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37
On Designing Incentive-Compatible Routing and Forwarding Protocols in Wireless Ad-Hoc Networks --An Integrated Approach Using Game Theoretical and Cryptographic Techniques
, 2005
"... In many applications, wireless ad-hoc networks are formed by devices belonging to independent users. Therefore, a challenging problem is how to provide incentives to stimulate cooperation. In this paper, we study ad-hoc games—the routing and packet forwarding games in wireless ad-hoc networks. Unlik ..."
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Cited by 126 (12 self)
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In many applications, wireless ad-hoc networks are formed by devices belonging to independent users. Therefore, a challenging problem is how to provide incentives to stimulate cooperation. In this paper, we study ad-hoc games—the routing and packet forwarding games in wireless ad-hoc networks. Unlike previous work which focuses either on routing or on forwarding, this paper investigates both routing and forwarding. We first uncover an impossibility result—there does not exist a protocol such that following the protocol to always forward others’ traffic is a dominant action. Then we define a novel solution concept called cooperation optimal protocols. We present Corsac, a cooperation-optimal protocol consisting of a routing protocol and a forwarding protocol. The routing protocol of Corsac integrates VCG with a novel cryptographic technique to address the challenge in wireless ad-hoc networks
Random access game and medium access control design,”
- IEEE/ACM Trans. Netw.,
, 2010
"... Abstract-Motivated partially by a control-theoretic viewpoint, we propose a game-theoretic model, called random access game, for contention control. We characterize Nash equilibria of random access games, study their dynamics and propose distributed algorithms (strategy evolutions) to achieve Nash ..."
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Cited by 30 (4 self)
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Abstract-Motivated partially by a control-theoretic viewpoint, we propose a game-theoretic model, called random access game, for contention control. We characterize Nash equilibria of random access games, study their dynamics and propose distributed algorithms (strategy evolutions) to achieve Nash equilibria. This provides a general analytical framework that is capable of modelling a large class of systemwide quality of service models via the specification of per-node utility functions, in which systemwide fairness or service differentiation can be achieved in a distributed manner as long as each node executes a contention resolution algorithm that is designed to achieve the Nash equilibrium. We thus propose a novel medium access method derived from CSMA/CA according to distributed strategy update mechanism achieving the Nash equilibrium of random access game. We present a concrete medium access method, which adapts to a continuous contention measure -conditional collision probability, stabilizes the network into a steady state that achieves optimal throughput with targeted fairness (or service differentiation), and can decouple contention control from handling failed transmissions. In addition to guiding medium access control design, the random access game model also provides an analytical framework to understand equilibrium and dynamic properties of different medium access protocols.
A Game-Theoretic Study of CSMA/CA Under a Backoff Attack
- IEEE/ACM Transactions on Networking
, 2006
"... Abstract—CSMA/CA, the contention mechanism of the IEEE 802.11 DCF medium access protocol, has recently been found vul-nerable to selfish backoff attacks consisting in nonstandard config-uration of the constituent backoff scheme. Such attacks can greatly increase a selfish station’s bandwidth share a ..."
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Cited by 29 (2 self)
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Abstract—CSMA/CA, the contention mechanism of the IEEE 802.11 DCF medium access protocol, has recently been found vul-nerable to selfish backoff attacks consisting in nonstandard config-uration of the constituent backoff scheme. Such attacks can greatly increase a selfish station’s bandwidth share at the expense of honest stations applying a standard configuration. The paper investigates the distribution of bandwidth among anonymous network stations, some of which are selfish. A station’s obtained bandwidth share is regarded as a payoff in a noncooperative CSMA/CA game. Re-gardless of the IEEE 802.11 parameter setting, the payoff function is found similar to a multiplayer Prisoners ’ Dilemma; moreover, the number (though not the identities) of selfish stations can be in-ferred by observation of successful transmission attempts. Further, a repeated CSMA/CA game is defined, where a station can toggle between standard and nonstandard backoff configurations with a view of maximizing a long-term utility. It is argued that a desirable station strategy should yield a fair, Pareto efficient, and subgame perfect Nash equilibrium. One such strategy, called CRISP, is de-scribed and evaluated. Index Terms—Ad hoc LAN, game theory, MAC protocol, selfish behavior. I.
Globally optimal channel assignment for non-cooperative wireless networks
- in INFOCOM’08
, 2008
"... Abstract—Channel assignment is a very important topic in wireless networks. In this paper, we study FDMA channel assignment in a non-cooperative wireless network, where devices are selfish. Existing work on this problem has considered Nash Equilibrium (NE), which is not a very strong solution concep ..."
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Cited by 25 (15 self)
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Abstract—Channel assignment is a very important topic in wireless networks. In this paper, we study FDMA channel assignment in a non-cooperative wireless network, where devices are selfish. Existing work on this problem has considered Nash Equilibrium (NE), which is not a very strong solution concept and may not guarantee a good system-wide performance. In contrast, in this work we introduce a payment formula to ensure the existence of a Strongly Dominant Strategy Equilibrium (SDSE), a much stronger solution concept. We show that, when the system converges to a SDSE, it also achieves global optimality in terms of effective system-wide throughput. Furthermore, we extend our work to the case in which some radios have limited tunability. We show that, in this case, it is generally impossible to have a similar SDSE solution; but, with additional assumptions on the numbers of radios and the types of channels, etc., we can again achieve a SDSE solution that guarantees globally optimal effective system throughput in the entire system. Besides this extension, we also consider another extension of our strategic game, which is a repeated game that provides fairness. Finally, we evaluate our design in experiments. Our evaluations verify that the system does converge to the globally optimal channel assignment with our designed payment formula, and that the effective system-wide throughput is significantly higher than that of anarchy and Nash Equilibrium (NE). I.
An Analysis of Generalized Slotted-Aloha Protocols
"... Aloha and its slotted variation are commonly deployed Medium Access Control (MAC) protocols in environments where multiple transmitting devices compete for a medium, yet may have difficulty sensing each other’s presence (the “hidden terminal problem”). Competing 802.11 gateways, as well as most mode ..."
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Cited by 21 (0 self)
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Aloha and its slotted variation are commonly deployed Medium Access Control (MAC) protocols in environments where multiple transmitting devices compete for a medium, yet may have difficulty sensing each other’s presence (the “hidden terminal problem”). Competing 802.11 gateways, as well as most modern digital cellular systems, like GSM, are examples. This paper models and evaluates the throughput that can be achieved in a system where nodes compete for bandwidth using a generalized version of slotted-Aloha protocols. The protocol is implemented as a two-state system, where the probability that a node transmits in a given slot depends on whether the node’s prior transmission attempt was successful. Using Markov Models, we evaluate the channel utilization and fairness of these types of protocols for a variety of node objectives, including maximizing aggregate throughput of the channel, each node greedily maximizing its own throughput, and attacker nodes attempting to jam the channel. If all nodes are selfish and greedily attempt to maximize their own throughput, a situation similar to the traditional Prisoner’s Dilemma arises. Our results reveal that under heavy loads, a greedy strategy reduces the utilization, and that attackers cannot do much better than attacking during randomly selected slots. I.
Modeling and analysis of generalized slotted-Aloha MAC protocols in cooperative, competitive, and adversarial environments
- Proc. of ICDCS
, 2006
"... Aloha [1] and its slotted variant [2] are commonly deployed Medium Access Control (MAC) protocols in environments where multiple transmitting devices compete for a medium, yet may have difficulty sensing each other’s presence. This paper models and evaluates the throughput that can be achieved in a ..."
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Cited by 18 (1 self)
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Aloha [1] and its slotted variant [2] are commonly deployed Medium Access Control (MAC) protocols in environments where multiple transmitting devices compete for a medium, yet may have difficulty sensing each other’s presence. This paper models and evaluates the throughput that can be achieved in a system where nodes compete for bandwidth using a generalized version of slotted-Aloha protocols. We evaluate the channel utilization and fairness of these types of protocols for a variety of node objectives, including maximizing aggregate throughput of the channel, each node greedily maximizing its own throughput, and attacker nodes that attempt to jam the channel. If all nodes are selfish and greedily attempt to maximize their own throughputs, a situation similar to the traditional Prisoner’s Dilemma[3] arises. Our results reveal that under heavy loads, greedy strategies reduce the utilization, and that attackers cannot do much better than attacking during randomly selected slots. 1
The analysis of nash equilibria of the one-shot random-access game for wireless networks and the behavior of selfish nodes
- IEEE/ACM Trans. Netw. 2008
"... Abstract—We address the fundamental question of whether or not there exist stable operating points in a network in which selfish nodes share a common channel, and if they exist, how the nodes behave at these stable operating points. We begin with a wireless communication network in which nodes (agen ..."
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Cited by 16 (3 self)
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Abstract—We address the fundamental question of whether or not there exist stable operating points in a network in which selfish nodes share a common channel, and if they exist, how the nodes behave at these stable operating points. We begin with a wireless communication network in which nodes (agents), which might have different utility functions, contend for access on a common, wireless communication channel. We characterize this distributed multiple-access problem in terms of a one-shot random-access game, and then analyze the behavior of the nodes using the tools of game theory. We give necessary and sufficient conditions on nodes for the complete characterization of the Nash equilibria of this game for all 2. We show that all centrally controlled optimal solutions are a subset of this game theoretic solution, and almost all (w.r.t. Lebesgue measure) transmission probability assignments chosen by a central authority are supported by the game theoretic solution. We analyze the behavior of the network throughput at Nash equilibria as a function of the costs of the transmitters incurred by failed transmissions. Finally, we conclude the paper with the asymptotic analysis of the system as the number of transmitters goes to infinity. We show that the asymptotic distribution of the packet arrivals converges in distribution to a Poisson random variable, and the channel throughput converges to ( (1 +)) ln ( (1 +)) with 0 being the cost of failed transmissions. We also give the best possible bounds on the rates of convergence of the packet arrival distribution and the channel throughput. Index Terms—Channel throughput, game theory, Nash equilibrium, random access control, slotted ALOHA. I.
Contention control: A gametheoretic approach
- In Decision and Control, 2007 46th IEEE Conference on
, 2007
"... Abstract — We present a game-theoretic approach to contention control. We define a game-theoretic model, called random access game, to capture the contention/interaction among wireless nodes in wireless networks with contention-based medium access. We characterize Nash equilibria of random access ga ..."
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Cited by 15 (3 self)
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Abstract — We present a game-theoretic approach to contention control. We define a game-theoretic model, called random access game, to capture the contention/interaction among wireless nodes in wireless networks with contention-based medium access. We characterize Nash equilibria of random access games, study their dynamics and propose distributed algorithms (strategy evolutions) to achieve the Nash equilibria. This provides a general analytical framework that is capable of modelling a large class of systemwide quality of service models via the specification of per-node utility functions, in which systemwide fairness or service differentiation can be achieved in a distributed manner as long as each node executes a contention resolution algorithm that is designed to achieve the Nash equilibrium. We thus design medium access method according to distributed strategy update mechanism achieving the Nash equilibrium of random access game. In addition to guiding medium access control design, the random access game model also provides an analytical framework to understand equilibrium and dynamic properties of different medium access protocols and their interactions. I.
On adaptive-width channel allocation in non-cooperative, multi-radio wireless networks
, 2010
"... Abstract—Due to the limitation of radio spectrum resource and fast growing of wireless applications, careful channel allocation is highly needed to mitigate the performance degradation of wireless networks because of interference among different users. While most of the existing works consider alloc ..."
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Cited by 10 (6 self)
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Abstract—Due to the limitation of radio spectrum resource and fast growing of wireless applications, careful channel allocation is highly needed to mitigate the performance degradation of wireless networks because of interference among different users. While most of the existing works consider allocating fixed-width channels, combining contiguous channels may provide an alternative way to better utilize the available channels. In this paper, we study the problem of adaptive-width channel allocation from a game-theoretic point of view, in which the nodes are rational and always pursue their own objectives. We first model the problem as a strategic game, and show the existence of Nash equilibrium (NE) , when there is no exogenous factor to influence players ’ behavior. We further propose a charging scheme to influence the players ’ behavior, by which the system is guaranteed to converge to a Dominant Strategy Equilibrium (DSE), a solution concept that gives participants much stronger incentives. We show that, when the system converges to a DSE, it also achieves global optimality, in terms of system-wide throughput without starvation. Numerical results verify that with our charging scheme, the system-wide throughput obtained is higher as compared to the throughput obtained when system is in NE. I.
Evaluation of Detection Algorithms for MAC Layer Misbehavior: Theory and Experiments
- IEEE/ACM TRANSACTIONS ON NETWORKING
, 2008
"... We revisit the problem of detecting greedy behavior in the IEEE 802.11 MAC protocol by evaluating the performance of two previously proposed schemes: DOMINO and the Sequential Probability Ratio Test (SPRT). Our evaluation is carried out in four steps. We first derive a new analytical formulation of ..."
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Cited by 10 (0 self)
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We revisit the problem of detecting greedy behavior in the IEEE 802.11 MAC protocol by evaluating the performance of two previously proposed schemes: DOMINO and the Sequential Probability Ratio Test (SPRT). Our evaluation is carried out in four steps. We first derive a new analytical formulation of the SPRT that considers access to the wireless medium in discrete time slots. Then, we introduce an analytical model for DOMINO. As a third step, we evaluate the theoretical performance of SPRT and DOMINO with newly introduced metrics that take into account the repeated nature of the tests. This theoretical comparison provides two major insights into the problem: it confirms the optimality of SPRT, and motivates us to define yet another test: a nonparametric CUSUM statistic that shares the same intuition as DOMINO but gives better performance. We finalize the paper with experimental results, confirming the correctness of our theoretical analysis and validating the introduction of the new nonparametric CUSUM statistic.
