Results 1 - 10
of
324
Pay without performance: The unfulfilled promise of executive compensation.
, 2004
"... ). The book provides a detailed account of how structural flaws in corporate governance have enabled managers to influence their own pay and have produced widespread distortions in pay arrangements. The book also examines how these flaws and distortions can best be addressed. Part IV of the book di ..."
Abstract
-
Cited by 233 (6 self)
- Add to MetaCart
). The book provides a detailed account of how structural flaws in corporate governance have enabled managers to influence their own pay and have produced widespread distortions in pay arrangements. The book also examines how these flaws and distortions can best be addressed. Part IV of the book discusses how executive compensation -and corporate governance more generally -can be improved. We examine the extent to which pay arrangements can be improved by adopting board process rules, imposing shareholder approval requirements, and making pay more transparent. We conclude that problems with compensation arrangements cannot be fully addressed without ensuring that directors focus on shareholder interests and operate at arm's length from the executives whose compensation they set. To achieve this result, we argue, it is not sufficient to make directors independent of executives as recent reforms has sought to do; it is also necessary to make directors dependent on shareholders by changing the legal arrangements that insulate boards from shareholders.
Financial accounting information and corporate governance
, 2001
"... This paper reviews and proposes additional research concerning the role of publicly reported financial accounting information in the governance processes of corporations. We first discuss research on the use of financial accounting in managerial incentive plans and explore future research directions ..."
Abstract
-
Cited by 179 (5 self)
- Add to MetaCart
This paper reviews and proposes additional research concerning the role of publicly reported financial accounting information in the governance processes of corporations. We first discuss research on the use of financial accounting in managerial incentive plans and explore future research directions. We then propose that governance research be extended to explore more comprehensively the use of financial accounting information in additional corporate control mechanisms, and suggest opportunities for expanding such research. We also propose cross-country research to investigate more directly the effects of financial accounting information on economic performance through its role in
2003, International corporate governance
- Journal of Financial and Quantitative Analysis
"... We survey two generations of research on corporate governance systems around the world, concentrating on countries other than the United States. The first generation of international corporate governance research is patterned after the US research that precedes it. These studies examine individual g ..."
Abstract
-
Cited by 145 (2 self)
- Add to MetaCart
We survey two generations of research on corporate governance systems around the world, concentrating on countries other than the United States. The first generation of international corporate governance research is patterned after the US research that precedes it. These studies examine individual governance mechanisms – particularly board composition and equity ownership – in individual countries. The second generation of international corporate governance research recognizes the fundamental impact of differing legal systems on the structure and effectiveness of corporate governance and compares systems across countries. We would like to thank Orlin Dimitrov and David Offenberg for valuable research assistance. International Corporate Governance: A Survey I.
Corporate Governance and Merger Activity in the United States: Making Sense of the 1980s and 1990s
- Journal of Economic Perspectives 15:2 (Spring
"... Corporate governance in the United States changed dramatically throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Before 1980, corporate governance—meaning the mechanisms by which corporations and their managers are governed—was relatively inactive. Then, the 1980s ushered in a large wave of merger, takeover and restr ..."
Abstract
-
Cited by 104 (3 self)
- Add to MetaCart
Corporate governance in the United States changed dramatically throughout the 1980s and 1990s. Before 1980, corporate governance—meaning the mechanisms by which corporations and their managers are governed—was relatively inactive. Then, the 1980s ushered in a large wave of merger, takeover and restructuring activity. This activity was distinguished by its use of leverage and hostility. The use of leverage was so great that from 1984 to 1990, more than $500 billion of equity was retired on net, as corporations repurchased their own shares, borrowed to finance takeovers, and were taken private in leveraged buyouts. Corporate leverage increased substantially. Leveraged buyouts were extreme in this respect with debt levels typically exceeding 80 percent of total capital. The 1980s also saw the emergence of the hostile takeover and the corporate raider. Raiders like Carl Icahn and T. Boone Pickens became household names. Mitchell and Mulherin (1996) report that nearly half of all major U.S. corporations received a takeover offer in the 1980s. In addition, many firms that were not taken over restructured in response to hostile pressure to make themselves less attractive targets. In the 1990s, the pattern of corporate governance activity changed again. After a steep but brief drop in merger activity around 1990, takeovers rebounded to the levels of the 1980s. Leverage and hostility, however, declined substantially. At the same time, other corporate governance mechanisms began to play a larger role,
The state of U.S. corporate governance: What’s right and what’s wrong?, Working paper 9613, National Bureau of Economic Research
, 2003
"... The U.S. corporate governance system has recently been heavily criticized, largely as a result of failures at Enron, WorldCom, Tyco and some other prominent companies. Those failures and criticisms, in turn, have served as catalysts for legislative change (Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002) and regulatory ..."
Abstract
-
Cited by 83 (5 self)
- Add to MetaCart
The U.S. corporate governance system has recently been heavily criticized, largely as a result of failures at Enron, WorldCom, Tyco and some other prominent companies. Those failures and criticisms, in turn, have served as catalysts for legislative change (Sarbanes-Oxley Act of 2002) and regulatory change (new governance guidelines from the NYSE and NASDAQ). In this paper, we consider two questions. First, is it clear that the U.S. system has performed that poorly; is it really that bad? Second, will the changes lead to an improved U.S. corporate governance system? We first note that the broad evidence is not consistent with a failed U.S. system. The U.S. economy and stock market have performed well both on an absolute basis and relative to other countries over the past two decades. And the U.S. stock market has continued to outperform other broad indices since the scandals broke. Our interpretation of the evidence is that while parts of the U.S. corporate governance system failed under the exceptional strain of the 1990s, the overall system, which includes oversight by the public and the government, reacted quickly to address the problems. We then consider the effects that the legislative, regulatory, and market responses are likely to have in the near future. Our assessment is that they are likely to make a good system better, though there is a danger of overreacting to extreme events.
The Determinants of Board Structure at the Initial Public Offering
- Journal of Law and Economics
"... This paper describes board size and composition and investigates the role of venture capital in a sample of 1,116 IPO firms. First, venture capital-backed firms have fewer insider and instrumental directors and more independent outsiders. Second, we consider board composition as the outcome of a bar ..."
Abstract
-
Cited by 71 (1 self)
- Add to MetaCart
This paper describes board size and composition and investigates the role of venture capital in a sample of 1,116 IPO firms. First, venture capital-backed firms have fewer insider and instrumental directors and more independent outsiders. Second, we consider board composition as the outcome of a bargain between the CEO and outside shareholders. Representation of independent outsiders on the board decreases with the power of the CEO- tenure and voting control- and increases with the power of outside investors- venture capital backing and venture firm reputation. Third, within the sample of venture financed firms and also consistent with a bargaining model, the probability that a founder remains as CEO is decreasing in venture firm reputation. Finally, we examine the influence of venture capital backing and board structure on firm outcomes in the ten years after the IPO.
Financial accounting information, organizational complexity and corporate governance systems
- Journal of Accounting and Economics
, 2004
"... We posit that limited transparency of firms ’ operations to outside investors increases demands on governance systems to alleviate moral hazard problems. We investigate how ownership concentration, directors ’ and executive’s incentives, and board structure vary with: 1) earnings timeliness, and 2) ..."
Abstract
-
Cited by 63 (1 self)
- Add to MetaCart
(Show Context)
We posit that limited transparency of firms ’ operations to outside investors increases demands on governance systems to alleviate moral hazard problems. We investigate how ownership concentration, directors ’ and executive’s incentives, and board structure vary with: 1) earnings timeliness, and 2) organizational complexity measured as geographic and/or product line diversification. We find that ownership concentration, directors ’ and executives ’ equity-based incentives, and outside directors’ reputations vary inversely with earnings timeliness, and that ownership concentration, and directors’ equity-based incentives increase with firm complexity. However, board size and the percentage of inside directors do not vary significantly with earnings timeliness or firm complexity.
Financial expertise of directors
, 2007
"... We analyze how directors with financial expertise affect corporate decisions. Using a novel panel data set, we find that financial experts exert significant influence, though not necessarily in the interest of shareholders. When commercial bankers join boards, external funding increases and investme ..."
Abstract
-
Cited by 51 (3 self)
- Add to MetaCart
We analyze how directors with financial expertise affect corporate decisions. Using a novel panel data set, we find that financial experts exert significant influence, though not necessarily in the interest of shareholders. When commercial bankers join boards, external funding increases and investment-cash flow sensitivity decreases. However, the increased financing flows to firms with good credit but poor investment opportunities. Similarly, investment bankers on boards are associated with larger bond issues but worse acquisitions. We find little evidence that financial experts affect compensation policy. The results suggest that mandating financial expertise on boards may not benefit shareholders if conflicting interests (e.g., bank profits) are neglected.
2009. Differences in governance practices between U.S. and foreign firms: Measurement, causes, and consequences. Review of Financial Studies
"... We construct a firm-level governance index that increases with minority shareholder protection. Compared with U.S. matching firms, only 12.68 % of foreign firms have a higher index. The value of foreign firms falls as their index decreases relative to the index of matching U.S. firms. Our results su ..."
Abstract
-
Cited by 41 (2 self)
- Add to MetaCart
We construct a firm-level governance index that increases with minority shareholder protection. Compared with U.S. matching firms, only 12.68 % of foreign firms have a higher index. The value of foreign firms falls as their index decreases relative to the index of matching U.S. firms. Our results suggest that lower country-level investor protection and other country characteristics make it suboptimal for foreign firms to invest as much in governance as U.S. firms do. Overall, we find that minority shareholders benefit from governance improvements and do so partly at the expense of controlling shareholders.