We examine how investor sentiment affects the cross-section of stock returns. Theory predicts that a broad wave of sentiment will disproportionately affect stocks whose valuations are highly subjective and are difficult to arbitrage. We test this prediction by studying how the cross-section of subsequent stock returns varies with proxies for beginning-of-period investor sentiment. When sentiment is low, subsequent returns are relatively high on smaller stocks, high volatility stocks, unprofitable stocks, non-dividend-paying stocks, extreme-growth stocks, and distressed stocks, consistent with an initial underpricing of these stocks. When sentiment is high, on the other hand, these patterns attenuate or fully reverse. The results are consistent with predictions and appear unlikely to reflect an alternative explanation based on compensation for systematic risk.

Given the cross-sectional and temporal variation in their liquidity, emerging equity markets provide an ideal setting to examine the impact of liquidity on expected returns. Our main liquidity measure is a transformation of the proportion of zero daily firm returns, averaged over the month. We find that it significantly predicts future returns, whereas alternative measures such as turnover do not. Consistent with liquidity being a priced factor, unexpected liquidity shocks are positively correlated with contemporaneous return shocks and negatively correlated with shocks to the dividend yield. We consider a simple asset pricing model with liquidity and the market portfolio as risk factors and transaction costs that are proportional to liquidity. The model differentiates between integrated and segmented countries and time periods. Our results suggest that local market liquidity is an important driver of expected returns in emerging markets, and that the liberalization process has not fully eliminated its impact.

We develop a theory in which the decision to pay dividends is driven by investor demand. Managers cater to investors by paying dividends when investors put a stock price premium on payers and not paying when investors prefer nonpayers. To test this prediction, we construct four time series measures of the investor demand for dividend payers. By each measure, nonpayers initiate dividends when demand for payers is high. By some measures, payers omit dividends when demand is low. Further analysis confirms that the results are better explained by the catering theory than other theories of dividends.

We model the relationship between asset float (tradeable shares) and speculative bubbles. Investors trade a stock with limited float because of insider lock-ups. They have heterogeneous beliefs due to overconfidence and face short-sales constraints. A bubble arises as price overweighs optimists’ beliefs and investors anticipate the option to resell to those with even higher valuations. The bubble’s size depends on float as investors anticipate an increase in float with lock-up expirations and speculate over the degree of insider selling. Consistent with the internet experience, the bubble, turnover and volatility decrease with float and prices drop on the lock-up expiration date.

, respectively. Over the last twenty years, the field of behavioral finance has grown from a startup operation into a mature enterprise, with well-developed bodies of both theory and empirical evidence. On the empirical side, the benchmark null hypothesis is that one should not be able to forecast a stock’s return with anything other than measures of its riskiness, such as its beta; this hypothesis embodies the familiar idea that any other form of predictability would represent a profitable trading rule and hence a free lunch to investors. Yet in a striking rejection of this null, a large catalog of variables with no apparent connection to risk have been shown to forecast stock returns, both in the time series and the cross-section. Many of these results have been replicated in a variety of samples and have stood up sufficiently well that they are generally considered to be established facts. One prominent set of patterns from the cross-section has to do with medium-term momentum and post-earnings drift in returns. These describe the tendency for stocks that have had unusually high past returns or good earnings news to continue to deliver relatively strong returns over the subsequent six to twelve months (and vice-versa for

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Research in behavioral corporate finance takes two distinct approaches. The first emphasizes that investors are less than fully rational. It views managerial financing and investment decisions as rational responses to securities market mispricing. The second approach emphasizes that managers are less than fully rational. It studies the effect of nonstandard preferences and judgmental biases on managerial decisions. This survey reviews the theory, empirical challenges, and current evidence pertaining to each approach. Overall, the behavioral approaches help to explain a number of important financing and investment patterns. The survey closes with a list of open questions.

Alberta, for their comments.

We assess the impact of stock touting via unsolicited email upon the stocks’ trading activity, and sketch how profitable spamming might be for those who manipulate stocks via spam as well as how harmful it is to those who might heed advice in stock-touting e-mails. We suggest that the profitability of spammed stock touting calls for adjustments to securities regulation models that rely principally on the proper labeling of information and disclosure of conflicts of interest in order to protect consumers. Based on a large sample of touted stocks listed on the Pink Sheets quotation system, we find that stocks experience a significantly positive return on days when they are heavily touted via spam, and on the day preceding such touting. Volume of trading also responds positively and significantly to heavy touting. Indeed, on a day when no tout has been detected in our database, the likelihood of a touted stock being the most actively traded stock that day is only 6%. On the other hand, on days when there is touting activity, the probability of a

Many studies find that aggregate managerial decision variables, such as aggregate equity issuance, predict stock or bond market returns. Recent research argues that these findings may be driven by an aggregate time-series version of Schultz’s (2003, Journal of Finance 58, 483–517) pseudo market-timing bias. Using standard simulation techniques, we find that the bias is much too small to account for the observed predictive power of the equity share in new issues, corporate investment plans, insider trading, dividend initiations, or the maturity of corporate debt issues. EQUITY MARKET TIMING IS THE TENDENCY OF FIRMS to issue equity before low equity market returns. In contrast, pseudo market timing, as recently defined by Schultz (2003), is the tendency of firms to issue equity following high returns. In small samples, pseudo market timing can give the appearance of genuine market timing. Consider an extreme example of pure pseudo market timing with only two returns. If the first return is high, equity issues rise; if the first return is low, equity issues fall. The first return can be mechanically explained