single Transferable Vote (STV) protocol, which has been shown hard to manipulate in the above sense. This motivates the core of this paper, which derives hardness results for realistic elections where the number of candidates is a small constant (but the number of voters can be large). The main manipulation question we study is that of coalitional manipulation by weighted voters. (We show that for simpler manipulation problems, manipulation cannot be hard with few candidates.) We study both constructive manipulation (making a given candidate win) and de-

Computing in Mechanism Design

by Tuomas Sandholm
"... ..."
Abstract - Cited by 146 (27 self) - Add to MetaCart
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Universal Voting Protocol Tweaks to Make Manipulation Hard

by Vincent Conitzer, Tuomas Sandholm , 2003
"... Voting is a general method for preference aggregation in multiagent settings, but seminal results have shown that all (nondictatorial) voting protocols are manipulable. One could try to avoid manipulation by using voting protocols where determining a beneficial manipulation is hard computationa ..."
Abstract - Cited by 112 (23 self) - Add to MetaCart
Voting is a general method for preference aggregation in multiagent settings, but seminal results have shown that all (nondictatorial) voting protocols are manipulable. One could try to avoid manipulation by using voting protocols where determining a beneficial manipulation is hard computationally.

Negotiation Among Self-interested Computationally Limited Agents

by Tuomas W. Sandholm , 1996
"... ..."
Abstract - Cited by 109 (21 self) - Add to MetaCart
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Junta distributions and the average-case complexity of manipulating elections

by Ariel D. Procaccia, Jeffrey S. Rosenschein - In AAMAS , 2006
"... Encouraging voters to truthfully reveal their preferences in an election has long been an important issue. Recently, computational complexity has been suggested as a means of precluding strategic behavior. Previous studies have shown that some voting protocols are hard to manipulate, but used N P-ha ..."
Abstract - Cited by 106 (23 self) - Add to MetaCart
Encouraging voters to truthfully reveal their preferences in an election has long been an important issue. Recently, computational complexity has been suggested as a means of precluding strategic behavior. Previous studies have shown that some voting protocols are hard to manipulate, but used N P-hardness as the complexity measure. Such a worst-case analysis may be an insufficient guarantee of resistance to manipulation. Indeed, we demonstrate that N P-hard manipulations may be tractable in the averagecase. For this purpose, we augment the existing theory of average-case complexity with some new concepts. In particular, we consider elections distributed with respect to junta distributions, which concentrate on hard instances. We use our techniques to prove that scoring protocols are susceptible to manipulation by coalitions, when the number of candidates is constant. 1.
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...ieves this would make the final outcome of the elections more favorable for it. Consequently, the outcome may be one that does not maximize social welfare. This problem is provably acute: it is known =-=[8, 10]-=- that, for elections with three or more candidates, in any voting protocol that is nondictatorial, 1 there are elections where an agent is better off by voting untruthfully. Fortunately, it is reasona...

Introduction to Mechanism Design (for Computer Scientists)

by Noam Nisan
"... ..."
Abstract - Cited by 104 (4 self) - Add to MetaCart
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